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Abstract 
 
The relationship between the body and the self raises a number of questions in 
psychology, philosophy and neuroscience. What is the body for the self? Is the self embodied or 
is something completely mental? Does the body guarantee personal identity? Of course, the 
self is a multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low-level bodily representations, 
and higher level attitudes and beliefs. For instance, the “physical self ” is referred to the body 
ownership and bodily self recognition. On the other hand, the “interpersonal self” represents 
the attention or intentions of others directed at the self, for instance when a person notices that 
he or she is being looked at (Sugiura, 2013). Recently, some evidence have suggested that both 
bodily self representation and social, interpersonal representation of the self are malleable and  
linked, showing a mutual influence (Maister et al., 2015). When we experience an illusion over 
a body different from our own, this can change aspects of our self identity and the way in which 
the self is conceptualized, which, in turn, may change the way in which we interact with other 
people (Banakou et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013; Yee & Bailenson, 2007). This evidence reveals 
the social valence of body representation, and the intimate relationship between basic, body 
perceptual representations and the complex mechanisms underlying our everyday social 
interactions.  
The importance of one’s own body representation in social interaction, can be due to the 
elaborate system of visual signals that the social interaction itself requires. Indeed, being gazed 
upon is an important social cue and representing one’s own body as a visible entity to outside 
observer, may play a key role during social interactions. The first two studies of the thesis, 
presented in the Chapters II and III, investigate the social cognitive consequences of having an 
invisible body. The power of being invisible has captured the imagination of writers and 
philosophers for millennia and it is clear that the idea of invisibility has a strong intuitive 
psychological meaning. In particular, the study presented in Chapter II demonstrates that the 
illusion of having an invisible body modulates the interpersonal space. The interpersonal space 
refers to the distance that people maintain between each other during a social interaction and 
into which intrusions by others may cause discomfort (Hall, 1966; Hayduck, 1983). Results 
show that the experience of invisibility, induces a specific contraction of the interpersonal 
space, without affecting the perceived reaching-space around the body. Thus, these results 
support a close relationship between interpersonal space and the conscious representation of 
the body external appearance.  The study in Chapter III shows that the experience of 
invisibility affects also the perception of gaze direction itself. When people notice that they are 
being looked at, they become aware that the attention of another person is directed at them. 
This awareness is fundamental during social interactions and it is  distinct from the awareness 
of one’s own physical body because it requires the existence of another person (Sugiura, 2013). 
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Humans are very accurate in determining the gaze direction of others. However, although gaze 
direction can be perceived very accurately in general, observers are prone to assume mutual 
gaze when another person is looking roughly into the direction of their own face. Crucially, 
results from the study in Chapter III show that the illusion of having an invisible face affects 
gaze perception, reducing the expectation that the gaze is directed toward them. 
The last two chapters (Chapter IV and  V) focus more in depth on the difference 
between interpersonal and peripersonal space and their relationship with the body appearance 
and the body schema. In the neurocognitive domain, the peripersonal space is a functional 
representation of the space near the body, conceptualized as a sensorimotor interface for the 
body to act on nearby objects (di Pellegrino & Làdavas, 2015). Crucially, peripersonal space is 
modulated by, and relies on, morphological and sensorimotor body representation. This 
sensorimotor representation of the body morphology has been termed body schema, and it is 
concerned with tracking and updating the positions and configuration of body parts in space 
(Martel et al., 2016). The study presented in Chapter IV shows that a change in body height 
reveals a dissociation between interpersonal and peripersonal space. In particular, the illusion 
of having a tall body reduced the interpersonal space, but, at the same,  extended the perceived 
peripersonal space.  On the other hand, the illusion of having a short body extended the social 
interpersonal space, leaving the peripersonal space intact. Body size, indeed, has been related 
to interpersonal dominance in a variety of social settings (Stulp et al.,2015). At the same time, 
a change of body height affects also the sensorimotor representation of the arm length, i.e. the 
body schema. Thus, given this double valence of the body size, a change in body height is 
effective to reveal a dissociation in the representation of the  space around the body, depending 
on whether this sector of space is used for programming actions or for regulating social dyadic 
interaction. Finally the study in Chapter V focuses more in depth on the notion of body 
schema, trying to figure out which is the exact variable that determinates its extent. In 
particular, I hypothesize that  body schema and peripersonal space extent depend on the sense 
of agency, that is the sense of controlling one’s own motor acts and, through them, the events 
in the external environment.   
Taken together these data contribute to the emerging field of research on embodied 
cognition that suggests the existence of a causal link between central body representations and 
more social and cognitive aspects of the self. In particular, I argue that the self can be 
conceptualized as a layer structure. In this hierarchical layered structure each level is highly 
dynamic and extremely plastic. Moreover, there may be also cross-layer dynamics that operate 
along different categories of the self.  
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Chapter 1 
From the body in the mind to the mind in the body 
 
This chapter introduces key concepts and gives a theoretical frame for my researches. In 
the first session, I briefly explain how the brain represents the bodily self.  One of the main 
arguments of this session is that body representation relies on processing multisensory 
information from the space immediately surrounding the body (i.e. the peripersonal space). 
Indeed, several researchers have demonstrated that, manipulating multisensory cues in the 
space immediately around the body, it is possible to induce an illusory ownership over a fake 
or virtual body parts or whole bodies. Thus, in the first session, I explore how the brain creates 
the experience of having a body located in space. I refer to this session as “the body in the 
mind".   
In the second part, I provide evidence that a change in one’s own body representation,  can 
induce a change in more conceptual and psychological  representations of the self, affecting 
social cognition and behaviour. Thus, in the second session I show that changing body changes 
mind. I refer to this session as “the mind in the body”. 
 
1. The body in the mind 
 
I thought to myself: “Well, here I am sitting on a folding chair, staring through a piece of plate 
glass at my own brain … But wait,” I said to myself, “shouldn’t I have thought, ‘Here I am, 
suspended in a bubbling fluid, being stared at by my own eyes’?” I tried to think this latter 
thought. I tried to project it into the tank, offering it hopefully to my brain, but I failed to carry off 
the exercise with any conviction. I tried again. “Here am I, Daniel Dennett, suspended in a 
bubbling fluid, being stared at by my own eyes.” No, it just didn’t work 
Daniel Dennett (1978) 
 
1.1. The concept of body ownership and its relation to multisensory integration 
 
The feeling that conscious experiences are grounded to the self and are bound to a 
unitary entity (“I”), is often considered one of the most amazing features of the human mind. 
The body is the point from which we perceive the world: we perceive the world from the 
perspective of our body. The body is also the medium with which we interact with external 
world. So, in some sense, the self  is first and foremost our body. Thus, one of the approach to 
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investigate self-consciousness has been to study how the brain process bodily signals and 
create the experience of a physical self in space, that is the bodily self consciousness (Blanke et 
al., 2015). One of the fundamental dimension of the bodily self is the sense of body 
ownership. The term body ownership, indeed, refers to special perceptual status of one’s own 
body, in virtue of which one is aware of one’s own body as one’s own. There has been a growing 
consensus in the cognitive neuroscience that the perception of one’s own body in space 
critically depends on multisensory integration (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, 2010). 
Information from different sensory signals (such as visual, vestibular, and auditory signals) 
reach cortical convergence zones in the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes, where the 
integration of these body signals occurs (Angelaki & Cullen, 2008; Avillac et al., 2007; 
Graziano & Botvinick, 2002; Graziano & Cooke, 2006; Hagura, et al., 2007; Pouget et al., 
2002). Researchers have suggested that multisensory integration of bodily inputs within the 
space immediately surrounding the body is a key component of bodily self consciousness. 
Therefore, numerous experimental paradigms used several multisensory stimulations as 
means for studying and altering the experience of body ownership.  
        The Rubber hand illusion (RHI) is one of the most common experimental paradigm 
for manipulating the feeling of body ownership. In brief, participants’ real hand is kept out of 
view, while a realistic life-sized rubber hand is placed in front of them. The experimenter uses 
two small paintbrush to synchronously stroke the rubber hand and the participant’s real hand 
(Figure 1.1). After a short period of stroking, the majority of participants report perceiving the 
touch as if coming from the rubber hand and the latter as being part of their own body 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This illusion does not occur when the rubber hand is stroked 
asynchronously. One behavioural correlate of the rubber hand illusion is a change in the 
perceived location of one’s own hand, the so called proprioceptive drift. In particular, 
participants are asked to point blindly to the position of their left hand. Crucially, they give 
proprioceptive estimations that are shifted toward the rubber hand compared to their 
estimations before the stimulation. Interestingly, the subjective intensity of the experience of 
body ownership is positively correlated with changes in the felt location (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Apart from proprioceptive drift, a 
further test is to induce an emotional response in participants by simulating an injury to the 
fake hand. This emotional response can be measured by recording  changes in the conductance 
of the skin (skin conductance response, SCR). Thus, when the rubber hand is threaten with a 
knife (Ehrsson et al., 2008; Petkova and Ehrsson,2009) or one of its finger is bent backward 
(Armel & Ramachandran, 2003), the SCR enhances significantly in comparison to the 
appropriate control conditions.  Another evidence of the illusion is obtained by measuring the 
skin temperature. Indeed, during the illusion, the  real hand’s temperature drops by 0.27°. 
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Importantly, the extent of the temperature drop is correlated with the strength of the illusion 
(Moseley et al., 2008)  
 
                                             
Figure 1.1 The classical setting of the rubber hand illusion. The participant’s hidden hand are synchronously 
stroked by the experimenter. Image from Braun et al.(2018) 
 
As mentioned before, the RHI reflects the malleability of the representation of the body caused 
by multisensory processing. Multisensory processing aims at the integration of sensory signals 
and the resolution of potential conflicts to generate a coherent representation of the world and 
the body. The RHI reflects an interaction between vision and touch. However, the intermodal 
matching between vision and touch is not a sufficient factor for limb ownership. Multisensory 
integration of bodily signals, indeed, relies on additional constraints, such as proprioceptive, 
anatomical and spatial constraints (Blanke et al., 2015). When the rubber hand is positioned in 
an anatomically implausible posture, the rubber hand illusion is abolished (Figure 1.2A; 
proprioceptive constraint; Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). The illusion is 
also significantly diminished when participants are stroked on their right hand and see a left 
rather than right fake hand. (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Given this anatomical constraint, 
the illusion does not work with objects that do not resemble a human hand at all, such as a 
stick or wooden objects [Figure 1.2B ; body related visual information constraint (Tsakiris et 
al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005)]. Moreover, no illusory hand ownership is induced if the 
rubber hand is presented far outside the space surrounding the hand (Figure 1.2 C; spatial 
constraint; Lloyd, 2007).  These observations fit well with the idea that the multisensory 
integration responsible for body ownership operates on representations of near-personal 
space. Sensory inputs, originally processed in sensory-dependent coordinates (e.g., visual 
stimuli in eye-centered, auditory stimuli in head-centered, tactile stimuli in skin-centered 
reference frames),  are realigned and integrated into a common reference frame. 
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Figure 1.2. Fundamental constraints of the hand ownership. No change in the bodily self representation occurs if the 
fake hand is placed in a non-matching body posture (A: prorpioceptive constraint). No change in body ownership 
occurs for an object with a non-bodily shape (B: body related visual information constraint), or if the rubber hand is 
placed  outside  the near space of the real hand (C: spatial constraint). A change in body ownership is obtained if the 
real hand and the artificial hand receive synchronous visuotactile stimulation (D: rubber hand illusion). Note that, in 
normal conditions, all multisensory constraints are present, leading to a normal sense of body ownership (E). Red or 
green body of the participant indicate, respectively, absence or presence of body ownership for the hand. Adapted 
from Blanke et al., 2015   
 
The common reference frame of multisensory perception is the subject’s body, and the 
transformation involves processing and integration of additional proprioceptive and vestibular 
inputs signalling the location of a tactile cue on the body in space and visual inputs related to 
the configuration of the body in space. Therefore, the system of areas integrating information 
from the body and from the space surrounding the body, binding visual, tactile, proprioceptive 
and other multisensory signals, could be the good candidate for the neural substrate of body 
ownership.  
Thus, in the next paragraph, I will focus on a set of neurons, bimodal and multimodal neurons, 
located in the posterior parietal cortex and premotor cortex, highlighting  their proprieties 
related to body ownership and multisensory bodily perception. The key feature of bimodal 
neurons is that they respond not only to stimuli in one modality, such as tactile cues, but also 
to visual, or auditory signals in the space immediately surrounding the body: the so-called 
peripersonal space. 
13 
 
1.2. Neural basis of the bodily self  
 
   1.2.1 Body part ownership 
 
The existence of multisensory body-centred neurons has been revealed at first by 
electrophysiological research in the macaque monkeys, within a network of interconnected 
sensorimotor areas, such as the parietal and frontal premotor cortices. The key feature of 
multisensory neurons is that they respond not only to stimuli in one modality, such as tactile 
cues, but also to visual, auditory and proprioceptive signals (see di Pellegrino and Ladavas for 
review). These neurons are mainly located, in the macaque monkey, in the inferior aspect of 
the premotor cortex (area 6), particularly its caudal portion (i.e. the histochemical area F4 
where proximal arm movements respond to tactile stimulation; Matelli et al., 1985). Also 
posterior parietal lobe, particularly areas 7b and VIP, heavily linked to the F4 region,  harbours 
bimodal and trimodal neurons. These fronto-parietal areas are strongly interconnected, and 
they project, directly or indirectly, to the cortico-spinal tracts, forming a fronto-parietal 
multisensory-motor network supporting sensory-motor functions (Rizzolatti et al., 1997, 2002; 
Colby,1998; Grefkes and Fink, 2005).  
Compared to tactile receptive field in S1, F4 neurons are characterized by relatively large tactile 
receptive fields covering an entire hand/arm, the head and the neck, as if to form a broad map 
of the body (Rizzolatti et al.,1981). A large portion of neurons in area F4 are bimodal, 
discharging in response to both tactile and visual stimuli. Specifically, unlike classical visual 
neurons, F4 neurons respond poorly to visual stimuli far from the body, whereas they are 
effectively triggered by three dimensional objects moving close to the tactile receptive field 
(Gentilucci et al., 1983,1988; Rizzolatti et al.,1981). Some of such neurons respond only to 
stimuli very close to the body surface, up to 10 cm away from the body (the so called 
pericutaneous neurons), while others respond also to stimuli located further away, but always 
within the animal’s reaching (the so called distance peripersonal neurons).  The visual and 
tactile receptive fields are in spatial register with one another, so that F4 neurons form a single 
responsive region mapping the bodily surface and the space immediately adjacent to it. The 
interaction between different receptive fields is not limited to visuo-tactile information, since 
F4 neurons integrate also auditory information, indicating that premotor area F4 creates a 
multimodal representation of the near space (Graziano e al., 1999). Most bimodal neuron in 
area 7b have even larger tactile receptive field and may cover the arm, the head and the trunk 
and sometimes even the whole body bilaterally, showing a crude somatotopic organization.  
Most of the cells in 7b respond preferentially to visual stimuli moving toward the skin, 
within about 10 cm of the tactile receptive fields, although stimuli presented further away, but 
still within a reachable distance, are also effective (Leinonen et al., 1979, 1980; Leinonen and 
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Nyman, 1979; Hyva¨rinen, 1981; Graziano  and Gross, 1995). The ventral intraparietal areas 
(area VIP), located in the fundus of the intraparietal sulcus contains mainly visual and visuo-
tactile neurons. Unlike area 7b neurons, in most VIP neurons the tactile receptive fields are 
usually centred  on the head and their visual receptive fields are anchored to the region of 
space around the face (Colby et al., 1993). Moreover, some VIP neurons are trimodal, 
responding to visual, auditory and tactile stimuli, with the three different receptive fields 
usually aligned (Schlack et al., 2003). It has been suggested that the area VIP is involved in the 
construction of a multisensory, head-centred representation of near space.  
More relevant for present purposes, an important characteristic of these neurons is that 
they also integrate proprioceptive and sometimes vestibular signals to anchor their 
multisensory receptive field to different body parts  (see Fig. 1.3). Thus, the receptive fields of 
these neurons are independent of eye movements remaining in the same position regardless of 
gaze deviation (Graziano et al., 1994). This is demonstrated by the fact that passive or active 
displacement of a body part to which the tactile receptive filed is anchored, e.g., the arm, 
causes a shift in the location of the visual or auditory receptive field from the initial spatial 
position to its new location (Graziano et al., 1994) 
In a well known research, Graziano,(1999) recorded the activity of ventral premotor cortex 
(vPMc) neurons of a monkey, showing that such neurons responded to visual objects presented 
near a fake arm, placed in a realistic posture. In this study, a fake monkey arm was placed 
above a barrier that occluded the monkey’s real arm, while the monkey saw a visual stimuli 
that approached the fake arm.  The responses of the bimodal neurons were modulated by the 
seen position of the fake arm. That is, the visual receptive fields of these neuron shifted toward 
the position of the fake hand. Moreover when the fake hand moved, the visual receptive fields 
also moved in the same direction, even though the monkey’s real arm was stationary.  
Similar visuo-proprioceptive coding was found also in parietal area 5. In another  study, 
Graziano and colleagues (2000)  selected  only neurons whose response depended on the 
position of the real arm but not of the fake arm. Authors tested neural responses before and 
after a synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation similar to the rubber hand illusion (i.e. the 
experimenter stroked synchronously with a paintbrush the fake hand and the monkey’s real 
hand). Crucially, after the synchronous stimulation the neuron become sensitive to the 
position of the fake arm, a coding which was absent before visuo-tactile stimulation.  
Moreover, these neurons were not sensitive to the sight of unrealistic substitute for arm and 
were able to distinguish a right from a left arm.  Thus, these results are consistent with the 
proprioceptive and body related visual constrains highlighted by behavioural studies in 
humans using the rubber hand illusion.  
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Figure 1.3 Visual responses of a typical premotor neuron with a tactile RF the forearm and hand, and a visual RF 
within 10 cm of the tactile RF. (A) On each trial, the arm contralateral to the neuron was fixed in one of two positions 
and the visual stimulus was advanced along one of four trajectories (1–4). For this neuron, the two arm positions were 
chosen to align the visual RF near the hand and forearm with trajectories 2 and 3. For other neurons, the arm was 
moved to different extents depending on the location of the visual RF, to better capture the movement of the visual RF 
with the arm. (B) Responses of the neuron to the four stimulus trajectories when the arm was visible to the monkey. 
When the arm was fixed on the right, the response was maximum at position 3. When the arm was fixed on the left, the 
maximum response moved to the left, to position 2. (C) Responses of the neuron when the arm was covered. The 
movement of the visual RF with the arm was reduced but not eliminated, indicating that the neuron combined both 
proprioceptive and visual information about the position of the arm. Each point is a mean of 10 trials. Error bars are 
standard error. From Graziano, 1999 
 
Human imaging studies, indeed, suggest that a similar system for multisensory 
integration also exist in the human brain. Makin et al., 2007 showed that regions across the 
posterior intraparietal parietal sulcus, (IPS) the lateral occipital cortex (LOC) and the premotor 
cortex (PMc) were activated more strongly when a  ball approached the participant’s hand. 
Critically the greater activation for near ball was lost when the hand was retracted, indicating 
that these regions represent visual stimuli with respect to hand position. Moreover in these 
areas selective responses to objects in near space was abolished  when the hand was occluded 
from view. However, when a dummy hand was placed in a natural position near the objects, 
these areas responded again, irrespective of the position of participant’s real hand. This result 
was obtained although participants reported that they did not sense an illusion of ownership 
over the dummy hand.  Thus the mere presence of the dummy hand in front of the retracted 
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subject’s hand modulated the preference for a near stimulus in the posterior IPS and the LOC, 
indicating that the response of these areas is based primarily on visual information about hand 
position, regardless of information from proprioception. This conclusion nicely accord with the 
activity recorded in the macaque ventral PMc, modulated by the seen position of the fake hand.  
In contrast, Makin et al. (2007) found that the anterior part of IPS was characterized by 
converging proprioceptive and visual information of the hand. This area indeed responded 
only in the real hand condition, in particular when the real hand was occluded from view. 
Thus, human anterior IPS showed peri-hand proprieties similar to those reported in single 
unit studies in macaque area 5, whose neurons responded to the fake hand only after a 
visuotactile stimulation to induce ownership for the fake arm (Graziano et al., 2000).    
Another study showed that these regions of the brain process not only signals that are on or 
close to the hand, but they also integrate multisensory stimuli delivered within the arm-
centred peripersonal space (Gentile et al., 2011). Participants, in the scanner, gazed at their 
hand, while unimodal tactile stimulation, unimodal visual stimulation and bimodal (visuo-
tactile) stimulation were presented on the hand and in the space immediately surrounding the 
hand. Areas in posterior and inferior parietal cortex and PMc showed an additive response to 
bimodal as compared to unimodal stimulation. Other regions in the anterior IPS dorsal PMc, 
insula and putamen showed non-linear, supper additive response during multisensory visuo-
tactile stimulation, thus nicely matching the neurophysiological data on multisensory 
integration in non human primates. Moreover, in a subsequent study from the same laboratory 
(Gentile et al., 2013), authors joined tactile stimulation of the participant’s hand with the visual 
presentation of a virtual hand while manipulating spatial and temporal synchrony.  Activation 
in IPS, ventral and dorsal PMc, in LOC and in the cerebellum depended on spatial and 
temporal congruence of the visual and tactile signals. Furthermore, visuo–tactile integration 
requires congruency between the seen and felt orientations of the hand, indicating that 
multisensory integration in the peripersonal space of the hand requires congruent visual and 
proprioceptive information from the hand, again in close accord with results in animals.  
Thus, neuroimaging studies in humans highlight a network of premotor and parietal 
areas associated with the integration of visuotatctile information occurring within the hand  
peripersonal space, depending on the aforementioned constrains of the body ownership (i.e. 
prorpioceptive, anatomical and spatial constrains). Further neuroimaging studies linked this 
periperosonal hand centred system to arm and hand ownership. 
 A greater activation was found, during the rubber hand illusion,  in the ventral PMc and the 
left intraparietal cortex as compared to control conditions in which temporal asynchrony or 
spatial incongruency was introduced [(Ehrsson et al., 2004), Fig. 1.4]. The intraparietal cortex 
was sensitive to both the orientation of the rubber hand and the synchrony of the visual and 
tactile stimuli. The level of activity in this area during the illusion condition reflected a 
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summation of the effects of temporal and spatial congruency. Moreover, the vPMC showed a 
response even more specific to the illusion. In particular, the degree of activity in vPMC 
correlated with the strength of the illusion, as measured by subjective reports in a 
questionnaire.  
 
                                          
Figure 1.4. fRMI activations in multisensory area during the rubber hand illusion. The top panel shows the position of 
the participant in the scanner. Activity is seen in both the intraparietal sulcus (middle panel) and the ventral part of 
the premotor cortex (lower panel). From Ehrsson, 2012 
More recently, fRMI adaptation was used to investigate whether, similarly to findings in 
monkeys (Graziano and Gross, 1995), regions in IPS and PMc remap the peripersonal space of 
the hand when the hand is moved in space, that is to say whether also in the human brain, 
peripersonal space is coded in hand centred reference frames (Brozzoli et al., 2012). In line 
with previous studies, neural populations in human intraparietal, premotor and inferor 
parietal cortices showed adaptation effect when the stimulus was presented near the hand and, 
crucially, the effect followed the hand when it was moved across two positions in space. In 
addition, by using the rubber hand illusion, authors revealed the link between the encoding of 
the hand peripersonal space and the perception of the hand with respect to its location and 
identity. In particular, during the rubber hand, the peri-hand space remapped onto the 
location of the rubber hand when the rubber hand was perceived as one’s own. Also, the 
presentation of an object near the fake hand led to a stronger BOLD response in the premotor, 
posterior parietal and putaminal regions after the synchronous compared to asynchronous 
stimulations. Results, moreover, indicated that the adaptation responses in the left ventral 
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PMc correlated with the subjective feeling of ownership of the seen limb, whereas adaptation 
responses in the posterior parietal cortex correlated with the proprioceptive drift toward the 
hand, i.e., with changes in the position sense of the arm. This is in line with the 
neurophysiological function of posterior parietal cortex in updating the position of the body 
parts in space and in planning of manual actions. As mentioned before, neurons in area 5 of 
the macaque encode the arm position by integrating visual and proprioceptive signals. Thus, 
the posterior parietal cortex could play a role in creating, as authors said,  a “proprioceptive 
skeleton into which selective visual response can be grounded” ( Brozzoli et al., 2012; 2014)     
Taken together, these human neuroimaging studies highlight two main regions (PMC 
and PPC), within a larger network of cortical areas (including insula, primary somatosensory 
cortex, LOC and cerebellum), involved in  multisensory integration in arm centred coordinates. 
Human PMC and IPS integrate multisensory stimuli within the hand peripersonal space, based 
on the spatial and temporal laws of multisensory perception. This is consistent with the 
neurophysiological data in PMC and area 5 in non-human primates. These data point towards 
the idea that tuning properties of bi- or tri-modal neurons, mapping the peri-hand space, in 
the PMC-IPS network (Graziano et al., 1999, 2000; see also Makin et al., 2008) define 
ownership for one’s own hand, or for an its replacement (i.e. the rubber hand), by integrating 
multiple hand-related signals within the peripersonal space, on the basis of proprioceptive and 
visual constraints.  
1.2.2 Self identification and self location: the full body illusion 
 
So far in this chapter, I have only considered cases in which subjects experience changes 
in the ownership of a single limb. However, beyond ownership of a limb, the same principles of 
multisensory integration have been used to probe questions of full body ownership. For 
instance, Ehrsson’s research team developed a body swap illusion in which participants feel 
ownership for an entire artificial body (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). In this illusion, participants 
wear a set of  head-mounted displays (HMDs), connected to two cameras which are attached to 
a life-sized mannequin and positioned so that they are looking down on the mannequin’s body. 
Thus, when participants wear the HMDs and look down, they see the mannequin’s body where 
they expect to see their own body. Similar to the rubber hand, to induce the illusion the 
experimenter touches simultaneously the participant’s belly, out of view, and the  mannequin’s 
belly, in full view of the participant. This procedure creates in participants the illusion of 
owning the mannequin’s body (See Fig. 1.5A). This effect is quantified with questionnaires and 
with the skin conductance responses when the participants observed a knife cutting the belly of 
the mannequin. Importantly, this illusion, just like the rubber hand illusion, seems to conform 
to the multisensory principles above described. Asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, 
replacement of the mannequin by a block of wood, or presentation of the mannequin 2 m in 
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front of the participant, which is outside the peripersonal space, were all conditions that 
eliminated or strongly reduced the illusion (Petkova et al., 2011b).  
                                                      
               
Figure 1.5. Eliciting illusions of entire bodies. (A) The mannequin illusion (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) and the 
participant’s perspective in this illusion. (B) The out-of-body-illusion (Ehrsson, 2007) and what the participants see. The 
participants are wearing a set of head mounted displays connected to two video cameras placed on the mannequin’s 
head (A), a tripod 1.5 m behind the participant (B). Synchronous somatic and visual events are provided by touches 
applied to the mannequin’s belly and the participant’s belly (A), the participant’s chest and the “chest” of the “illusory 
body”. Adapted from Ehrsson, 2012  
 
Visuo-tactile stimulation can produce also an “out of body illusion”  (Ehrsson, 2007). 
Participants seat on a chair and  wear an HMDs connected to two cameras placed about 2 m 
behind them. Thus, participants see themselves from the point of view of the cameras, i.e. with 
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the perspective of a person sitting behind them. To induce the illusion, the experimenter used 
two plastic rod to touch the person’s actual chest, which is out of view, while simultaneously 
moved another rod in the location just below the camera The visual impressions of a hand 
approaching a point below the cameras and the touch felt on the chest, led the participants to 
experience the illusion of being located 2 m behind their real body (See Fig. 1.5B).  
Thus it seems that multisensory stimulation involving larger part of the body, such as the trunk 
region, leads to alteration of more global aspect of bodily self, like self identification and self 
location. Another systematic change in self location have been induced by Blanke’s research 
team (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Usually, in these paradigms  participants view the back of 
their bodies filmed from a distance of 2 m and projected onto an HMD (Fig. 1.6) 2 meters in 
front of them.   
                  
 
                                    
                      
Figure 1.6. (A) Participant (dark blue trousers) see through a HMD his own virtual body (light blue trousers) in 3D, 
standing 2 m in front of him and being stroked synchronously or asynchronously at the participant’s back. (B) virtual 
fake body (light red trousers) or (C) a virtual noncorporeal object (light gray) being stroked synchronously or 
asynchronously at the back. Dark colors indicate the actual location of the physical body or object, whereas light 
colors represent the virtual body or object seen on the HMD. From Lenggenhager et al., 2007 
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The experimenter strokes the participant’s back, thus the  participants feel the stocking on 
their back and see  the back of  the virtual body being touched two meters in front.  
Crucially, participants report that they feel the touch at the position where they see the virtual 
body rather than on their back. When exposed to this full body illusion, participants identified 
themselves with the virtual body and show a forward drift in self location toward the position 
of the virtual body. Also in this case, the illusion does not work if the touches between the 
participant’s back and the virtual back are asynchronous and if the virtual body is replaced 
with an object. 
In the previous paragraph we suggested that changes in hand ownership involve 
changes and shifts in the spatial characteristics of hand centred multimodal neurons in human 
parietal or PMC areas. Analogously, it’s possible to imagine that the full-body illusions rely on 
similar neurophysiological tuning changes for trunk, especially in areas VIP or area 7b. Thus, 
the visuotactile stroking described for the arm and trunk and affecting bodily ownership, 
change the neural responses of multimodal neurons, resulting in a shift or enlargement of their 
visual receptive fields, so that they also encode the seen fake hand or body. Bodily illusions, 
implementing specific spatio-temporal conflicts in multisensory signals, might alter the 
standard constraints typically ruling multisensory integration of bodily inputs, thus re-shaping 
peripersonal representation and inducing specific and predicted changes in body ownership. 
However, although the mechanisms of multisensory integration at the trunk level are similar to 
those in circumscribed body part, there are important differences. Indeed, multisensory 
perception of stimuli at the trunk encompasses large parts of the body, or the entire body, thus 
involving more global aspects of the bodily self. Incidentally, this difference is reflected also in 
tactile proprieties: since the size of the tactile receptive fields is small at finger/hand and large 
at the trunk, the tactile spatial resolution at the fingers and hand is very high, whereas it is very 
low for the trunk (Iwamura, 1998; Graziano and Gandhi, 2000). Moreover, illusory shift  in the 
perceived self location can be induced also for an artificial body presented farther away, 
outside the peripersonal space. Thus, it has been recently proposed that neural processes of 
global aspects of bodily self, related to the trunk, are fundamental for self identification and 
self location and are partially different from those encoding body ownership for circumscribed 
body parts (Blanke et al., 2015). Only global aspects of the bodily self lead to the experience of 
being located within a particular portion of space (self-location) and to identify with that 
portion of space. In everyday life, our position in space coincides with our physical body (self-
identification), where our peripersonal space representation is centred. However, if 
multisensory bodily inputs are manipulated, using specific conflicts under specific constraints, 
it is possible to induce states of body ownership for other objects or spatial locations, reshaping 
the periepersonal space representation and altering self-identification and self-location.  
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      Petkova et al., (2011a) combined the body swap illusion with fRMI, showing that the 
posterior parietal cortex  and the ventral premotor cortex were more active when tactile 
information applied to the participant’s belly was spatially and temporally congruent with 
tactile stimulation seen on the virtual body. Greater activation in such areas was found when 
the artificial body was presented in a similar location and orientation as the participant’s real 
body as compared to when the body was lying directly opposite the participant. Moreover, the 
same areas were also activated during illusory ownership for a virtual hand, but these 
activations were stronger when the hand was visually perceived as part of the virtual body, as 
compared to when the hand was presented in isolation, detached from the body. These results 
thus suggest that the integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information in body-
part-centered reference frames represents a basic neural mechanism underlying the feeling of 
ownership of entire bodies. Importantly, a sub-region of the left vPMc was constantly activated 
when illusory ownership for the virtual body was evoked after synchronous visuotactile 
stimulation, independently of whether the hand or the abdomen was stimulated. Thus, activity 
in left vPMC reflects ownership generalized to the entire body, integrating multisensory 
information across body parts. This type of multisensory integration could be implemented by 
neurons with large visual, tactile and proprioceptive receptive fields extending over multiple 
body segments. This idea was further supported by a subsequent study, in which three 
anatomically different body segments (hand, abdomen and leg) were stimulated to induce a 
full body illusion over a virtual body (Gentile et al., 2015). Crucially, also in this case patterns 
of neural activity in vPMc reflected the integration of visual and tactile signals that were 
associated with the feeling of ownership over the entire body, regardless of the body segment 
that received the multisensory stimulation. On the other hand, other portions of the ventral 
PMC, IPS, LOC and putamen showed more selective responses for synchronous visuo-tactile 
stimulation of specific body parts.   
Thus, neural populations in the vPMc contain visuotactile receptive field that encompass 
multiple body segments, mediating the construction of a multisensory whole-body percept. 
These results are again in line with the electrophysiological recordings in non human primates 
that showed neurons containing multisensory receptive field sufficiently large to encompass 
multiple body segments or the entire body surface. These neuronal populations are pivotal to 
the construction of a whole body percept via the integration of multisensory information 
across multiple body segment.  
These last two studies manipulated the sense of ownership for the virtual body, but didn’t 
modify the perceived location of the self in space. As mentioned before, some bodily illusions 
can also alter the perceived location of the self in space. In a study by Ionta et al. (2011), 
participants felt touch on their back while viewing videos of a virtual body being touched on its 
back. Participants reported a feeling that their body shifted from the space occupied by their 
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physical body to a spatial location closer to where they saw the virtual body and some 
participants reported also a sense of ownership for the virtual body. Thus, differently from the 
body swap illusion, this illusion has also been shown to induces change in self location, which 
were found to be associated to an activity in the left and right TPJ and the middle inferior 
temporal cortex. No activations related to body ownership were observed in PMC and IPS. 
Interestingly, in this study changes in self-location were associated also to changes in the 
experienced direction of participants’ first-person perspective. In particular, some  participants 
experienced looking upward toward the virtual body (up-looking first-person perspective), and 
other participants experienced looking down on the virtual body (down-looking first-person 
perspective). Crucially, the modulation of the TPJ activity varied as a function of how 
participants felt themselves to be located and orientated with respect to the virtual body. 
Participants who felt themselves to be looking upwards at the virtual body (up-group), 
estimated self-location as higher and TPJ activity was lower during synchronous compared 
with asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation. Participants who felt themselves at a lower 
location and to be looking downwards, the estimated self-location was lower and TPJ activity 
was higher during synchronous compared with asynchronous stimulation. Thus TPJ activity 
reflects self location and the direction of the first person perspective. The TPJ is an important 
multisensory area, integrating inputs from the tactile, proprioceptive and visual systems, and, 
critically, from the vestibular system (Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Lopez & Blanke, 2011; Lopez et al., 
2008). Clinical, neurophysiological and neuroimaging data about the TPJ strongly support the 
involvement of this area in self-location and perception of the world from a perspective 
originating from one’s position in space. A subsequent study (Ionta et al., 2013), used the 
functional connectivity analysis and showed that during the shift in self location there was a 
strength in the connection between right and left TPJ and  supplementary motor area, ventral 
premotor cortex, insula, intraparietal sulcus and occipitotemporal cortex. In particular,  the 
functional connectivity between right TPJ and right insula had the highest selectivity for 
changes in self-location and first-person perspective.  The involvement of the insula in bodily 
self consciousness and self-location is in line with the prominent involvement of the insula 
neurons in processing bodily multisensory signals including vestibular signals (Indovina et al., 
2005; Mazzola et al., 2014). The insula is also the primary region processing interoceptive 
signals (Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004). A PET study by Tsakiris et al. (2007), for instance, 
suggests that the insula also underpins bodily self-consciousness during the RHI because 
activation of the right insula was positively correlated with the strength of the RHI. To this 
regard, a recent study has shown that interoceptive awareness, measured by a heartbeat 
detection task, is negatively correlated with the intensity of the RHI. Subjects with higher 
interoceptive awareness were less prone to experience the illusion.  
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Finally, in another study, Guterstam, et al.,(2015) used the body-swap illusion with different 
visual viewpoints from where the mannequin’s body and the room were seen. Thus, 
participants experienced illusory self-location at different places in the scanner room, 
depending on the mannequin’s viewpoint. Activity patterns in the hippocampus and the 
posterior cingulate, retrosplenial, and intraparietal cortices reflected the sense of self-location, 
whereas the sense of body ownership was associated with premotor-intraparietal activity.  
The functional interplay between these two sets of areas was mediated by the posterior 
cingulate cortex, suggesting that this area has a key role in integrating the neural 
representations of self location and body ownership . 
To sum up, neuroimaging studies in humans suggest that body ownership involves a 
network of multisensory brain areas in the posterior parietal cortex (IPS/VIP region) and 
PMC. These areas in IPS and PMC, contain bimodal and trimodal neurons underlying 
peripersonal space representation. They  are widely connected with  temporo-occipital regions 
(LOC; processing high-level visual and multisensory information related to the body), the 
insular cortex (processing interoceptive bodily signals), and with more lateral regions at the 
TPJ, including posterior insula and parietal operculum (receiving important projections from 
the vestibular system). Trunk centred multisensory neurons contain neurons with a large 
receptive fields anchored to large body regions, encompassing the right or left hemi-body, the 
upper or lower body half, or in some cases the entire body. Multisensory neural process related 
to the trunk is fundamental for self identification and self location. In particular, the key 
regions for self-identification are within the PMC-IPS network, whereas key areas for self 
location are located in more lateral temporo-parietal regions, encompassing parietal 
operculum, supramarginal gyrus, posterior superior temporal gyrus, and posterior insula, 
(Ionta et al., 2011, 2013), as well as posterior cingulate cortex (Guterstam et al., 2015). 
 
1.3 Peripersonal space as the space of the bodily self: from body ownership to 
body schema 
 
It has been shown in the previous paragraphs that bodily illusions rely on processing 
sensory information from the space immediately surrounding the body, the peripersonal 
space, which is a particularly important spatial component of the bodily self. Peripersonal 
space neurons encode the position of the body in space. Also behavioural studies showed that 
their receptive fields can shift or enlarge during a change in one’s own body representation.  
One of the best known paradigms that is used to behaviourally investigate multisensory  
integration in the peripersonal space, is the cross-modal congruency task (Spence et al., 1998;  
Spence et al., 2004; Spence and Driver 2004; Shore et al.,2006; Macaluso and Maravita, 2010; 
Costantini et al., 2017). This is a discrimination task in which people are required to respond as 
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quickly as possible to tactile targets on different digits while they try to ignore irrelevant visual 
distractors presented to these digits, either on a congruent finger or on an incongruent one. 
The overall effect is that participants are normally significantly slower and less accurate at 
discriminating tactile targets when the visual target is presented near to an incongruent finger, 
rather than to a congruent finger. The difference in performance between incongruent and 
congruent trials, known as Cross-modal Congruency Effect (CCE), is thus a measure of the 
amount of the crossmodal visuotactile interaction occurring in the space near the hand 
(Spence et al., 1998, Spence et al. 2004). Crucially, when the real hand is hidden by an 
occluding screen and the visual distractors are presented near the digits of the rubber hands in 
full view, CCE is still present (Pavani et al., 2000;  Zopf et al., 2010). O the contrary, this effect 
is absent when the rubber hand is placed in a posture incompatible with the actual posture of 
participant’s hand (Pavani et al., 2000). Importantly, the degree of this cross-congruency 
effect is correlated to the subjective strength of owning the rubber hand  (Pavani et al., 2000) 
and it is greater following a period of synchronous visuotactile stimulation to induce illusory 
ownership for the rubber hand  (Zopf et al., 2010). This provides objective evidence that the 
multisensory integration in space surrounding artificial limbs is modulated by the feeling of 
ownership, as if the peripersonal space was being defined with respect to the rubber hand.  
  Another behavioural paradigm to assess multisensory integration in the perieprsonal 
space is the Audio-tactile interaction task (Canzoneri etal., 2012; Canzoneri et al., 2013; Serino 
et al., 2007). In this paradigm, authors measured the reaction time to a tactile stimulus at the 
finger of the right hand, while a dynamic sound was presented, giving the impression of a 
sound source either approaching or receding from the participant’s hand.  Tactile stimulation 
was delivered at different temporal delays from the onset of the sound, such that it occurred 
when the sound source was perceived at varying distances from the body. Subjects were asked 
to respond as rapidly as possible to the tactile stimulation, trying to ignore the sound. 
The rationale of the task is that stimuli from different sensory modalities interact more 
effectively with one another when presented within the same spatial representation. It was 
found that the moving auditory stimulus speeded up the processing of a tactile stimulus at the 
hand when it was perceived within a limited distance from the hand. Thus, authors were able 
to mark the region within which approaching auditory stimuli facilitated the detection of the 
tactile stimulus, i.e., what the authors called the boundaries of peripersonal space. Crucially, 
more recently, Noel et al., (2015), combined the audio-tactile interaction task with the full 
body illusion in which participants see a virtual body 2 m in front of them. Authors measured 
the peripersonal space boundaries while participants were exposed to a synchronous visuo-
tactile stroking to induce the illusion. Peripersonal space was found to extend in the front-
space toward the position of virtual body. The opposite effect was found in the back space, in 
which peripersonal space boundaries was contracted. Thus, these data indicate that the 
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remapping of peripersonal space mirrored the induced changes in body ownership and further 
confirm that trunk-centred, whole body peripersonal space, is strictly connected to the 
perceived location of the self in space.  
Thus, multisensory integration for the body occurs, under normal conditions, within the 
peirpersonal space , however a bodily illusion can alter the boundaries of multisensory bodily 
integration, reshaping the peripersonal space and inducing body ownership for an artificial 
body (Blanke et al., 2015). 
But which is the exact function of the periperosnal space ? Why does the brain construct 
multiple, body part-centred representations of the space around us? In monkeys, electrical 
stimulation of neurons in F4 or VIP area results in arm or head movements (Cooke et al., 
2003; Graziano et al., 2002). In humans, studies using single pulse TMS have shown that 
auditory or visual stimuli presented within peripersonal space transiently modulated the 
excitability of the hand representation in the primary motor cortex as compared to stimuli 
presented in the extrapersonal space (Avenanti et al., 2012; Serino et al., 2009). For this 
reason, the peripersonal space has been conceptualized as a multisensory motor interface, 
which serve to encode the location of nearby sensory stimuli to generate suitable motor acts. 
This interpretation fits well with the data presented so far. As recalled in the second paragraph, 
peripersonal space neurons in the fronto-parietal areas project, directly or indirectly, to the 
cortico-spinal tracts, forming a fronto-parietal multisensory-motor network supporting 
sensory-motor functions. Moreover, the evidences reviewed until now, showed that 
peripersonal space neurons provide information about the position of the body or body parts 
in space, constructing a “proprioceptive skeleton  onto which selective visual responses can be 
grounded” (Brozzoli et al., 2014). Importantly, the visual receptive fields of these neurons 
remain anchored to the observer’s body parts. This is a fundamental function for planning 
actions. In order to perform even simple actions, indeed,  the motor system needs to compute 
the position of the visual stimulus relative to the head, hand or both. Thus, the peripersonal 
space, being centred on a specific body part, serves to encode the arm position in the same 
coordinates used for nearby objects. This facilitates object-direct actions and provides an 
effective mechanism to guide actions directed at objects within reaching distances. It remains 
unclear if motor proprieties of peripersonal space may primarily subserve goal directed, 
approaching and appetitive actions, such as grasping an objects, or involuntary defensive 
reactions in response to threats, although it has been proposed that these two hypothesis are  
not mutual exclusive (Brozzoli et al., 2014).    
The finding of a tight link between  peripersonal space and the sense of position of the 
body in space, provide evidence for a strict connection between peripersonal space 
representation and the so-called “body schema”. The term body schema refers to a highly 
plastic representation of the body parts, in term of posture, shape and size, that the brain uses 
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to execute or plan body movements. This sensorimotor representation entails tracking and 
updating the position and configuration of the body parts in space at the service of action. 
There is a common agreement in considering the body schema an implicit representation that 
usually does not enter into awareness. Thus, body schema is essentially sensorimotor in 
nature.   
Crucially, because these space and body representations are strictly linked with the motor 
system, both peripersonal space and body schema are sensitive to  action-dependent 
manipulations. An intriguing characteristic, indeed, of both body schema and peripersonal 
space is that they are extremely plastic. Over the last decades, for instance, several studies, 
from non humans primates to healthy humans, have documented that tool use could modify  
peripersonal space and body schema representations (di Pellegrino & Làdavas, 2015; Maravita 
& Iriki, 2004). The general idea is that a visual stimulus in far space, when repeatedly reached 
with a tool, starts to be processed as if it is near to the body. In other words, by tool use it is 
possible to functionally remap space so that “far becomes near” (Berti & Frassinetti, 2000). 
The first, extremely influential, study has been conducted by Iriki et al. (1996) on macaques 
monkeys. Monkeys were trained to use a rake to retrieve food placed outside the reaching 
distance, thus extending the animals’ reaching distance. Authors recorded activity from 
bimodal visuo-tactile neurons in the intraparietal cortex, before and after the use of the tool.  
Crucially, after the monkey had performed food retival with the rake, the visual receptive field 
of bimodal neurons expanded to include the entire length of the tool. This was true for both 
distal neurons, with a visual field immediately surrounding the hand, and “proximal” neurons, 
with a tactile receptive field  centred on the shoulder and visual receptive field covering the 
space reached by the arm. After tool use, these latter proximal visual receptive fields expanded 
to code space now accessible with the rake (Figure 1.7).  
In healthy humans,  the effect of tool use in far space has been investigated trough the 
aforementioned cross modal congruency task. These studies have shown that the active tool-
use increase the salience or effectiveness of visual stimuli presented at the tip of the tool. An 
extension of peripersonal space after tool use was also found by using the aforementioned  
Audio-tactile interaction task. Serino et al. (2007) showed that such plastic changes in PPS are 
associated with the expertise for specific tools. In this study, authors investigated the audio-
tactile interaction in the space around the hand before and after, healthy participants used a 
blind cane to explore the environment. Crucially, auditory peripersonal space extended 
towards far space after an active use of the cane.  As expected, when the same participants 
were tested the following day, the previously extended periepersonal space, shrank back to its 
original dimension. While in healthy participants active training was required to induce such 
extension, in blind people, who would use the cane in everyday life, auditory peripersonal 
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space immediately extended towards the cane tip as soon as they hold their cane, even without 
any active use of the tool.  
                         
                        
Figure 1.7 Changes in bimodal receptive field properties following tool-use. The somatosensory receptive fields of 
cells in this region were identified by light touches, passive manipulation of joints or active hand-use. The visual 
receptive field was defined as the area in which cellular responses were evoked by visual probes (the most effective 
ones being those moving towards the somatosensory receptive fiedl. (a) somatosensory receptive fiels (blue area) of 
the ‘distal type’ bimodal neurons and their visual receptive field (pink areas) (b) before tool-use, (c) immediately after 
too-luse, and (d) when just passively grabbing the rake. (e) somatosensory receptive field (blue area) of ‘proximal 
type’ bimodal neurons, and their visual receptive field (pink areas) (f) before and (g) immediately after tool-use. From 
Maravita and Iriki, 2007 
        
Besides changing in peiripersonal space, tool use, as mentioned before, induce changes 
also in the body representation, i.e., the body schema, increasing the length of the 
sensorimotor representation of the arm. Cardinali et al. (2009) reported, for the first time, an 
increased length of the arm representation after tool use. Authors measured the participant’s 
free hand kinematic before and after the active use of a tool. Crucially after  tool use, the 
movement kinematics were drastically modified: participants showed longer latencies and a 
reduced maximal amplitude in their reaching movement, resulting in a longer movement time. 
These outcomes are consistent with an increased length of the arm representation: in other 
words, participants literally acted as if they had a longer arm after tool use. Such changes, 
moreover, did not occur for the grasping component of the movements, but were limited to the 
transport phase, suggesting a modification of the representation of the forearm but not of the 
hand.       
Subsequent studies confirmed these data, giving abundant evidence that the active use of a 
tool, to interact with object placed beyond one’s reaching space, modulates body schema extent 
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(Canzoneri et al., 2013; Cardinali et al., 2011; Sposito et al., 2012). Body schema has been 
found to be sensitive also to other action dependent manipulations.  For instance, Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., (2012), found that body schema is modulated by the sound of one’s own action. 
Body schema extended after participants tapped on a surface and listened to a tapping sound 
originating at a double the distance at which they actually tapped. In terms of its neural 
underpinnings, the few available studies suggest that the body schema depends mainly on the 
activity in the somatosensory cortices, posterior parietal cortex, intra parietal sulcus. In 
particular, the tool use has been associated with activity in the frontoparietal cortices (Gallivan 
et al. 2013; Jacobs et al., 2010), especially the superior parietal lobule (SPL; Di Russo et al., 
2006), and the left intraparietal sulcus [IPS; (Tomasino et al 2012; Valyear et al., 2007)], or 
the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), which is known to integrate visual and somatosensory 
information (Inoue et al., 2001). It’s worth to notice that the activity in posterior parietal 
cortex correlated also with the proprioceptive drift after the rubber hand illusion (Brozzoli et 
al.,2012), suggesting that this area is crucial for updating the positions and the configuration of 
the body parts in space.  
Crucially, it seems that changes in body ownership and changes in body schema rely, at 
least in part, on a similar neural mechanism, that is the multisensory integration in the space 
immediately near the body. However, as mentioned before, body schema is an implicit, 
unconscious representation of the body and it is strongly modulated according to the 
possibility to act in space. In stark contrast, the sense of body ownership depends on a series of 
additional constraints, such as the body related visual information constraint. Indeed, it seems 
difficult to feel ownership over non hand shaped tools (Tsakiris et al., 2010; de Vignemont & 
Farné, 2010). Therefore, bodily illusions, like the rubber hand or the full body illusion, not only 
could modify  the perceived location of the body or body parts in space, i.e. body schema, but 
induce changes also in a more conscious representation of the body external appearance, that 
is, the explicit body image (de Vignemont et al., 2010; Kammers et al., 2009; Longo et al., 
2010; Dijkenrman & De Haan, 2007) . The term body image refers to a representation of the 
body, mainly used for perception of the bodily itself, primary based on vision. The body image 
represents the way in which the body appears to its owner but also to outside observers. There 
is a common agreement that this kind of body representation is not involved in action, but 
plays a key role in emotional and social processing (Gallagher, 2006). In the next chapter, 
indeed, I describe researches that showed how a change in one’s own body ownership can 
update some aspects of one’s own self identity and, in turn, induces changes in our 
interpersonal attitudes. Self representations, indeed, are essential not only for the self-
awareness, but also for the relationship between self and others.  
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2. The mind in the body 
 
“ Socrates famously urged his followers to ‘know thyself ’. 
 Modern psychology suggests this is much easier said than done” 
Amodio and Frith (2006) 
2.1 How many selves? 
 
So far, I focused mainly on the representation of the bodily self without an explicit 
reference to others component of the self or to social processes. The self, indeed, is a 
multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low level, bodily representation and higher 
level attitudes and beliefs. A comprehensive review of the debate concerning the different 
components of the  “self” is beyond the scope of this chapter, however one of the common 
distinction in the literature is that between physical and mental aspects of self (Uddin et al., 
2007; Lieberman, 2007; Gillihan and Farah, 2005). As it was shown in the previous part of the 
present chapter, the fronto-parietal system is involved in representing the physical and 
embodied self.  On the other hand, parallel lines of research, inspired by social-psychological 
constructs, have individuated in  the dorsal and ventro medial prefrontal cortex, an 
instantiation of more social and psychological aspects of the mental self. These networks seem 
to overlap with areas that comprise the “default mode” network and show an increased activity 
in tasks that require self referential processing (Wicker et al., 2001), such as self referential 
judgement (Gusnard et al., 2001), self appraisal (Ochsner et al.,2005), and judgments of 
personality traits (Lou et al., 2004; Kelley et al.,2002).  Thus, while the frontoparietal system is 
involved in representing the bodily self, the cortical midline structure that comprise the default 
mode network seems to be more involved in representing the self in terms of mental states or 
non physical aspects.  A similar distinction was proposed by Sugiura (2013). He suggested at 
least three categories of self, based on neuroimaging findings. The “physical self ” that is 
referred to the body ownership and bodily self recognition. It is mainly supported by the 
sensory and motor areas located primarily in the parietal and premotor cortices in the right 
hemisphere. The “interpersonal self”, which represents the attention or intentions of other 
directed at the self, for instance when a person notices that he or she is being looked at. The 
interpersonal self is implemented in several amodal association areas in the dorsomedial 
frontal and lateral posterior cortices. Finally, the “social self” that represents the self as a 
collection of context-dependent social-values and it is supported by the ventral regions of the 
medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex. Thus, the mental representation of 
the self is a complex construct, containing both perceptual information (such as information 
regarding the physical appearance of the body, e.g., facial appearance) and conceptual 
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information, which is composed of varied semantic and episodic knowledge relevant to the 
self. However some evidence suggested that both conceptual self representation and bodily self 
representation are malleable and that these different aspects of the self are linked.   
Crucially, several recent researches have shown that when we have an illusion over a body 
different to our own this can change aspects of our self identity and the way in which the self is 
conceptualized, which, in turn, may change the way in which we interact with other people. In 
the first paragraph of this sessions, I show how a change in one’s own body representation can 
induce a change in more conceptual representations of the self, from the mere body image to 
more abstract, psychological representation of the self.  
In the second paragraph, I illustrate how these changes in bodily self alter not only more 
conceptutal representation of the self, but also social behaviour and the social processing of 
others.   
2.2 Changing body, changes self 
 
As mentioned before, the mental representation of the self contains both perceptual 
information, regarding the physical appearance of the body, and conceptual information, 
composed of varied semantic and episodic knowledge relevant to the self. Thus, a first step in 
demonstrating that changes in body ownership can elicit changes in the way in which the self is 
conceptualized, was to demonstrate that the mental representation of our body is not only 
derived from stable mnemonic representation, but instead is susceptible to the current 
multisensory visuotactile stimulation. 
One of most prolific approach was to investigate  the extent to which multisensory stimulation 
may influence self-other boundaries. To this aim, beyond ownership over body parts, other 
studies used multisensory visuotactile stimulation to induce similar changes in the 
representation of one’s own face. Now, one’s face is the body part  that most characterizes self 
appearance, and recognition of one’s face, as distinctive from others’, is a fundamental 
component of self awareness and self identity. Recently, various research group (Paladino et 
al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; 2014; Tsakiris, 2008), used 
multisensory visuotactile stimulation to study the plasticity of self face representation, showing 
that self face representation can be updated to include another person’s facial features, which 
in turn can tem1porary impair self face recognition. This effect has been called Enfacement.  
In the enfacement illusion, participants are stroked on their face, while they are looking 
another face being touched in synchrony and in corresponding positions, a procedure that 
authors termed interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS). Crucially, when participants 
performed a self recognition task  before and after IMS, results showed that synchronized 
multisensory stimulation had a significant effect on self-face recognition. Participants not only 
perceived the other face as more physically similar to their own after synchronous IMS, but 
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they are also affected in their ability to discriminate between their own and the other’s face 
(Tsakiris, 2008). In a  psychophysical visual discrimination task, participants were shown 
manipulated images of their own face morphed with varying percentages of  another person’s 
face. Participants were required to report whether the face looked more like their own face, or 
more like the other’s face (see Figure 1.8). Crucially after synchronous, but not asynchronous, 
IMS participants accepted larger percentage of other face’s features as their own face (Sforza et 
al., 2010).  
The changes in perceived physical similarity between self and other in the enfacement illusion, 
suggested that participants’ visual representations of their own and another’s body had 
become partially overlapped, or shared. Thus, our body image is not a static mnemonic 
representation, but it is extremely dynamic and it can be updated by the interpersonal 
multisensory stimulation.     
 
 
Figure 1.8 (A) shows the morphing procedure and the direction of morphing (from ‘‘self to other’’ or from ‘‘other to 
self’’). (B)Participants, and the experimental set-up during the visuo-tactile stimulation. From Tsakiris, 2008 
 
 
The enfacement not only changes the perceived physical similarity between self and other, but 
also revealed a clear affective component. Participants perceived the other to be more 
trustworthy and attractive after synchronous IMS (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012). Paladino et 
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al. (2010),  for instance, showed that, following the enfacement illusion, participants rated the 
other as conceptually closer to themselves, and also attributed to them more self-like 
personality traits.  
Thus, enfacement illusion does not only tend to blur boundaries of body representation of self 
and others, but also blur self-other conceptual boundaries. Bernhard Hommel’s research team 
called this latter effect “feature migration”. In two recent studies, indeed, these authors 
demonstrated that enfacement promotes features migration in terms of emotional states and 
intelligence from the representation of other to the representation of oneself. In particular, Ma 
and collegues (2016) demonstrated that “enfacing a smile makes you happy”. In this study, 
authors created a virtual version of the enfacement illusion in which participants can control 
the movements of a face presented on a pc screen. Crucially, when participants 
enfaced/perceived ownership for a smiling face, they showed a better mood, as explicitly 
assessed by questionnaires and a better performance in a mood-sensitive brainstorming 
creativity task,  which gave a more implicit measure of participant’s mood. Thus, increasing 
self-other similarity allows also affective features to “migrate” from the representation of the 
other to the representation of oneself. Authors explained this effect with the theory of event 
coding (TEC). According to this theory, people represent themselves and others just like other 
perceptual events, that is “in terms of integrated networks of sensorimotor feature codes 
(event files: Hommel, 2004) representing all discriminable features an event or person 
consists of, such as physical attributes, affective responses, control states, and covert and 
overt actions associated with a given event.” (Ma et al., 2016).  An important implication of 
TEC is that the more features are shared by different events (i.e., the more they are similar and 
the more their representations overlap), the more they can be related to, compared with, or 
confused with each other. This allows salient feature codes that are activated by (and thus 
actually represent) one event to become part of, and shape the representation of another event 
they actually do not belong to. In other words, being confronted with multiple perceptual 
events can lead to ‘‘illusionary conjunctions”, bindings of features actually representing 
different events into one event file especially if the events share other features. Thus, 
experiencing a virtual happy face as being part of oneself caused participants to confuse their 
own features and states with the features and states of the virtual face to the extent that 
affective features of the virtual face became assimilated with participants’ self representation.  
These results were strengthen by a subsequent study from the same group of research (Ma et 
al., 2018) in which authors investigated whether enfacing members of another species would 
induce self–other assimilation (and features migration). Participants were presented with a 
virtual human face moving in or out of sync with their own face, and then morphed it into an 
ape face. Participants tended to perceive the ape face as their own in the synchronous 
condition. Crucially, ownership for the ape face reduced the performance in a fluid intelligent 
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task and increased the willingness to attribute emotion to apes. Thus, also in this case 
increasing the overlap between the self and the other representation promotes illusory 
conjunctions, in which features of the other become features of oneself. 
The evidence that a change in one’s own body representation can lead to a change in 
other higher order representation of self, has been revealed also in the context of the full body 
illusion. A notable study showed that when participants embodied an avatar representing a 
4year old child resulted in a bias towards associating the self with child like compared to adult 
like categorizations, as measured using an implicit association test (Banakou et al., 2013). In 
particular, authors used immersive virtual reality to embody adults participants as a 4 year old 
child, and as an adult body scaled to the same height. Crucially  they found that  there was an 
overestimation of the sizes of objects compared with a non embodied baseline, which was 
significantly greater for the child condition compared with the short adult condition.  
Moreover, the implicit association test showed that participants who embodied  the children, 
resulted in significantly faster reaction times for the classification of self with child-like 
compared with adult-like attributes. These results did not occur in the asynchronous 
conditions and, crucially,  the size estimation and the implicit association test results were 
influenced by the extent of the illusion of body ownership. This finding suggest that a correlate 
of a full body illusion is that the type of body carries with it a set of temporary changes in 
perception and attitudes that are appropriate to that type of body.   
It was explained in the first session that  our body representation depends on a multisensory 
integration in the peripersonal space. According to this, it seems that when multisensory data 
generates an illusory change in the body structure, then the neural network underlying the 
bodily-self representations maintains the homeostatic and psychological integrity of the body 
to conform with the changed body. These results suggest the intriguing possibility that this 
even extends to perceptual processing and implicit attitudes.  
So far, I have considered only those researches that showed a change in the way in 
which the self is conceptualized, due to a bodily manipulation, however it remains unclear 
whether this link is bidirectional, that is: can a change in more conceptual representations lead 
to changes in the bodily self representation? There is some evidence suggesting that the 
converse relationship is also true. Thus, a bidirectional link may exist. Farmer et al. (2013), for 
instance, report an experiment in which the manipulated trustworthiness of an unfamiliar 
individual impacted upon perceived similarity between the participant’s face and the 
unfamiliar face. Participants played a trust game with two unfamiliar individuals whose faces 
were shown on screen. One of the individuals was trustworthy, while the other always betrayed 
the participant’s trust. Before and after the game, participants performed a self-other 
discrimination task using morphed faces, to measure the perceived similarity between their 
own face and the faces of both player. Crucially, following the trust game, participants 
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perceived their face to be more similar to the trustworthy individual than to untrustworthy 
player.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that exists a bidirectional relationship between 
the conceptual and bodily self representation. Thus, it’s possible to hypothesize that a change 
in low level perceptual representation creates conflicts with more abstract, higher order 
representations of oneself and of others (or viceversa). This, in turn, induces an update in the 
attitudes and beliefs about one’s self, ensuring that the consistency within the multimodal self-
representation is maintained. In the next paragraph, I will show how these transformations in 
multimodal self representations change social cognition and our behaviour in turn.  
 
2.2 The Proteus effect: changing self identity, changes behaviour 
 
In the previous paragraph it was shown that experiencing ownership for a body 
different to our own body, can change also higher order, conceptual self representation. The 
changes in perceived physical similarity between self and other was a crucial finding as it 
suggested that participant’s visual representations of their own and other’s body had become 
partially overlapped, or shared. Given the putative role of shared body representations in 
socio-cognitive processing, the important next step was to investigate how the changes in body 
representation induced by multisensory integration can affect social cognition. In essence, as 
we change our self representation, do our self representations change our social cognition and 
behaviours in turn? The first step toward this direction was to investigate whether an increase 
in perceived physical self resemblance may also increase resonance with an outgroup. In one of 
the first study to assess this possibility, Maister et al., (2013) measured participants’ implicit 
racial attitudes before and after they experienced a rubber hand illusion of a different racial 
group. In particular, light skinned Caucasian participants, performed a skin colour implicit 
association test to assess their implicit attitudes towards people with dark skin. Participants 
were then subjected to a session of visuotactile stimulation to induce a  sense of ownership for 
a dark skinned rubber hand, before their implicit racial bias was again measured. Results 
showed that participants experienced the other-race hand as their own and body ownership 
occurred regardless of their implicit attitudes towards that race. Importantly, participants 
decreased significantly their negative implicit attitudes towards dark skin, which correlated 
with the strength of ownership experienced over the other-race hand. The more intense the 
participants’ illusion of ownership over the dark-skinned rubber hand, more their implicit 
racial bias decreased.  
These results were confirmed using immersive virtual reality setup (Peck et al., 2013).  
Immersive virtual reality provide a powerful tool for potentially changing the form of 
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participants’ body. The participants wore an head tracked head mounted display and  they saw 
a programmed virtual body  substituting their own real body (see Figure 1.9). 
 
                                 
Figure 1.9  The virtual body and scenario in Peck et al. 2013. (a) The light-skinned virtual body (EL) as seen in the 
mirror. (b) The dark-skinned virtual body (ED) in the mirror and directly. (c) The purple-skinned body (EA) as seen in 
the mirror. (d) A dark-skinned virtual character walks by – the first person viewpoint and corresponding view in the 
mirror for the ED condition. (e) A participant wearing the HMD and body tracking suit. From Peck et al.(2013) 
 
 They could also see this body when looking at their (geometrically correct) reflection in a 
virtual mirror. Additionally, participants wore a body-tracking suit that provides real-time 
motion capture. So as they moved their real body they watched their virtual body moved 
synchronously. By embodying participants in bodies of different skin colours, authors aimed to 
determine whether it is possible to induce a body-ownership illusion in a differently raced 
avatar, and whether the body-ownership illusion could reduce negative implicit responses 
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toward that other race. Crucially, also in this case the embodiment of light skinned people in a 
dark skinned virtual body reduced their implicit racial bias as measured by a racial implicit 
association test. To control for the effect of mere perceptual difference between the body of the 
avatar and participants’ actual bodies, in another condition, participants embodied a purple-
skinned body, but this condition did not produce any changes in racial bias even though the 
subjective illusion of body ownership was strong and not significantly different from 
embodiment of the light- or dark-skinned bodies.  
These findings suggest that an increase in overlap between self and other, induced by a change 
in body representation, was able to alter the perceived boundaries between in-group and out-
group to modulate high-level social attitudes. Changes in body-representation may therefore 
constitute a core dimension that in turn changes social cognition processes. Thus, a change in 
the perception of a purely bodily aspect of the self, such as the ownership of one’s hand or 
one’s own body, alters not only a higher level concept of the self (Banakou et al., 2013), but also 
the social processing of others (Maister et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013). 
Apart these studies that investigated a generic positive or negative associations with the 
embodied social group, other researchers examined directly how one’s self representation 
changes our behaviour. Yee & Bailenson, (2007), started out with the idea that, in virtual 
environments, the avatar that we embodied  is not simply a uniform that is worn, the avatar is 
our entire self representation. Thus, they expected that our avatars have a significant impact 
on how we behave. People may adhere to a new identity that is inferred from their avatars. 
Users in virtual environments may conform to the expectations and stereotypes of the identity 
of their avatars. Or more precisely, they conform to the behaviour that they believe others 
would expect them to have. Yee and Bainsolon (2007), termed this phenomenon the “Proteus 
Effect”, from the Greek god Proteus that is notable for being the origin of the adjective 
“protean”, i.e. the ability to take on many different self representation. In their original study, 
authors manipulated the attractiveness of the participants’ virtual body, so that participants 
were assigned to have an attractive avatar or unattractive avatar. Participants were asked to 
walk closer to a confederate and to introduce themselves. Crucially, participants in the more 
attractive conditions, were willing to move closer to the confederate and disclosed more 
information to the confederate than participants in the unattractive condition. In a second 
experiment, participants were assigned to have a tall or short virtual body. Authors argued that 
height is more often associated with self-esteem and competence. Taller people are perceived  
to be more competent (Young & French, 1996), more desirable as romantic partners 
(Freedman, 1979; Harrison & Saeed, 1977), and more likely to emerge as leaders (Stogdill, 
1948). For this reason, authors hypothesized that people with a taller virtual body would be 
more confident in a negotiation game, such as the ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game, 
two individuals take turns to decide how a pool of money should be split between the two of 
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them. One individual makes the split, and the other must choose to either accept or reject the 
split. If the split is accepted, the money is shared accordingly. If the split is rejected, neither of 
them gets the money. Crucially, Yee and Bainsolon (2007), found that participants in the tall 
condition were significantly more likely to offer an unfair split than participants in the normal 
and short conditions. At the same time, participants in the short condition were significantly 
more likely to accept an unfair split than participants in the normal and tall condition.  From 
this study, the “proteus effect” was observed with many variable. For instance, placing 
participants in avatars with a superhero ability promotes helping behaviour (Rosenberg et al., 
2013). More recently, it was demonstrated that our body representation can also modulate 
what Sugiura (2013) called the interpersonal self, that is the perceived attention of others.  
(Guterstam et al., (2015) created the illusion of having an invisible body, modifying  the 
experimental setup of the mannequin’s illusion by removing the mannequin’s body  and 
applying the touches to a discrete volume of empty space that represented an invisible body. 
After the illusion, participants were exposed to a socially stressful situation, that is standing in 
front of a crowd of unknown people. Crucially the illusion of having an invisible body, as 
compared to the illusion of having a mannequin’s body, reduced the participant’s heart rate 
and the subjective level of anxiety in response to the stressful social event. Authors concluded 
that if the body is represented as an invisible entity, it will be represented as being invisible to 
outside observers as well, which, in turn, should reduce the brain’s social anxiety response to 
being the centre of other people’s attention. 
However, how can a change in the perception of a purely bodily aspect of the self 
ultimately alter not only associations with higher level concept of the self, but also generalize to 
social processing and behaviour? Providing a unifying theory of the self is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, however it’s worth to notice that a notable theory comes from the predictive 
coding account (Friston, 2010). This approach rest upon the idea that the brain works as an 
inference machine that is trying to optimize its own model of the world, by actively predicting 
the causes of its sensory input. In other words, the brain interprets sensory information in a 
form of probabilistic representation of the causes on the basis of noisy sensory data, 
maintaining hypothesis (“generative model”) of the hidden causes of sensory input (Friston, 
2005). In this model any mismatch between predicted and actual sensory inputs generates a 
prediction error that the brain need to minimize in order to avoid surprise (or unpredictability, 
in mathematical terms).   
As previously recalled, the self is a multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low-
level, bodily representations and  higher level attitudes and beliefs. On a predictive coding 
account, these different levels of representation continuously interact, as prediction errors, and 
when left unexplained at one level, they need to be processed and eliminated at a higher level 
of the hierarchy. Given the focus of predictive coding accounts on complementary hierarchical 
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top-down and bottom-up processes, a change in low-level, perceptual representations of one’s 
own body in relation to the body of other creates errors further up in the processing hierarchy, 
as this new information now conflicts with more abstract, higher order representations of 
oneself and the other (Tsakiris, 2017). These errors must then be minimized, by updating 
attitudes and beliefs held about one’s self and the other, ensuring that the consistency within 
the multimodal self-representation is maintained (I will discuss this more in detail at the end 
of the thesis )   
 
The experimental contributions that I am going to present in the thesis, are in line with 
the theoretical framework presented in this chapter.  In particular, the first study examine the 
relationship between one’s own body representation and a crucial component of the social 
interaction: the distance that people maintain between each other.     
As mentioned before, the space around the body is a central tenet of the bodily self. 
Fronto-parietal multisensory neurons encode the space surrounding  the body in a body 
centred reference frame (i.e. the peripersonal space).  As previously recalled, the peripersonal 
space has been conceptualized as a multisensory-motor interface that may serve to encode the 
position of sensory stimuli to generate goal directed action toward objects within the reaching 
distance. However, human beings commonly perform actions in social contexts, where others 
are present and interacting to various degrees. Individuals reliably regulate a socially 
appropriate distance between each other, which typically extends to a point that, if crossed, 
causes discomfort. This distance that people maintain between each other during a social 
interaction has been studied mainly by the social psychology and it has been termed 
interpersonal space.  In the next chapter I question whether  a change in one’s own body 
representation may influence the space of interaction with other people. 
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Chapter 2 
Come closer, I am invisible! 
Invisible body illusion modulates interpersonal space 
 
This study is co-authored by Mariano D’Angelo, Giuseppe di Pellegrino and Francesca Frassinetti 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The term interpersonal space (IPS) refers to the protective, safety zone that people 
maintain around their body during social interaction, and into which intrusion by others may 
cause discomfort (Hall. 1996; Hayduck, 1983). The spatial extent of IPS may vary across 
culture (Aiello, 1987) and its boundaries are regulated and constantly negotiated according to 
the context and emotional states of individuals (Sommer,2002). For instance, IPS may reduce 
after a cooperative social interaction (Candini et al., 2016; Gessaroli et al., 2013), or after 
inducing a positive emotional experience  (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2011). Thus, studies on IPS 
have predominantly focused on how social space is modulated by high-order social and 
cognitive factors concerning the perception of the context or the attitude toward the 
interacting parts (Holland, et al., 2004; Iachini et al., 2015; Lloyd, 2009; Ruggiero et al., 2017; 
Scheele et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, as discussed in the Chapter 1, a number of studies on embodied 
cognition have emphasized the importance of one’s own body representation in interpersonal 
attitudes (Barsalou, 2008; Longo et al., 2009; Yee and Bainsolon, 2007; Peck et al., 2013). 
Perceived bodily similarity between self and others may change the way in which subjects 
interact with other people (Maister et al., 2013; 2015; Paladino et al., 2010), thereby revealing 
the social valence of body representation (Longo et al., 2009), and the intimate relationship 
between basic, body perceptual representation and the complex mechanisms underlying our 
everyday social interactions. Peck and co-workers (2013) demonstrated that inducing the 
illusion of ownership over a dark skinned virtual body reduces the implicit racial bias. In the 
same way, Yee and Bailenson (2007) found that participants were more willing to make unfair 
splits in an ultimatum game when they experienced the embodiment toward a taller than a 
shorter virtual body. 
Recently, Guterstam et al. (2013), modifying the now classical rubber hand illusion, 
through a multisensory visuotactile conflict, created the illusion of having an invisible hand. A 
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subsequent study from the same laboratory extended the illusion of having an invisible limb to 
an entire invisible body (Guterstam et al. 2015). More importantly for our present purpose, 
authors demonstrated that the illusion of owning an invisible body, as compared to a 
mannequin’s body, reduced participant’s heart rate and level of subjective stress in response to 
standing in front of an audience of strangers. Therefore, authors concluded that this body 
illusion has unique effect on social-affective cognition. Indeed, being gazed upon constitutes a 
salient social cue, and perceiving one’s own body as invisible can affect socio-affective 
processing of such cues. 
Based on these findings suggesting a dynamic interaction between bodily self 
representation and social cognitive processes, here we aimed to investigate whether inducing a 
change in one’s own body representation may influence the space of interaction with other 
people. Specifically, due to the protective, safety value of IPS, we predicted that the experience 
of invisibility should induce participants to feel themselves more protected and less exposed 
during another person’s approach, thus leading to a significant contraction of IPS boundaries. 
To this aim, we measured IPS trough a comfort-distance task, in which participants were asked 
to stop an individual approaching them at a position in which they felt most comfortable with 
the other’s proximity (Sommer, 2002; Gessaroli et al., 2013; Patané et al., 2017) . 
In addition, to rule out the possibility that the invisible body illusion may simply 
influence space perception, we also assessed how individuals encode the reaching space near 
the body. As previously recalled, in the neurocognitive domain, the reaching space has been 
conceptualized as a sensorimotor interface for the body to act on nearby objects, i.e. the 
peripersonal space (F. de Vignemont & Iannetti, 2015; di Pellegrino & Làdavas, 2015).  Thus, in 
the present study, we measured the peripersonal space (PPS) through a reaching-distance task 
(Bartolo et al., 2014; Bourgeois et al., 2014)  adapted to be similar to the methodology used to 
assess IPS, with the exception that, in this case, participants were asked to stop the other 
person at the distance in which they thought they could reach her. 
Thus, IPS and PPS were measured using a similar methodology, through a comfort-
distance and a reaching-distance task, respectively, which were repeated twice: before and 
after an invisible body illusion. Due to its effects on aspects of social cognition, we expected 
that the experience of having an invisible body should reduce the size of IPS, without affecting 
PPS extension. On the contrary, if the illusion of invisibility modifies the perception of the 
space around the body per se, a modification of this space should be found independently from 
the social or sensorimotor valence of the task, and thus involving both IPS and PPS. 
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2.2 Experiment 1 
2.2.1 Methods 
 
Participants. Twenty four participants, all females, to avoid possible gender 
differences effects (Iachini et al., 2016; Iachini et al., 2014), volunteered for the study (age 
range = 20-26; mean age = 22.63). Sample size was determined a priori by conducting a power 
analysis using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007) . A small to medium effect size (η2p = 0.20) was 
specified based on a previous study conducted in our laboratory (Patanè et al.,2017). Within 
our chosen sample size and effect size, the power (1 – β) was approximately .80. 
Participants were naive to the experimental hypothesis, and had no self-reported history of 
neurological or psychiatric disease. All participants had normal or correct to normal vision. 
They provided written informed consent to participate in the experiments, which were 
approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Bologna, in agreement with the 2008 
Helsinki Declaration. Participants were instructed to wear a pair of trousers and a t-shirt.   
Setting. For the entire duration of the experiment, participants wore a set of head-
mounted displays, HMDs, (TRIVISIO VRvision, 800 x 600 resolution, equals 1.4M pixels and 
full colour, 42° diagonal field of View). The spacing between HMD’s oculars was adjusted for 
each participant to fit their inter-pupillary distance (55-72 mm adjustable). HMDs were 
connected, through a PC, to a synchronized HD webcam colour (Logitech HD pro webcam 
C920, full HD 1080p) placed on a tripod adjusted at the same height of the participant’s head. 
Participants were asked to stand upright in a fixed position 40 cm to the left of the tripod. In 
this way, through the HMDs, participants viewed in real time the part of the room filmed by 
the webcam, as if their point of view was that of the camera. 
Procedure.  Experiment was conducted in the same rectangular room (7.5 x 6.5m). 
The experimental session included two tasks: (i) a comfort-distance judgment to assess social 
interpersonal space (participants indicated the comfort distance between themselves and a 
confederate) and (ii) a reaching-distance judgment, designed to assess peripersonal space 
(participants indicated the reaching distance between themselves and a confederate). 
Testing began with a participant standing in a fixed position, 40 cm to the left of the tripod 
and the confederate standing, facing the tripod from a 5 meters starting position. The 
confederate was always the one moving toward the camera, which corresponded to the 
participant’s first person perspective. Participants provided both comfort-distance judgments 
(“stop the confederate at the distance you feel comfortable with her”), and reachability-
distance judgments (“stop the confederate at the distance you think you can reach her”). The 
distance was measured with a digital laser meter, as the distance between the confederate’s 
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chest and a fix point on the tripod just below the camera (Agatec, model DM 100, error ± .003 
m). This procedure was repeated twice in separate blocks of five trials for each condition: 
before and after 2 minutes of visuotactile stimulation to induce the invisible body illusion. The 
order of tasks was counterbalanced across subjects. 
The procedure to create the illusion of owning an invisible body was very similar to the 
one described in Guterstam et al. (2015). Participants were asked to close their eyes while the 
experimenter pointed the camera toward the floor. Then participants were asked to tilt their 
heads downwards as if looking at their bodies and open their eyes. In this way participants saw 
in the HMD the empty space captured by the camera where they expected to see their own 
body. To induce the illusion the experimenter stroked, with a large paintbrush, five different 
participant’s body parts while synchronously, in corresponding position, moving another 
paintbrush in the empty space under the camera (see Figure 2.1). According to the study by 
Guterstam et al. (2015), the strokes were delivered to the abdomen (A), the left and right lower 
arm (LLA, RLA) and the left and right lower legs and feet in a pre determined sequence: (A-A-
A-A-LLA-LLA-LLA-LLA- RLA-RLA-RLARLA-LLF-LLF-LLF-LLF-A-A).  
 
 
               
Figure 2.1 Experimental setup of the invisible body illusion. Participants watched in the HMDs the empty space 
captured by the camera. To induce the illusion, the experimenter applied touches to the participant’s body with a 
paintbrush and moved another paintbrush in the empty space in corresponding position. 
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This sequence was repeated two times. The duration of each stroke was 1 second and the 
interval between one touch and the next touch was 1.5 second. 
The entire visuotactile stimulation lasted about 2 min. To identify the portions of empty space 
corresponding to the stroked body targets of the invisible body, we used a female body as a 
template. Visual landmarks, which were out of participant’s view, indicated the starting and 
stopping points of brushstrokes. Since the work by Guterstam et al. (2015) has shown that the 
illusion of having an invisible body is dependent on spatio-temporal congruence of visual and 
tactile signals, as a control condition we applied asynchronous brushstrokes to the 
participant’s body and to the empty space, matching the total number and length of the 
strokes. 
The experiment was conducted as a within-group counterbalanced design. Participants 
were randomly allocated to one of two groups, regarding whether they first received 
synchronous or asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, or vice versa. Synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation were administered in two different sessions separate by one week. 
Two different female confederates, unknown to the participants, were involved in the pre and 
post sessions. One of the confederates approached the camera for the entire duration of the 
first session before visuotactile stimulation, whereas the second confederate was introduced in 
the post experimental session. To avoid any aesthetical confound, the order of confederate 
facing the camera in the pre and post session was also counterbalanced between participants 
and within participant’s two conditions (Synchronous-Asynchronous visuotactile stimulation). 
Moreover, the two confederates were instructed to wear similar neutral clothes. During the 
approach toward the camera, the confederate walked with natural gaits at a constant speed. 
They were instructed to maintain a neutral expression and to keep their gaze looking straight 
ahead at a fixed point just below the camera. 
To provide a measure of the illusory ownership of the invisible body, at the end of the 
experimental session, participants were asked to complete a 6-item questionnaire, which 
served to quantify the subjective experience of illusory ownership during multisensory 
stimulation. Questions were derived from Guterstam et al., (2015). Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with six statements using a seven-point 
Likert scale, ranging from -3 (“I completely disagree”) to +3 (“I completely agree”), with a 
response of 0 indicating “neither agreed nor disagreed”. Three of the statements examined the 
perception of the illusion (S1-S3) and the other three statements were designed to control for 
suggestibility and task compliance (S4- S6) (see Table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1. Questionnaire used to evaluate the subjective experience after visuotactile stimulation:     statements S1 –
S3 examined the perception of the illusion;  Statements S4- S6 controlled for suggestibility and task compliance. 
 
2.2.3 Results 
 
To test effect of the invisible body illusion on the comfort-distance and reaching-
distance, the mean distances obtained in different experimental conditions were compared 
trough a three-way ANOVA, with Stimulation (synchronous vs asynchronous), Session (pre vs 
post visuotactile stimulation) and Task (reaching vs comfort-distance) as within-participants 
factors. Newman-Keuls post hoc test was used to analyze significant interactions. Data 
revealed a significant effect of the Task (F1,23=16.89; p<.0001; η2p=0.42) indicating that the 
participant-confederate distance was larger in the comfort than in reachability-distance task. 
The significant interaction Task x Session  (F1,23=11.66; p<.01; η2p =0.33), as well as the 
interaction Stimulation x Session x Task were significant (F1,23=7.92; p<.01; η2p =0.25) (see 
figure 2.2). Specifically, our results show that comfort-distance was smaller after (75 cm) than 
before (89.8 cm) visuotactile stimulation in the synchronous condition (p<.0001), but not in 
the asynchronous condition (86.8 vs, 90.21 cm, p=.28). Moreover, the comfort-distance after 
the synchronous visuotactile stimulation was significantly smaller than the comfort-distance 
measured before, as well as after asynchronous visuotactile stimulation (p<.0002, in both 
comparisons). Reachability-distance, instead, was not significantly different between pre and 
post visuotactile stimulation in both synchronous (62.4 vs. 64.6 cm, p=.10), and asynchronous 
conditions (66.3 vs. 68 cm, p=.43). In sum, the critical statistical interaction Stimulation x 
Session x Task indicates that only the synchronous, but not the asynchronous, visuotactile 
stimulation affected comfort-distance estimation. In contrast, neither synchronous nor 
asynchronous visuotactile stimulation modulated reaching-distance  
 
Table 1  Questionnaire statements 
 
During the experiment … 
 
S1    I felt the touch of the brush in the empty space in the location where I saw the brush moving 
S2    It felt as if I had an invisible body 
S3    I experienced that the touch I felt was caused by the brush moving in the empty space 
S 4   When I saw the brush moving , I experienced the touch on my back 
S5    It felt as if I had two bodies 
S6    I could no longer feel my body  
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Figure 2.2 Effects of visuotactile stimulation on comfort and reaching-distance. Statistical comparison of mean 
distance (cm) in the two tasks (comfort and reaching judgment), in the stimulation conditions (synchronous 
and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation), and in the two sessions (pre- and post-visuotactile stimulation). 
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. The asterisk indicates a significant difference before and after 
invisible body illusion in the synchronous condition. 
 
To investigate whether participants’ subjective experience during multisensory 
stimulation was affected by experimental conditions, the average rating of the illusion 
statements (S1-S3) and the control statements (S4-S6) at the questionnaire in the synchronous 
and synchronous conditions, were compared. An ANOVA with Stimulation (synchronous vs. 
synchronous) and Statement Type (illusion vs. control) as within-participants factors, showed 
a significant effect of Stimulation (F1,23 =17.87; p<.00001; η2p=0.68), Statement Type 
(F1,23=102.78; p<.00001; η2p=0.66), and of their interaction (F1,23=61.22; p<.00001; η2p=0.72) 
(see Figure 2.3). Participants in the synchronous stimulation affirmed more strongly illusion 
than control statements (p<.001), and more strongly than in the asynchronous stimulation 
(both in the illusion and control statements) (p<.001 for all comparisons).  
These findings show that IPS, as measured by the comfort-distance task, considerably 
reduces after synchronous, but not asynchronous, visuotactile stimulation. Since, as assessed 
by the questionnaire, visuotactile stimulation evoked illusory ownership over an invisible body 
only when touches are synchronously  applied, the reduction of IPS is due to the perception of 
one’s own body as invisible. By contrast there was no significant difference in the reaching 
space between pre and post visuotactile stimulation both in the synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation. This suggests that perception of one’s own body as invisible does 
not affect the general perception of space around the body, but it has unique effect when this 
space assumes a safety value in the comfort-distance task. 
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Figure 2.3. Questionnaire evidence for perceiving an invisible body. Mean score of illusion and control statements as 
a function of the condition (synchronous and asynchronous). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. The 
asterisk indicates a significant difference between illusion statements in Synchronous condition and all other 
conditions 
 
An alternative explanation of this result can be that reduction of social interpersonal space 
is not caused by the invisible body illusion per se, but it is due to an altered feeling of presence 
in the spatial environment as filmed by the camera and presented to the participants through 
the HMDs (Sanchez-Vives  et al., 2005). In other words, it is possible that simply the 
perception of the other person by means of the HMD may have led participants to feel 
themselves more shielded, and less exposed to the other’s approach. Related to this issue, 
participants could have particularly emphasized that what they saw did not correspond to their 
real first person perspective or to the real position of their body, since they were located 40 cm 
to the left of the tripod. 
Therefore, to rule out the possibility that comfort-distance reduction reflects a general bias 
due to the HMD’s device and virtual reality system, we conducted another study (Experiment 
2) aimed to modulate PPS, without altering social IPS. That is, by using the same methodology 
used to assess IPS and PPS of the Experiment 1, we investigated the possibility to reveal the 
opposite dissociation between these spaces. To this aim, we implemented a tool-use paradigm, 
known to affect PPS (Farnè & Ladavas, 2000; Berti and Frassinetti, 2000; Maravita and Iriki, 
2004), adapted to the virtual reality system used in the previous experiment. Accordingly, we 
hypothesized that the active use of a tool should enlarge PPS, but leaving IPS unaffected, 
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thereby confirming that variation of IPS size found in Experiment 1 is not merely the 
consequence of being in a virtual environment. 
 
2.3 Experiment 2 
2.3.1 Methods 
 
Participants. A new group of female participants (n= 24; age range = 20-28; mean age = 
23.91), naive to the purpose of the study, participated in Experiment 2.  All participants had 
normal or correct to normal vision, no self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric 
dieses and all but three were right-handed, as assessed by Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). They provided written informed consent to participate in the experiments, 
which were approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Bologna, in agreement 
with the 2008 Helsinki Declaration. 
Procedure In the Experiment 2, participants performed reachability and comfort-distance 
task before and after 12 minutes of active and passive tool training. Experimental setting and 
procedure were similar to the Experiment 1, with the exception that in Experiment 2 there 
were two web cameras: one webcam was on the tripod, and the other one was applied on the 
head mounted display (HMD) worn by participants. During tool training, the webcam on the 
tripod was turned off and the webcam applied on the HMD filmed the training, that 
participants watched online through the HMD. In the active tool training, participants were 
required to use a 70 cm long rake to perform different tasks with their right hand, with which 
they were instructed to reach and retrieve, one at the time, different tokens placed on a table-
top (see Figure 2.4) at a distance of ≈ 85 cm from the participants’ sternum. In the passive tool 
training, participants held the tool passively with their right hand while they were asked to 
verbally report some characteristics of the tokens put near the tip of the tool. The experiment 
was conducted as a within-group counterbalanced design. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of two groups, regarding of whether they first performed active or passive tool 
training, or vice versa. 
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Figure 2.4. Experimental setup of tool-use. A webcam was applied on the HMDs worn by the participants. 
Participants were instructed to reach and retrieve different tokens.  
 
2.3.1 Results 
 
To test the effect of the tool training on the comfort-distance and reaching-distance, the 
mean distances obtained in the different experimental conditions were compared through a 
three-way ANOVA with Training (active tool vs. passive tool training), Session (pre vs. Post 
tool training), Task (reaching vs. comfort-distance), as within-participant factors. Significant 
interactions were explored by Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests. The ANOVA showed a significant 
effect of the Task (F1,23=779.35; p<.05; η2p=0.16). As in Experiment 1, the participant-
confederate distance was larger in the comfort-distance than in the reaching-distance task. 
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Task x Session interaction (F1,23=15,46; p<.0001; η2p=0.40) as well as Training x Session x 
Task interaction were significant  (F1,23 =8.21; p<.001;  η2p=0.26). Post-hoc tests revealed that 
the interaction was driven by an increased reaching-distance estimation after active tool use 
training (83.8 cm) with respect to before (68.2 cm, p < .01), whilst no significant difference 
between before and after active tool use was found in the comfort-distance task (85 vs. 81.5 
cm, p=.57) In contrast, in the passive tool use training no significant differences before and 
after training were found in either reaching (69.7 vs. 67.4 cm; p = .80) or comfort-distance 
(80.8 vs. 79.6 cm; p=.72) (see Fig. 2.5). In sum, only active, but not passive, tool use training 
affected the reaching-distance estimation. Comfort-distance estimation was modulated neither 
by the active nor passive tool use training.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. Effects of tool use training on comfort and reaching-distances. Statistical comparison of average distances 
(cm) in the two tasks (comfort and reaching judgment) in the two Tool training conditions (Active and Passive) and in 
the two Sessions (pre and post training). Error bars indicates standard errors of the mean. The asterisk indicates a 
significant difference in the reaching distance before and after active tool training.   
 
Experiment 2 shows an increased reaching-distance, but not change in comfort-
distance, after an active tool use. No significant differences emerge in reaching and comfort-
distance task after passive tool use. Thus, these findings are strongly in favor that the reduction 
of IPS found in Experiment 1 is not due to a low feeling of presence in the spatial environment 
presented in the HMDs because, in that case, we would found a reduction of IPS also in 
Experiment 2. 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
 Available evidence suggests that IPS is modulated by higher order psychological and social 
factors concerning personality characteristics (Hayduk, 2002), perception of social context 
(Altman and Vinsel, 1977), and the attitude toward the interacting parts (Gessaroli et al., 2013; 
Candini et al., 2016; Iachini et al., 2015). In the current study, in light of recent evidence 
emphasizing the importance of one’s own body representation in modulating interpersonal 
attitude (Maister et al., 2015; Guterstam et al., 2015), we investigated whether a change in 
one’s own body representation can modify social IPS. 
 In Experiment 1, we show that the illusion of having an invisible body, elicited by 
temporally and spatially congruent visual and tactile stimuli (synchronous condition), and 
assessed by the questionnaire scores, significantly reduces IPS extent during the comfort-
distance task. On the contrary, following the asynchronous control condition, the experience of 
the illusion was absent and, crucially, no significant modulation of interpersonal distance was 
found. These results therefore indicate that IPS reduction cannot be explained by effects that 
were non-specific to the illusion, such as, for instance, the mere habituation to the task. 
Rather, these findings support the close relationship between interpersonal distance and the 
bodily self-representation. 
Despite synchronous visuotactile stimulation caused both a change in participant’s body 
perception, and a reduction of the space in which participants feel comfortable with the other’s 
proximity, it failed to modulate the participants’ judgement of reaching-distance. We found 
that reaching space (PPS) did not change either after synchronous or asynchronous 
stimulation. This latter result allows us to exclude that the observed reduction of IPS is merely 
due to a modification in the perception of space near the body after the invisible body illusion.  
Nevertheless, one can argue that IPS reduction, rather than reflecting a change in 
participant’s body perception, is due to an altered feeling of presence in the spatial 
environment as observed through the HMDs. Perceiving other person’s approach by means of 
the HMD may have led participants to feel themselves less exposed and more protected as 
compared to a real, direct approach. This could be sufficient to induce a reduction of the space 
in which participants felt most comfortable with the confederate. 
This interpretation of the findings, however, can be ruled out by the results of Experiment 2. 
In this latter experiment, a tool-use paradigm, known to modulate PPS (Farnè & Ladavas, 
2000; Berti & Frassinetti, 2000), was adapted to the setting of Experiment 1. As predicted, 
after active tool-use, participants showed a significant enlargement of PPS, as assessed by the 
reaching-distance task, while social IPS remained unaffected. Thus, Experiment 2 reveals that 
viewing the surrounding environment through the HMDs does not hinder modulation of PPS 
by an appropriate manipulation (i.e., active tool-use). Crucially, the lack of IPS change in 
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Experiment 2 suggests that the reduction of IPS observed in Experiment 1 cannot be accounted 
for by the feeling of protection associated with the virtual environment. Therefore, our overall 
findings clearly indicate that the reduction of IPS depends on the perception of one’s own body 
as invisible. 
These results fit nicely with previous research by Guterstam et al. (2015), showing that 
invisible body illusion reduces the level of subjective stress and decreases heart rate in 
response to standing in front of a crowd of unknown people. Authors argued that if the body is 
represented as invisible, it will be represented as being invisible to outside observers as well, 
which in turn reduces social stress and anxiety response. Although in the current experiment 
we do not have a measure of subjective stress or level of anxiety during the confederate’s 
approach, this argumentation is particularly interesting for the present study. Indeed studies 
on IPS show that interpersonal distance is strongly modulated by alterations in brain areas 
involved in fear processing and anxiety responses, such as the amygdala (Kennedy et al., 
2010). 
Thus, if participants truly experience invisibility, their body should be represented as 
invisible to others individual as well, which, in turn, might induce participants to feel more 
protected and less exposed during the confederate’s approach. As a consequence, participants 
may reduce the distance at which they feel more comfortable with the other’s proximity, 
allowing the confederate to be closer to their body. Related to this issue, an important finding 
of the present experiments is that interpersonal distance is consistently larger than reaching-
distance, thereby indicating that participants feel comfortable when they cannot be reached 
and touched by an unfamiliar other. This finding is in line with an interpretation of IPS as a 
protective, safety space, while PPS represents a working space, or a space elected for reaching 
and manipulate close objects (de Vignemont & Iannetti, 2015) 
Collectively, results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 provide converging evidence for a 
double dissociation between IPS and PPS. In Experiment 2, we found that the active use of a 
tool can temporarily alter the representation of the PPS, due to an extension of sensorimotor 
representation of arm length, as suggested by several previous studies (Cardinali et al., 2009; 
2011; Canzoneri et al., 2013; Sposito et al., 2012). Indeed, reaching space is modulated by, and 
relies on, morphological and sensorimotor body representation (Longo & Lourenco, 
2007;Lourenco & Longo, 2009) For instance, the size of near space is scaled as a proportion of 
one’s arm length (Longo & Lourenco, 2007). This sensorimotor representation of the body 
morphology linked to PPS has been termed body schema, and is concerned with tracking and 
updating the positions and configuration of body parts in space (Paillard, 2005; Martel et al., 
2016). This representation typically does not enter into awareness, and is primarily used for 
spatial organization of action. Accordingly, in Experiment 1, no modification of PPS was found, 
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since the invisible body illusion does not alter the sensorimotor representation used to guide 
action and act in space, i.e. the body schema.  
In stark contrast, the invisible body illusion directly manipulates the conscious 
representation of the body external appearance, that is, the explicit body image (Frederique de 
Vignemont, 2010; Kammers et al., 2009; Longo et al., 2010), as indicated by the questionnaire 
ratings. The term body image indeed refers to a distinct representation of the body used for 
perception of the body itself, primarily based on vision, but also on somatic perception, and 
represents the way the body appears to outside observers. It is not involved in action but plays 
a key role in emotional and social processing (Gallagher, 2006). Therefore, the present 
findings not only reveal that IPS and PPS are two space representation functionally defined 
according to different behavioural context, but also suggest that IPS and PPS are linked to 
different high-order representations of the body, used for the perception (i.e., body image), 
and action (i.e., body schema) of the body, respectively.  
Some may argue that the reduction of IPS found in the present research is not due to the 
feeling of body invisibility per se, but rather to a more general change in body form or 
appearance. Thus, in principle, any change in one’s own body perception might produce 
similar effects on IPS. Note, however, that Guterstam et al. (2015) have previously shown that 
the illusion of having a mannequin’s body did not induce the same feeling of protection and 
safety during a socially stressful situation. Thus, evidence from previous research makes it 
unlikely that reduction of IPS found in the current study was caused by a mere modification of 
the body appearance. However, we cannot exclude that other changes in one’s own body 
representation can modify the space of interaction with others. For instance, perceiving bodily 
similarity between oneself and others (Peck et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2013) may be another 
factor that could result in modulation of the IPS.  
On the other hand, it is not our intent to claim that change of body image is the only way by 
which a modulation of IPS may occur. As mentioned above, IPS can be influenced by several 
psychological, social and context-dependent factors. Although in the current study the 
experience of having an invisible body, possibly through an increased sense of security 
(Guterstam et al., 2015), reduces IPS, we do not exclude that feelings of safety and protection 
and a consequent reduction of IPS can be achieved through other manipulations unrelated to 
body image. For instance, interposing a transparent barrier between an observer and others 
may similarly cause the reduction of IPS without changing the observer’s body image.  
Finally, the present findings indicating a close relationship between IPS and body 
representation may have significant implications for the study and treatment of different 
clinical disorders. For instance, recent studies have shown that children with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) have an altered IPS representation, preferring or larger (Gessaroli et al., 2013; 
Candini et al., 2016) or closer (Kennedy et al., 2014; Perry et al., 2013) comfort-distances. 
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People with social anxiety show an abnormal IPS too (Scheele et al., 2012; Perry et al. 
Therefore, due to the close link between IPS and body image, we should expect an altered body 
image in ASD population or in people with social anxiety. Moreover, it should be interesting, as 
already suggested by Guterstam et al. (2015), to verify whether the effects of having an 
invisible body are stronger in people with social anxiety. Likewise, IPS is expected to be 
affected in populations with a persistent distorted body image, such as individuals with eating 
disorders (Horne et al., 1991) 
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Chapter 3 
Are you looking at me? That’s impossible, I am 
invisible 
 
Embodying an invisible face shrinks the cone of gaze 
 
This study is co-authored by Mariano D’Angelo, Raffaele Tucciarelli, Francesca Frassinetti and Matthew 
Longo 
 
In the study described in the previous chapter, we  induced in participants the illusion of 
having an invisible body and we showed a socio - cognitive “side effect” of perceiving our body as 
invisible, that is a contraction of the space in which people feel comfortable with the other 
proximity.  
 In agreement with the results of Guterstam et al. (2015), we  argued that if the body is represented 
as an invisible entity, it  will be represented as being invisible to outside observers as well, which in 
turn should induce participants to feel themselves less at the centre of other people’s attention. 
Indeed invisibility is, by definition, the impossibility to be gazed upon. Being gazed upon is an 
important social factor.  When an individual notices that he or she is being looked at or hears 
his/her own name being called, he/she becomes aware that the attention or intentionality of 
another person is directed at him/her. This awareness is a basic mindset during social interaction. 
It’s possible to imagine that the experience of having an invisible body directly affect this kind of 
interpersonal awareness  that represents the attention or intentions of others directed at the self.  
 In particular, in the next study we investigated if the experience of invisibility affect the 
participants’ awareness that  another person is looking at them    
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In Book II of Plato’s Republic (1888), Glaucon relates the myth of the ring of Gyges, a 
golden ring which makes the wearer invisible. Gyges uses the ring to take over the kingdom of 
Lydia, seducing the queen and killing the king. In the context of Glaucon and Socrates’s 
discussion of justice, the invisibility conferred by the ring is a symbol of ultimate, even godlike, 
power and freedom from the consequences of one’s actions. The conferral of invisibility by 
objects of great power is common in literature, from Tolkien’s (1937) ‘one ring to rule them all’ 
to one of the ‘deathly hallows’ in the Harry Potter novels (Rowling, 2007). It is clear that the 
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idea of invisibility has captured the imagination of writers and philosophers for millennia for 
its strong intuitive psychological meaning.  
Recent research has started to move invisibility from the realm of fantasy to the 
laboratory. As previously recalled, Guterstam and colleagues (2013) used the logic of the 
rubber hand illusion to demonstrate that people can be induced to feel body ownership over an 
empty region of space, as if their hand had become invisible. Other research has extended this 
logic to induce the experience of owning an entire invisible body (Guterstam et al., 2015; 
D’Angelo et al., 2017; Kondo et al., 2018).  To create this illusion, participants wore an HMD, 
connected with a camera placed on a tripod and pointing toward the floor. When participants 
tilted their heads downwards, as if looking at their body, they saw in the HMDs the empty 
space captured by the camera where they expected to see their own body. The experimenter, to 
induce the illusion, synchronously stroked the participants’ real body with a paintbrush, while 
moving another paintbrush in the empty space in corresponding positions. This setup resulted 
in the referral of tactile sensations to the empty space and the perception of having an invisible 
body.  
Intriguingly, experiencing one’s own body as invisible has been found to have 
widespread effects on participants’ physiological and cognitive processing. Guterstam et al. 
(2015) showed that the illusion of having an invisible body, as compared to the illusion of 
owning a mannequin’s body, decreased participant’s heart rate and subjective level of anxiety 
in response to standing in front of a crowd of unknown people. These authors argued that 
representing one’s own body as an invisible entity should make participants feel themselves 
less at the centre of other people’s attention, reducing the social anxiety produced by a stressful 
situation. The study presented  in the previous chapter, showed that the invisible body illusion 
reduced the interpersonal distance at which participants felt most comfortable with another 
person (D’Angelo et al., 2017), leaving intact the perceived reaching space. The experience of 
invisibility induced participants to feel themselves more protected and less exposed during 
another person’s approach, allowing the other person to be closer to their body. Thus, knowing 
whether one is the recipient of a gaze can be decisive in a social interaction and experiencing 
one’s own body as invisible may affect the social consequences of being looked at. In fact, one’s 
own body is a source of visual information communicating emotional and mental states which 
can be used by others to predict our future behaviours. To this end, research  has emphasized 
the importance of one’s own bodily appearance in interpersonal attitudes, revealing a 
relationship between body external representation and our everyday social interactions 
(Maister et al., 2015). For instance, an increase in perceived physical self resemblance may 
increase resonance with an out-group (Peck et al., 2013; Maister at al., 2013). Moreover, the 
type body, over which participants experience illusory ownership, carries with it a set of 
temporary changes in perception and attitudes that are appropriate for that type of body (Yee 
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and Bailenson, 2007; Banakou et al., 2013; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2017). Therefore, 
changing one’s own body visual appearance can change the way in which the self is 
conceptualized (Banakou et al., 2013) and, in turn, our interpersonal attitudes to conform to 
the changed body (Peck et al., 2013; Yee and Bailenson, 2007).   
 Given the importance gaze in social interactions, it is perhaps not surprising that 
humans are very accurate in perceiving the gaze directions of others (Gibson & Pick, 1963; 
Anstis et al., 1969; Gale & Monk, 2000). However, although gaze direction can be perceived 
accurately in general, observers are prone to assume that they are being looked at when 
another person is looking even roughly in their direction (Gamer et al., 2011; Ewbank et al., 
2009). For instance, observers assume a mutual gaze when the looker’s gaze is directed at their 
mouth or nose (Lord & Haith, 1974). Several studies have measured the range of gaze 
directions over which an individual perceives another to be looking at them. Crucially, it was 
found a relatively wide range of gaze directions that were perceived as being directed at the 
observer. Indeed, the metaphor of “cone of gaze” is used to refer to the range of eye deviations 
participants judge as being directed towards them (Gamer & Hecht, 2007; Gamer et al., 2011; 
Mareschal et al., 2013a). The cone of gaze has been shown to be modulated by several 
emotional, social, and affective factors. For instance, the cone of gaze is wider for faces that 
appear angry compared to fearful or neutral faces (Ewbank et al., 2009). Moreover, individuals 
with social phobia show a larger cone of gaze than control subjects (Gamer et al., 2011; Jun et 
al., 2013). The cone of gaze is also widened by social ostracism (Lyyra et al., 2017).  
In the present study, we investigated the link between the representations of one’s own 
body and the perception of gaze direction. Based on data showing that the invisible body 
illusion reduced social anxiety and the interpersonal distance, we speculated that the 
experience of invisibility affects the way in which participants process the attention of others 
toward the self, starting from the perception of gaze direction. Thus, we hypothesized that the 
illusion of having an invisible face induce participants to feel themselves less observed by 
others, affecting gaze perception and leading to a reduction of the width of the cone of gaze. 
One’s own face is the body part that most characterizes self appearance, and recognition of 
one’s face, as distinctive from others’, is a fundamental component of self awareness and self 
identity (Tsakiris, 2017). A widely used paradigm to study the plasticity of self face 
representation is the enfacement illusion (Tsakiris, 2008; Paladino et al., 2010). In the 
enfacement illusion, participants are stroked on their face, while they are looking another face 
being touched in synchrony and in corresponding positions. When the two touches are 
synchronous, participants perceived the other face as more physically similar to their own, 
moreover they are also affected in their ability to discriminate between their own and the 
other’s face (Tsakiris, 2008; Sfroza et al., 2010). 
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Here, we combined the classical enfacement setup (Tsakiris, 2007) with the logic of the 
invisible hand illusion (Guterstam et al., 2012) to create the illusion of embodying an invisible 
face. In our setup, participants were stroked on different parts of their face, while they saw a 
video in which a hand used a paintbrush to touch a discrete volume of empty space to define 
the contours and the shape of an invisible face. In Experiment 1, we assessed the illusion 
through a questionnaire designed to capture the subjective experience during visuotactile 
stimulation. In Experiment 2, to provide also an objective evidence of the illusion, we 
threatened the invisible face and  measured the evoked skin conductance response (SCR) as an 
objective measure of  anxiety. This test has been used before to provide physiological evidence 
of body illusions, and there is a direct relationship between the degree of anxiety evoked by 
threatening the illusory body and the strength of illusory body ownership (Armel and 
Ramachandran, 2003; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Guterstam et al., 2013; 2015).  Finally, in 
Experiment 3 we directly tested the hypothesis that enfacing an invisible face affect gaze 
perception, reducing the cone of gaze. To this end, we used a gaze categorization task, in which 
several faces looking in various directions were presented and participants are required to 
judge whether the faces were looking to their left, to their right or directly at them.  We 
speculated that if one’s own face representation affects the perception of gaze direction, 
participants should reduce the range of gaze directions perceived as directed toward them, 
accordingly to the illusion of having an invisible face.  
 
3.2. Experiment 1 
 
3.2.1 Methods 
 
Participants 
Twenty individuals (10 women) were recruited for this study (mean age = 26.5 years; 
SD = 5.8.  Participants had normal or correct to normal vision. They all provided written 
informed consent to participate to the experiment, which was approved by the Department of 
Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Commette at Birkbeck, University of London. The 
study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
Stimuli 
For the visuotactile multisensory stimulation, we used a video in which a hand uses a 
paintbrush to stroke different parts of an invisible face. To create such a video, we used the 
chroma key (or ‘green screen’) technique. Chroma key is a postproduction video technique by 
which a colour range (often green) in a video can be replaced by an image background or 
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another video. In particular, the colour range in the foreground footage is made transparent, 
allowing separately filmed background or a static image to be inserted into the scene.  In our 
case, we used a life sized 3D model head with a green mask on it and a black smock on its 
shoulders. Behind the model head there was a green screen as background. In the 
postproduction, all the green colour was replaced with the static image of an empty room.  
Thus, the final video showed the experimenter’s hand defining, with a paintbrush, the 
contours and the shape of an invisible head (Figure 3.1). Four different segments of the head 
were stroked with long brushstrokes in a predeterminated sequence: two brushstrokes from 
the right cheek to the chin; two brushstrokes from the middle of the forehead to the right 
temple; two brushstrokes from the lower part of the forehead to the nose; two brushstrokes 
from the lips to the end of chin. Each stroke lasted 3 seconds and time between the offset of 
one touch and the onset of the next touch was 3 seconds as well. The entire stroking sequence 
was repeated for three times, thus the video lasted in total 156 sec.   
   
 
Figure 3.1. One frame from the movie used for induction of the enfacement illusion. The chroma key 
technique was used to create realistic visual information about a paintbrush stroking an invisible face. Though 
the face is not visible, the bristles of the brush were deflected in a way that defined the contours of an 
invisible face.  
 
 
Procedure  
During the experiment, participants were comfortably seated in front of a table. The 
induction movie in which a paintbrush strokes different parts of the invisible face was 
projected on a monitor placed at ≈ 65 cm from the participant’s sternum. Participants were 
asked to wear the same black smock that appeared in video on the invisible face’s shoulders. 
OpenSesame software (Mathot et al., 2012) was used to display stimuli and to collect 
participant’s response. Participants were asked to watch the movie without moving their head, 
while the experimenter synchronously stroked the participant’s face with an identical 
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paintbrush at specularly congruent locations. We compared the illusion condition, with 
synchronous touches between participant’s face and invisible face, to an asynchronous control 
condition in which the participant’s face and the invisible face were touched in alternation. The 
synchronous and asynchronous condition were each repeated two times with ABBA 
counterbalancing, with the first condition counterbalanced across participants. Further, the 
order of presentations was balanced across individuals. At the end of each trial, we obtained 
subjective reports about the experience of the illusion during multisensory visuotactile 
stimulation by asking participants to fill out a questionnaire containing 14 statements 
presented in a random order on the PC screen (statements were adapted from Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012). Participants indicated on a PC keyboard the extent of their agreement 
with the statements using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (I completely disagree) to + 3 
(I completely agree)  
 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 
In line with previous studies on enfacement, scores at the questionnaires tend to fall in 
the affirmative range of the scale in some statements (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et 
al., 2012; Beck et al., 2015; Cardini et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2015). Our statistical analysis 
focused on the difference between synchronous and asynchronous conditions (Figure 2). 
Responses given to each statement after synchronous stimulation was compared to the 
response given after asynchronous stimulation using paired t-tests. There were several items 
with which participants showed more agreement in the synchronous than in the asynchronous 
condition, such as touch referral (Q12, Q13), perception of one’s own face as invisible or 
identification with the empty space (Q8, Q9, Q10) and the perceived location of one’s own face 
(Q7, Q14).  
The significant differences between synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation are consistent with other studies of the enfacement illusion (Prociello et al., 2018), 
suggesting that, also with the presence of an invisible face, multisensory visuotactile 
stimulation was effective in manipulating the sense of facial identity. Indeed, only in the 
synchronous condition participants identified their own face with the invisible face, referring 
tactile sensation on the empty space. Moreover, they could easily imagine their own face in the 
location where they saw the paintbrush moving, as if they were looking to their reflection in a 
mirror. Thus, it seems that the current multisensory stimulation induced a change in one’s 
own face representation.  
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These results demonstrate that the enfacement illusion can be induced even in the 
absence of a visible face. These results extend recent research on the invisible hand (Guterstam 
et al., 2013) and invisible full-body (Guterstam et al., 2015; D’Angelo et al., 2017) illusions. 
 
Figure 3.2. Subjective experience of the enfacement. The graph shows the average ratings for each question as a 
function of the visuotactile stimulation (Synchronous vs Asynchronous). Asterisks mark a significative difference 
(*p<.05; **p < .005; Red asterisk indicate a significant difference after Bonferroni correction ** p<.0001) . Error bars 
represent standard error of mean (SEM). Questions are ordered from the more significant to the less significant 
different.      
 
3.3 Experiment 2 
 
The first experiment showed that subjective experiences of enfacement can be elicited 
over an empty region of space. In this experiment we investigated the illusion using a more 
objective test, measuring skin-conductance responses in response to a knife approaching the 
region of the invisible face. Such autonomic responses have been widely used as an objective 
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measure of body ownership in studies of the enfacement illusion (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 
2012; 2014), as well as the rubber hand illusion (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 
2007; Tieri et al., 2015) and the full-body illusion (Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). 
Therefore if participants truly embodied the empty space , we expected an higher skin 
conductance response to the knife after synchronous as compared to the asynchronous 
condition. 
3.3.1 Materials and methods 
 
Participants 
Thirty individuals (14 women) were recruited for this study (mean age = 25.6 years; SD 
= 6.4). A statistical power analysis was performed for sample size estimation. We first 
identified previous studies that used SCRs to objectively measure the effect of a bodily illusion 
comparing synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Four such studies were identified 
(Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Guterstam et al., 2012; 
2015). Specifically, Armel and Ramachandran (2003), recorded SCRs  after injuring a rubber 
hand over which participants experienced ownership. Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012) 
combined SCRs with the classical enfacement illusion. Finally Guterstam et al. (2012, 2015), 
recorded SCRs to a threat after participants experienced the illusion of having an invisible 
hand or body, respectively. We conducted a random-effects meta-analysis on the effect sizes 
(Cohen’s dz) for the comparison between synchronous and asynchronous conditions, using 
ESCI software (Cummings, 2013), which resulted in an average effect size of 0.535. We then 
conducted a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), with power level of 0.80, which 
indicated that 30 participants were needed.  
Participants had normal or correct to normal vision. They all provided written informed 
consent to participate to the experiment, which was approved by the Department of 
Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Birkbeck, University of London. The 
study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
 Stimuli 
We used the same video as in Experiment 1, with the only difference that this time at 
the end of the stroking, a knife appeared on the left side of the screen, moving towards the 
invisible face making contact with the right side of the face and then disappearing out of the 
field of view. The entire movement lasted approximately 3 sec.  As previously recalled, such 
kind of stimulus is very common to objectively test the degree of embodiment in several bodily 
illusion (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Tajadura-Jimenez et 
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al., 2012; 2014). The rationale is that bodily threat usually evokes change in autonomic 
arousal. Thus, if an object is qualified as a part of one’s own body, a physical threat to it evokes 
the same anxiety response and autonomic arousal.  To avoid participants being able to 
anticipate the appearance of the knife, we produced three videos of different lengths: 105 sec, 
156 sec, 207 sec before the knife onset. In the 105 sec video, the entire stroking sequence was 
repeated two times, in the 156 sec video the sequence was repeated three times, and in the 207 
sec video it was repeated for four times.   
 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the difference that in Experiment 2 we 
recorded the skin conductance response as a measure of the emotional response when the 
invisible face was threaten by a knife after a period of visuotactile stimulation. The skin 
conductance response was collected through a Biosemi ActiveTwo System (Biosemi, 
Amsterdam) connected to a dedicated PC through a parallel port. For the skin conductance 
measures the ActiveTwo uses a 16Hz SC circuit with a 1μA current producing a 16Hz signal that 
is synchronized with the ActiveTwo system’s sample rate. The signal was recorded by means of 
two silver electrodes placed on the volar surface of the distal phalanges (fingertip region) of the 
left hand. A saline conductive paste was applied to the electrodes to improve signal to noise 
ratio. OpenSesame software (Mathot et al., 2012) sent triggers coding for the stimulus onset to 
the skin conductance response trace at the moment in which the knife appears on the screen. 
Participants wore the electrodes for a few minutes before starting the recording at the beginning of 
the Experiment in order to allow a good electrode contact and to allow for the gel to become 
sufficiently absorbed over the measurement area for high quality data (Dawson et al., 2007). 
    The synchronous and asynchronous conditions were repeated three times using 
ABBAAB counterbalancing, with the first condition counterbalanced across participants. At the 
end of each trial, the invisible face was threatened by the knife appearing on the screen.  
In addition to the SCRs, at the end of each trial we asked participants to fill out the 
same questionnaire used in Experiment 1 (see Table 1).  
 
 
Analysis 
 
We used EEGLab Matlab toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) to analyze SCRs. The 
SCR was identified as the peak value on the conductance occurring up to 6 sec after the onset 
of the threat stimuli. The amplitude of the increase in conductance was measured as the 
difference between the maximal and minimal value of the response identified in this time-
window (Armel and Ramachandran; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Guterstam et al., 2013). We 
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calculated the average of the all responses including the trials where no response was 
apparent, thus, analysing the magnitude of the SRC (Dawson et al., 2007).  
3.3.2 Results 
 
The SCR results are shown in Figure 3.3. We found a significantly greater threat evoked SCRs 
after the synchronous (1,28 μS)  as compared to the asynchronous condition (0, 86 μS), t(29) = 
2,92, p < .007; dz = 0.53 ; Figure 3.3).    
 
                                    
Figure 3.3. Skin conductance responses time-locked to the appearance of the knife threatening the invisible face. 
There was an increased reaction in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition. Error bars are 
indicates the standard error of the Mean (S.E.M). Asterisk indicate a significant difference (p < 0.007). 
 
The questionnaire results were similar to those of Experiment 1, and confirmed that the 
synchronous visuotactile stimulation was effective in manipulating the sense of facial identity. 
Crucially, also in Experiment 2 we found significative differences between Synchronous and 
Asynchronous conditions in the critical statements that evaluate the illusion (see Figure 3.4) 
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Figure 3.4. Subjective experience of the enfacement. The graph shows the average ratings for each question as a 
function of the visuotactile stimulation (Synchronous vs Asynchronous). Asterisks mark a significative difference 
(*p<.05; **p < .005; Red asterisks indicate significant differences after Bonferroni correction *p <.003; ** p < .0001). 
Error bars represent standard error of mean (SEM)    
  
3.3. Experiment 3  
 
Experiment 1 and 2 showed that synchronous visuotactile stimulation between 
participant’s face and a discrete volume of empty space elicits embodiment for an invisible 
face, as assessed by questionnaires and skin conductance response. In Experiment 3, we aimed 
to investigate whether such illusion is effective in modulating the gaze perception. In 
particular, we hypothesized that if participants truly experienced their own face as invisible 
they should feel themselves as less observed by others, leading to a reduction of the cone of 
gaze.  
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3.3.1 Methods 
 
Participants  
Thirty participants (18 women) were recruited for this study (mean age = 25; SD = 
3.70). Participants had normal or correct to normal vision. They all provided written informed 
consent to participate to the experiment, which was approved by the Department of 
Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee at Birkbeck, University of London. The 
study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
  
Stimuli 
For this study we used four faces identities, two males and two females, with a neutral 
expression, taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF). The hair and non 
facial areas were removed from the photographs, so that only the central face area was visible 
(see Figure 3.5). As in Ewbank et al. (2009), gaze direction was manipulated using Adobe 
Photoshop. The position of the eyes was shifted to the left or to the right of one pixel per 
images by up to 10 pixels in each direction. Therefore, we had twenty one gaze deviation along 
the horizontal axis for each face (from -10 to 10 pixels), manipulated according to the method 
of constant stimuli. 
 
Figure 3.5 We had 21 gaze directions for each of the four faces used in the Experiment (from 10 pixels left to 
10 pixels right). In the figure, one male and one female facial identity for five gaze directions are shown: 10 
pixels left, 5 pixels left, direct gaze, 5 pixels right, 5 pixels left.  
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Procedure  
The setting and the enfacement procedure were the same of Experiment 1. Participants 
were asked to watch the enfacement induction movie, while the experimenter stroked their 
face either synchronously or asynchronously with respect to the stroking on the invisible face. 
Counterbalancing of conditions was identical to Experiment 2. In each block, participants 
received 207 secs of visuotactile stimulation and then performed the cone of direct gaze task. 
Gaze deviations were tested using a method of constant stimuli. Each face, randomly selected, 
was presented for 500 ms in the centre of the screen on a grey background, using OpenSesame 
software. Participants were required to press one of three buttons according to whether they 
considered the face was looking to their left, to their right or directly at them. After each run, 
84 faces were presented, such that there were a total of 252 faces presented for each 
synchronous and asynchronous condition. In each block, after every 21 gazes we repeated the 
visuotactile stimulation for 15 secs (corresponding to two brushstrokes). These 15s visuotactile 
periods served as a top-up to reinforce enfacement effects when they loss could have occurred, 
given the possibility for participants to move their head.        
 
Analysis 
 Our analysis was modelled on that used by Mareschal and colleagues (2013b). For each 
participant, separate analyses were conducted on data from the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. In each case, three curves were fit simultaneously to the data using 
the fminsearch function in Matlab, implementing the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm. Data 
from the ‘left’ and ‘right’ responses were modelled using logistic curves, and ‘direct’ responses 
were modelled as a curve defined as 1 minus the sum of the left and right curves at each point. 
By definition, therefore, the three curves sum to 1, appropriately reflecting the fact that the 
participant made a 3-alternative forced choice judgment. To estimate the width of the cone of 
direct gaze, we calculated the cross-over points between the curves. The left edge of the cone of 
gaze was operationalized as the location where the curves for left and direct judgments 
intersected; the right edge was operationalized as the location where the curves for right and 
direct judgments intersected. The difference between these two boundaries provides the width 
of the cone of direct gaze. 
3.3.2 Results 
 
 Results from gaze perception task are shown in Figure 3.6. The model showed excellent 
fit to the data, with mean R2 values of 0.984 (range: 0.957 – 0.999) in the synchronous 
condition and 0.985 (range: 0.950 – 0.998) in the asynchronous condition.  
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Figure 3.6 Plot showing mean fitted left, direct and right responses as a function of gaze direction in the Synchronous 
and Asynchronous condition. Vertical lines show cross-over points used to calculate cone of gaze. 
 
We compared the mean width of cone across all participants for the Synchronous and 
Asynchronous condition through a paired t-test. Crucially the cone of gaze in the synchronous 
condition (5.37 pixels) is significantly thinner than the cone of gaze in the asynchronous (6.12 
pixels) control condition (t(29) = 6.86, p < 0.0001, dz = 1.25; Figure 3.6) 
 
                         
Figure 3.6 Mean width of cone across all participants for Synchronous and Asynchronous condition. Error bars indicate 
the standard error of the Mean (S.E.M). Asterisk indicate a significant difference 
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3.4 Discussion 
 
Our results showed that participants experience an embodiment for an invisible face 
when they received touches on their face and saw a paintbrush moving synchronously in an 
empty space and defining, through its bristles, the contours and the shape of an invisible face. 
Crucially embodying the invisible face significantly shrinks the cone of gaze. In Experiment 1, 
questionnaire ratings after synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation were significantly different 
from the asynchronous condition, suggesting that the synchronous visuotactile stimulation 
was effective in modulating the perception of facial identity, inducing in participants a sense of 
ownership for the invisible face. Questionnaire’s results were further confirmed in Experiment 
2. Moreover, objective evidence for the illusion  was obtained by demonstrating that physical 
threats to the “invisible face” elicited increased skin conductance responses  when participants 
experienced the illusion after the synchronous visuotactile stimulation as compared to the 
asynchronous control condition. Finally, in Experiment 3 we demonstrated that synchronous 
visuotactile stimulation, as compared to the asynchronous condition,  affects the perception of 
gaze directions. 
Contrary to previous studies on enfacement, we elicited a manipulation in one’s own 
face representation even in absence of visual inputs from a physical face. The invisible 
enfacement phenomenon indeed has particularly relevant implications for our understanding 
of the mechanisms involved in self face recognition. Previous researches on the enfacement 
illusion surely showed that the sense of facial identity may be more malleable than previously 
thought (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010; Cardini et al., 2013). However, previous studies 
gave particularly emphasis to the changes in the perceived physical similarity between the self 
and the other, suggesting that the participant’s visual representation of their own and 
another’s face become partially blurred. In particular, the enfacement illusion was found to 
elicit activity in unimodal visual (inferior occipital gyrus) and multimodal visuo-tactile areas, 
such as the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and temporopaietal junction (TPJ) (Apps et al., 2013). It 
has been proposed (Porciello et al., 2018) that TPJ detects a conflict between self tactile and 
other visual signals and then informs IPS that serves to maintain a coherent body 
representation. Indeed, IPS contains peripersonal space neurons that are multisensory 
neurons, anchored to the surface of one body parts (e.g. the face) and responding both to 
tactile stimuli on body parts and to visual stimuli presented near the same body part (Colby et 
al., 1993; Graziano and Gross, 1995). Thus, the enfacement illusion may be driven by the 
remapping of another person’s peripersonal space onto one’s own peripersonal space, 
triggered by the visuotactile stimulation (Maister et al., 2015). Crucially, the present study 
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suggests that this can also happen when visual information of a physical face is absent. 
However, it’s worth to notice that although the face was not visible, the bristles of the 
paintbrush used for the visuotactile stimulation deflected in a way that defined the contours of 
an invisible head. Thus, it’s possible to imagine that the visual information created by the 
bristles deflection, was a necessary cue to manipulate the sense of facial identity, although this 
question is not directly explored in our study.  
The most important result of the present study is that synchronous visuotactile 
stimulation   affected the perception of gaze direction. In particular, we used the metaphor of 
cone of gaze to refer to the range of gaze directions that are perceived as directed at the 
participant (Gamer et al., 2007).  In previous studies the cone of gaze has been shown to be 
modulated mainly by high order cognitive factors concerning personality traits (Jun et al., 
2013; Gamer et al., 2011), emotion perception (Ewbank et al., 2009) and perception of social 
contexts (Lyyra et al., 2016). Here, instead, we showed that also a mere change in one’s own 
face representation can affect the perception of gaze direction, demonstrating a close 
relationship between the perception of gaze directions and one’s own face representation. 
These data fit nicely with recent studies on embodied cognition showing the existence of a 
causal link between central body representations and social cognition or interpersonal 
attitudes. When we experience an illusion over a body different from our own, this can change 
aspects of our self identity  and the way in which the self is conceptualized (Banakou et al., 
2013), which, in turn, may change the way in which we interact with other people (Peck et al., 
2013; Yee & Bailenson, 2007). In particular, investigations on enfacement have not only found 
evidence of changes in perceived physical similarity between self and other, but also blur self-
other conceptual boundaries. Ma and co-workers (2016; 2018) called this effect “features 
migration”, referring to the fact that increasing self-other similarity allows also affective and 
conceptual features to “migrate” from the representation of the other to the representation of 
oneself. Ma et al. (2016), for instance, demonstrated that enfacing a smiling face, participants 
showed a better mood, as explicitly assessed by questionnaires and a better performance in a 
mood-sensitive brainstorming creativity task. A subsequent study from the same research 
team, showed that enfacing an ape face reduced the performance in a fluid intelligent task and 
increased the willingness to attribute emotion to apes (Ma et al., 2018). Thus, enfacement 
illusion paradigm showed that increasing the overlap between the self and another face 
representation promotes illusory conjunctions, in which features of the other become features 
of oneself.  In our case, enfacing an invisible face may lead participants to share the 
characteristic of being invisible, i.e., the impossibility of being gaze upon, thus reducing the 
range of gaze deviations perceived as directed toward the self.  
When people notice that they are being looked at, they become aware that the attention 
or intentionality of another person is directed at them. This awareness is fundamental during 
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social interactions and is obviously distinct from the awareness of one’s own physical body 
because it requires the existence of another person (Sugiura, 2013). Thus, our results suggest 
that the experience of invisibility may affect the manner in which we process the attention of 
others toward the self. These data are strongly in agreement with previous research by 
Guterstam et al. (2015), showing that the illusory ownership for an invisible body illusion 
reduces the level of subjective stress and decreases heart rate in response to standing in front 
of a crowd of unknown people. In particular, these authors argued that when participants 
experienced the invisible body illusion, their body was represented as invisible to outside 
observers as well, which in turn should reduce social anxiety related to being the centre of 
other people attention. This conclusion is particularly interesting for the present study, 
because researches on the cone of gaze demonstrated  that it is wider in people suffering of 
social anxiety (Gamer et al., 2011; Jun et al., 2013). People with social anxiety show a hyper 
vigilance-avoidance pattern of attention to threat stimuli (Onnis et al., 2011). Therefore, in the 
case of socially anxious individuals hyper vigilance may exacerbate the normal tendency to 
assume other’s people gaze as directed toward the self, producing a wider cone of gaze and 
leading to an exaggerated feeling of being looked at (Jun et al., 2013).  Thus, it’s possible to 
speculate that perceiving one’s own body as invisible affects the way in which the brain 
processes the attention of the others toward the self, starting from a hypo-attention to the eye 
region which is associated to a weaker judgment of those eyes being directed at the observer. 
As previously recalled, indeed, humans have an expectation that the gaze is directed toward 
them (Mareschal et al., 2013b). In a notable study, Mareschal et al. (2013b), by applying 
Bayesian framework,   demonstrated that this expectation dominates perception when there is 
high uncertainty. In this study authors, by adding noise to the eyes, presented participants 
with faces viewed under high or low levels of uncertainty. They found that participants 
systematically perceived the noisy gaze as being directed more toward them.  In accordance 
with previous evidence,  it’s possible to assume that participants, representing one’s own face 
as invisible after synchronous multisensory stimulation, may update also their prior 
expectation that the gaze is directed toward the self, accordingly with the new body 
representation.  
However it is not our intent to claim that the illusion of having an invisible face is the 
only body change effective in modulating gaze perception. The cone of gaze is extremely plastic 
depending on several emotional or affective contexts, thus  it’s possible to imagine that also 
other bodily illusions may affect the cone of gaze. For instance, embodying a scared face may 
lead participants to be hyper-vigilant, thus enlarging their cone of gaze like persons with social 
phobia. It’s possible that the dynamic interaction between one’s own face representation and 
the perception of gaze direction, could happen also at the neural level.. Perception of direct eye 
gaze is associated with activation in amodal association cortices in the medial frontal and 
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lateral posterior cortices (Sugiura et al., 2013). In particular, activation has been identified in 
the medio prefrontal cortex encompassing the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Kampe et 
al.,2003; Schilbach et al., 2006; Steuwe et al., 2012), the TPJ/pSTS (Pelphrey et al., 2004; 
Schilbach et al., 2006; Steuwe et al., 2012), the anterior temporo poral cortex (ATC). These 
regions have often been recognized as a cortical network supporting the inference of another’s 
mental state, namely mentalizing or theory of mind(Amodio and Firth, 2006). We can 
therefore hypothesize that the observed illusion-induced reduction of the cone of gaze, is 
reflected in the neural interplay between multisensory representations of one’s own face in 
intraparietal areas and the cortical neural network supporting metalizing and theory of mind. 
This is an intriguing hypothesis that future studies could put at test.   
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Chapter 4 
The illusion of having a tall or short body differently 
modulates IPS and PPS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the second chapter of the thesis it has been shown that the illusion of having an 
invisible body strongly modulates the interpersonal space (IPS), as measured by a comfort 
distant task.  As discussed, when participants experience their own body as invisible, they feel 
more protected and less exposed to the other proximity, allowing the other person to be closer 
to their body. This was in line with an interpretation of IPS as a protective safety space that 
increases in threatening and uncomfortable situations (e.g. danger, fear, anxiety) and decrease 
in unthreatening and comfortable situations.  
In contrast, the illusion of having an invisible body did not affect the perceived 
peripersonal space (PPS), as measured by a reaching distance task. Indeed, PPS, as discussed, 
is an action space that offers a  multisensory interface for body–objects interactions to 
generate goal directed action within the reaching distance. (Brozzoli et al., 2014; di Pellegrino 
and Ladavas, 2015) . PPS has been linked, indeed, with the actual length of the arm 
(Linkenauger et al., 2015; Longo and Lourenco, 2007)  and it is strongly modulated by action 
dependent manipulations  (Bassolino et al., 2015). We argued that the  illusion of having an 
invisible body did not affect the arm length representation, so that it leaved intact the 
potentiality to act in space and also the perceived PPS was unaffected.  
On the other hand, recent studies have been shown that inducing ownership over a 
body or body parts of different sizes caused modulations also in near space perception. In a 
series of elegant studies, Van der Hoort and colleagues (van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 2014;  2016; 
van der Hoort et al., 2011), modified the body swap illusion to embody participants in a very 
small or large body. Crucially, these modulations in body metrics not only affected body 
representation but impacted also on space and object perception.. Thus, identical objects at 
identical distances were perceived as larger and farther away when participants owned a small 
body, and as smaller and closer when they owned a large body. In line with these results, 
Linkenauger et al. (2015), by using virtual reality, induced in participants the illusion of having 
a long or short virtual arm. Authors found that the distances to targets appeared closer when 
participants’ virtual arm was long, compared to when their virtual arm was short, even if these 
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modulations occurred only following a reaching experience. Thus, these latter data suggest a 
close relationship between the representation of our body size, the potentiality to act in space 
and space perception.   
Although one’s own body-part size has been connected with the PPS (Linkenauger et al., 
2015; Longo and Laourenco, 2007), there are no studies that investigated whether an illusory 
change in one’s own body size can affect also IPS. In the social domain, body size and height  
have been associated with social status and dominance in both animals and humans (Ellis, 
1994; McElligott et al., 2001; Schuett, 1997).  Studies have shown that height is positively 
related to proxies of social status, such as leadership, professional achievement, education, and 
income. Stulp et al., (2015) showed that shorter individuals tend to give way on a narrow 
sidewalk and in a busy shopping street to taller individuals. These authors hypothesized that 
height directly influences the likelihood of an individual winning during a dyadic interaction, 
as a result of the increased interpersonal dominance of taller people during confrontations 
with competitors. There is evidence suggesting that individuals’ height is related to physical 
dominance: taller compared to shorter men are physically stronger and perceived to be 
stronger; physically more aggressive ; show better fighting ability; and feel less threatened by 
physically dominant men. However, also in non physical contest, taller people are also 
perceived as more competent, authoritative, intelligent, dominant, and having better 
leadership qualities. 
Setting out from these findings, in the present study we wanted to investigate whether 
the same manipulation in one’s own body height can affect IPS and, moreover, reveal a 
dissociation between IPS and PPS. To this aim, we measured IPS through a comfort-distance 
task, in which participants were asked to stop an individual approaching them at a position in 
which they felt most comfortable with the other’s proximity. In addition, we measure PPS in a 
similar way through a reaching-distance task, in which participants were asked to stop the 
other person at the distance in which they thought they could reach him. These two tasks were 
performed before and after participants experienced illusory ownership for a tall body.  
Based on the finding suggesting a positive association between height, social status and 
dominance (Stulp, 2005; Yee and Bainsolon, 2007), we hypothesized  that  the illusion of 
having a tall body should induce participants to feel more dominant during a dyadic 
interaction, thus leading to a reduction of IPS between them and a confederate. At the same 
time, an increase in body size, in particular of one’s own effectors, may affect also the perceived 
potentiality to act in space. Thus, we predicted that participants experiencing ownership for a 
tall body should extend their action PPS, accordingly to an increased length of their effectors. 
Thus, if IPS and PPS are sensitive to the body height manipulation, we should expect a 
modulation in opposite directions, that is a contraction of IPS and an extension of PPS.  
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4.2  Experiment 1 
 
 4.2.1 Materials and methods 
 
 Participants 
Twenty three healthy individuals volunteered for this experiment (age range= 19-26; 
mean = 22.78 ). A statistical power analysis  was performed with GPower 3 for sample size 
estimation. Based on data from our previous study (D’Angelo et al., 2017), we specified a 
medium effect size (η2p = 0.25) with power level at 0.80  and correlation among measures of 
0.26. All of the participants were instructed to wear a pair of trousers and a black t-shirt. The 
study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Bologna, in agreement with 
the 2008 Helsinki Declaration  and all participants gave their written informed consent. 
 
Setting 
 
Participants were fitted with a set of HMDs (VRvision, 800 x 600 resolutions equals 
1.4M pixels and full colour, 42° diagonal field of view). HMDs were connected, trough a PC, to 
a synchronized HD webcam colour (Logitech HD pro webcam C920 full HD 1080p) placed on 
a tripod and adjusted at the same height of the participant’s head. Participants were asked to 
stand upright in a marked position to the left of the tripod and to look straight head. In this 
way, participants viewed in the HMDs the part of the room filmed by the camera, as if their 
first person perspective was that of the camera.  
 
 Comfort and Reaching distance task     
 
Participants performed a Reaching and a Comfort distance task to assess the estimated 
PPS and IPS between them and a confederate actor. The confederate, placed in front of the 
tripod from a of 5 meters starting position, moved at natural gait toward the camera. In the 
Reaching distance task, participants were required to stop the confederate at the distance they 
thought they could reach the other person by extending their arm. In the Comfort distance 
task, instead, participants were asked to stop the confederate at the shortest distance they felt 
comfortable with the other’s proximity. In either tasks, participants could fine tune the 
distance, by asking the confederate to slightly move further backward or forward. The 
confederate was instructed to avoid any direct contact gaze, looking at a fix position on the 
tripod just under the camera.  Male participants performed the task with a male confederate 
and female participants performed the task with a female one. Through the tasks, participants 
stood with their arms extended along the trunk. The Reaching and Comfort distance tasks were 
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administrated in separate block of 6 trials per task. The order of blocks was counterbalanced 
across participants. At the end of each trial participants were asked to close their eyes, 
meanwhile the distance between the confederate’s sternum and a fix point on the tripod was 
measured with a digital laser meter (Agatec, model DM 100, error ±0.3 cm). Then, the 
confederate came back to his/her starting position for the following trial. To ensure a 
standardized appearance of the confederates, they had to wear a pair of trousers and a black t-
shirt and to maintain a neutral expression. Participants and the confederate didn’t speak to 
each other for the whole experiment.  
The Reaching and Comfort-distance task were repeated with the same confederate before and 
after the body swap illusion.  
 
Body swap with a tall body 
 
           Next, participants underwent a body swap illusion with a tall male mannequin (200 
centimetres tall).Immediately after the Reaching and Comfort distance task, participants were 
asked to close their eyes and to tilt their heads downwards as if they looked down at their 
bodies, meanwhile the experimenter replaced the tripod with the mannequin. On the 
mannequin’s head there was another camera pointing downwards, such that it recorded events 
from the position corresponding to the mannequin’s eyes. The experimenter turned on the 
mannequin’s camera connected, by PC, to the HMDs as well. Then, participants were asked to 
open their eyes and, in this way, they could see the mannequin’s body where they expected to 
see their own body. To induce the illusion, we used a paintbrush to repetitively stroke different 
participant’s body parts, which were out of view, while synchronously identical strokes were 
applied with another brush to the mannequin’s body, in full view of the participant (for a 
similar body swap procedure, see Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011). This 
visuotactile stimulation lasted 2 minutes. Then, participants were asked to close again their 
eyes, while the experimenter placed the tripod in the same location as before. To avoid that the 
bodily illusion was easily broken,  during the following tasks, we adjusted the tripod so that the 
camera filmed the room from 2 meters high perspective. Thus, participants raised their head, 
opened their eyes and watched, in the HMDs, the room from a 2 meters high perspective. As a 
control condition, we applied asynchronous brushstrokes to the participant and mannequin’s 
body, matching the total number and length of the strokes. The experiment was conducted as a 
within-group counterbalanced design. The order of the synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions was counterbalanced across participants, who performed both in two different days. 
To rule out a possible effect of the mere change of perspective, the camera was placed at 2 
meters in height also after the asynchronous visuotactile stimulation.  
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Ratings  
In our paradigm the change in body height was accompanied by a change in visual 
perspective, which in turn may had an effect on object size and distance perception. In other 
words participants could perceived the confederate and objects in the environment as smaller 
and closer after the visutactile stimulation and the change in visual perspective. Thus, we 
wanted to rule out the possibility that the modulation in space perception could be caused by a 
general change in object’s size perception, rather than by the ownership sensed for a tall body. 
To rule out this possibility we asked participants to manually estimate the size of a stool, before 
and after the body swap illusion.  In particular, before experiment started, the experimenter 
placed a stool in front of the camera that remained visible for about three seconds. 
Participants, who saw the stool trough the HMDs, were instructed  to manually estimate its 
size. In particular, they were asked to indicate  the size of the stool as the width between the 
palms (see figure 4.1), and to maintain their hands in this position until when the experimenter 
measured this distance with a laser meter (Agatec, model DM 100, error ±0.3 cm). This task 
was repeated also after the body swap illusion and it served as a measure to evaluate a change 
in object’s size perception due to the illusion.  The stool in the post illusion session had the 
same size of the previous one, but it was of different color to prevent participants from 
recognizing the object across the pre and post body swap sessions.   
   Moreover, to provide a measure of the illusory ownership over the tall body, at the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked to complete a 5-item questionnaire (questions were 
adapted from Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Guterstam et al., 2015; see Table 1).  Participants 
were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with six statements using 
a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from −3 (“I completely disagree”) to +3 (“I completely 
agree”), with a response of 0 indicating “neither agreed nor disagreed”. Three of the statements 
examined the perception of the illusion (Q1–Q3) and the remaining two  statements were 
designed to control for suggestibility and task compliance (Q4-Q5) 
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                              Figure 4.1  The figure shows the hands’ position kept by participants to estimate the stool size.  
  
4.2.2 . Results and discussion 
 
The mean distances in cm recorded in each condition were contrasted by an ANOVA 
with Stimulation (Synchronous and Asynchronous), Task (Reaching and Comfort distance) 
and Session (Pre and Post) as within subject factors. Significant interaction were followed by 
Newman Keuls post hoc. The interactions Stimulation x Task (F1,22=20.03; p<.001; η2p= 0.47) 
and Session x Task (F1,22 =17.85; p < .001; η2p= 0.44) were significant. Crucially, also the three-
way interaction Stimulation x Task x Session was also significative (F1,22 =16.10; p < .001; η2p= 
0.42). Newman-Keuls post hoc revealed the Reaching-distance was significantly extended after 
synchronous condition, as compared to before (62.05 vs 75.52 cm ; p< .005), whereas the 
Comfort distance following  the synchronous condition was significantly reduced with respect 
to before (66.23 vs 5.79 cm; p < 0.05) (See Figure 4.2).  
In contrast, there was no significant difference in the asynchronous condition between pre and 
post neither in the  Reaching (59.97 vs 63.24 cm; p = 0.68) and in the Comfort distance (66.71 
vs 71.19 cm; p = 0.42) task. In addition, before body swap  no significant difference between 
Reaching and Comfort-distance amplitudes appeared neither in the Synchronous ( 62.05 vs 
67.23 cm; p= .49) and Asynchronous (59.44 vs 66.11 cm; p = .30) conditions.  
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Figure 4.2. Effects of visuotactile stimulation on comfort and reaching-distance. Mean distance (cm) shown as a 
functions of the two tasks (comfort and reaching), Stimulation conditions (Synch, Asynch) and two sessions (pre and 
post). Asterisk marks a significant difference.  Error bars indicate standard error from the mean 
 
Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed to investigate the subjective experiences of 
participants during the multisensory stimulation. The response given to each question after 
synchronous stimulation was compared to the response given after asynchronous stimulation 
using Paired Wilconxon Signed Ranks Test cause they are not normally distributed; Mean 
agreement and results of the statistical comparisons are presented in Table 4.1. As it can be 
seen in Table 1, stronger agreement with the first three statements indicated that participants 
experienced the body swap illusion. Importantly, the questionnaire results show that only the 
three critical illusion questions significantly higher in the synchronous than asynchronous 
conditions. On the other hand, no significant difference was found in the two control 
statements ratings between synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
 
Question                                          Synchronous M(SD)            Asynchronous M(SD)                    z  
Q1. “I felt the touch of the brush 
on the mannequin in the location where                             2,43 (0.99)                                -0.11(2.24)*                                - 3.56 
I saw the brush moving” 
Q2. “It felt as if the mannequin’s body                              1.57 (1.24)                               -0.87 (1.96) *                                 - 3.77 
was my body 
Q3. “I experienced that the touch I felt was                       1.48 (1.56)                               -1.48 (1.62) *                                -3.05 
caused by the brush touching the mannequin” 
Q4. “It felt as if I had two bodies”                                      -0.99 (2.21)                              - 0.48 (1.98)                                  -0.68 
Q5 “I could no longer feel my body”                                  -1.78 (2.21)                               - 1.48 (1.62)                                  -0.69  
 
Tabel 4.1 Mean ratings (±SD) for each questionnaire item in the two experimental conditions (Synchronous 
vs. Asynchronous) 
*p <.005  
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Crucially, bimanual object size estimation were significantly smaller after the  participants 
watched the stool from a 2 meters height prospective in both synchronous (p <.01, paired t-
test) and asynchronous conditions (p < .01). This means that the only change in perspective is 
sufficient to induce a rescaling in the perceived object’s size (Table 4.2). 
 
Pre M (SEM) Post M (SEM) 
Synchronous 47.65(3.29) 39.40 (2.72)* 
Asynchronous 50.09 (3.89) 42.54 (2.86)* 
 
Tabel 4.2 The high perspective effect on size perception as measured by the hand aperture. Mean distances between the 
hands are shown as a function of the session (Pre and Post) and Stimulation (Synchronous and Asynchronous). Asterisk 
indicate a significant difference (p <.01)  between pre and post in both Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions 
 
     We showed that IPS was reduced after synchronous visuotactile stimulation and, at the 
same time, the perceived PPS was modulated in the direction of extension. By contrast, there 
was no significant modulation in IPS and PPS after asynchronous visuotactile stimulation. 
Crucially, participants reported ownership for the tall body only after synchronous but not 
after asynchronous visuotactile stimulation. However, a change in body height cause also a 
change in the visual perspective and a consequent change in the perceived size of the word. 
Therefore it remains possible that the present results do not reflect ownership sensed for a tall 
body. Rather, such modulations could be due to the high visual perspective during and after 
the body swap that cause participants to perceive the confederate smaller as compared to 
before visuotactile stimulation. However, findings from asynchronous condition rule out this 
possibility. In the asynchronous condition participants did not report ownership for the tall 
body but the change in perspective was still present. Although the 200 cm high perspective in 
the asynchronous condition was not effective in modulating IPS and PPS, it was still effective 
in changing the visual perception of object size, as assed by the manual estimation of the stool 
size. Thus, this evidence makes unlikely that the modulation of IPS and PPS was due  by the 
only change in the perceived confederate’s size. Rather, present data clearly indicate that the 
reduction of IPS and extension of PPS depend also (or exclusively) on the perception of one’s 
own body as taller.  
To further confirm this hypothesis we conducted another study (Experiment 2) aimed to reveal 
results opposite to those obtained in the Experiment 1. That is, if a tall body leads participants 
to feel themselves more dominant in the dyadic interaction and to accordingly modulate the 
IPS (i.e., enlargement), we should expect an opposite modulation of IPS when participants 
experience ownership for a short body. In experiment 2, we directly tested this hypothesis, 
measuring IPS and PPS before and after a body swap illusion with a short (105 cm) body. We 
expected that participants feel themselves less dominant in the dyadic interaction, leading to 
81 
 
an extension of IPS. Moreover, we hypothesized a contraction of PPS consistent with a reduced 
potentatiality to act in the space around the body.  
 
4.3. Experiment 2 
 
4.3.1 Methods 
 
Participants 
A new group of twenty three participants (age range= 20-27 ; mean = 22,87; 12 
women), were recruited to the study. Also in this case  participants were instructed to wear a 
pair of trousers and a black t-shirt. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the 
University of Bologna, in agreement with the 2008 Helsinki Declaration and all participants 
gave their written informed consent.  
 
 Procedure and tasks 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with the exception that a short (105 
cm)  mannequin was used for the body swap illusion. Moreover, after the synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation the experimenter adjusted the camera so that participants watched 
the room  from a 105 cm high perspective. 
 
 4.3.2Results 
 
The mean distances in cm recorded in each condition were contrasted by an ANOVA with 
Stimulation (Synchronous and Asynchronous), Task (Reaching and Comfort distance) and 
Session (Pre and Post) as within subject factors. Significant interaction were followed by 
Newman Keuls post hoc. The interaction Session x Task (F1,23 = 10.48; p <.005; η2p=0.32), as 
well as Session x Task (F1,22 = 12.00; p < .005 ; η2p=0.35)  were significant. Crucially, also the 
three-way interaction Stimulation x Task x Session was also significative (F1,23 = 8.98; p <.005; 
η2p=0.29; see Figure 4.3). Newman-Keuls post hoc revealed that the Comfort distance  was 
extended after as compared to before synchronous visuotactile stimulation (61,38 vs 79,66  cm 
; p <.001). No difference in the comfort distance between pre and post visutactile stimulation 
appeared in the asynchronous condition (56,32 vs 64,71; p =.07). Unlike to the Experiment 1, 
the reaching distance was not significantly modulated by the body swap illusion neither in the 
synchronous (64,53 vs 62,42; p = .27  or asynchronous condition (65,97 v69,47 cm; p = .24). 
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Fig 4.3 Effects of visuotactile stimulation on comfort and reaching-distance. Mean distance (cm) are  shown as 
a functions of the two tasks (comfort and reaching), Stimulation conditions (Synch, Asynch) and two sessions 
(pre and post). Asterisk marks a significant difference. Error bars indicate standard error from the mean 
 
Also in this case responses given at the questionnaire after synchronous stimulation was 
compared to the response given after asynchronous stimulation using Paired Wilconxon 
Signed Ranks Test (Table 4.4).  Also in this case, stronger agreement with the first three 
statements indicated that participants experienced the body swap illusion for  the short body. 
The three critical illusion questions were more strongly affirmed in the synchronous condition 
as compared to the asynchronous condition. No significant difference was found in the two 
control statements ratings between synchronous and asynchronous conditions.  
 
Question                                         Synchronous M(SD)       Asynchronous M(SD)                       z 
Q1. “I felt the touch of the brush 
on the mannequin in the location where                             2.68 (0.64)                                1.00(2.29)*                              -  2.95 
I saw the brush moving” 
Q2. “It felt as if the mannequin’s body                              1.82 (0.85)                               -1.30 (1.18) *                                - 4.01 
was my body 
Q3. “I experienced that the touch I felt was                       1.45 (1.37)                               -0.86 (2.05) *                              - 2.95 
caused by the brush touching the mannequin” 
Q4. “It felt as if I had two bodies”                                     -0.73 (1.38)                             - 1.23 (1.79)                                    - 1.44 
Q5 “I could no longer feel my body”                                 -2.36 (0.95)                             - 2.68 (0.77)                                   -1.11  
 
Tabel 4.4. Mean ratings (±SD) for each questionnaire item in the two experimental conditions (Synchronous vs. 
Asynchronous) 
*p < .005 
 
Bimanual object size estimation were significantly smaller after the  participants watched the 
stool from a 105 centimetres height perspective in both synchronous and asynchronous 
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conditions. This means that even in Experiment 2, the only change in perspective was 
sufficient to induce a change in the visual perception of object size (Table 4.3). 
 
Pre M (SEM) Post M (SEM) 
Synchronous 47.48(3.79) 62.60 (4.03)* 
Asynchronous 48.92 (3.99) 56.86 (4.19)* 
 
Tabel 4.3 The high perspective effect on size perception as measured by the hand aperture. Mean distances between the 
hands are shown as a function of the session (Pre and Post) and Stimulation (Synchronous and Asynchronous). Asterisk 
indicate a significant difference (p <.01)  between pre and post in both Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions 
In conclusion, Experiment 2 showed that IPS was enlarged after synchronous visuotactile 
stimulation as compared to before. In contrast, any significant difference in IPS was found 
after asynchronous visuotactile stimulation.  On the other hand, in contrast to our hypothesis, 
body swap illusion was not effective in modulating PPS in Experiment 2. Indeed, we didn’t find  
any significant modulation in PPS neither after synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation. This could be seem quite tricky to explain. However, previous studies shown that 
although body schema extension is recurrently reported, evidence of contraction is very rare 
(Bassolino et al.,2014 ; Pavani and Zampini, 2007). In healthy individuals, vibratory or 
visuotactile sensory illusions lead to a perception of body parts as bigger, rather than smaller 
than their actual dimensions, suggesting an asymmetric tendency to recognize enlarged but 
not reduced body parts (De Vignemont et al., 2005). Thus, the lack of a reduction of PPS in the 
present study could be due to this asymmetry.  
4.3 Discussion 
 
Body height  has been  related to interpersonal dominance in a variety of social settings.  In the 
present study, given the social “side effects” of the body height,  we wanted investigate whether 
a temporarily change in one’s own height, by a perceptual bodily illusion, may affect the social 
IPS.  Moreover we also  tested if this change is associated also to a modulation in the perceived 
PPS. To this end, we measured IPS and PPS before and after participants experienced 
ownership for a tall body (Experiment 1) and for a short body  (Experiment 2).  
Experiment 1 showed that the illusion of having a tall body, elicited by  synchronous  visual 
and tactile stimuli and explicitly assessed by the questionnaire, significantly reduced IPS and, 
at the same time, enlarged PPS. After asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, participants did 
not report ownership for the body and, crucially,  no significant modulation in both IPS and 
PPS was found.  On the other hand, Experiment 2, further supports the close relationship 
between body representation and IPS, showing that the illusion of having a short body, 
significantly enlarge IPS, although, contrary to the Experiment 1, it leaved intact the action 
PPS. This data nicely fit with previous researches showing that body height  play an important 
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role in the way in which  we interact with other people. Yee and Bainsolon (2007), for instance, 
found that participants were more willing to make unfair splits in an ultimatum game when 
they experienced the embodiment toward a taller than a shorter virtual body. Stulp et al. 
(2015), in a series of observational studies showed that height is related to interpersonal 
dominance in a variety of social setting. They showed that taller individuals were more likely to 
take precedence when entering a narrow passage wide enough for only a single individual to 
pass. Moreover, in a second study, they investigated how pedestrians reacted towards 
confederates of varying height, as they walked along a busy shopping street. Pedestrians were 
more likely to yield to taller than to shorter confederates by giving way and stepping aside.  
The present data fit well with the naturalistic observations by Stulp et al (2015). Indeed, it’s 
possible to assume that  even a momentary change in one’s own body height, like in our study, 
may lead participants to feel themselves as more dominant or less dominant in the dyadic 
interaction with the confederate. Thus we argue that such a change in the interpersonal 
attitude leads  to an enlargement or a contraction of the space in which participants felt most 
comfortable with the other proximity. The current study supports the hypothesis that a 
momentary change in  own-body representation influences the way in which we interact with 
other people, by contributing to the emerging body of research on embodied cognition that 
suggests the existence of a causal link between central body representations and various higher 
cognitive functions. To this regard, it’s worth to notice that in the present study, the change in 
body height was accompanied also by a change in visual perspective. Participants saw the room 
from a 200 or 105 cm high perspective after the body swap with a tall or short body, 
respectively. Thus, some may argue that only the change in visual perspective could be 
sufficient to affect IPS, irrespective of the body swap per se. However, the asynchronous 
condition ruled out this interpretation. Indeed, also in the asynchronous conditions, in which 
participants did not report ownership for the mannequin’s body and no modulations in IPS 
and PPS was found, we changed the visual perspective after the period of visuotactile 
stimulation. Thus, our overall findings clearly indicate that having experience ownership for 
the body was an essential factor to modulate the IPS and PPS and that the visual perspective 
alone was not effective in  modulating space perception.   
In Experiment 1 we found that the illusion of having a tall body, significantly enlarged the PPS. 
PPS is an action space that is modulated mainly by action-dependent variables. For example, 
it’s well known  that the active use of a tool to reach far objects significantly enlarge PPS.  
Cause the length of our effectors (mainly the arms) limits our action space, it has been 
proposed that the PPS extent strictly depends on arm length representation. For instance, 
Longo and Lourenco (2007) showed that the extent of PPS scaled as a function of the arm 
length. Indeed, to this regard, tool use not only affect the extent of PPS but affect also the body 
schema, increasing the length of the sensorimotor representation of the arm. Thus it’s possible 
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to hypothesize that the  illusion of having a tall body updated the representation of  
participants’ arm length, generating new sensorimotor predictions consistent with the new 
arm representation. However, several studies have shown that performing an action is a 
necessary factor  to obtain a modulation in PPS.  Linkenauger et al. (2014), by using virtual 
reality technology, induced in participants the illusion of having a long or short virtual arm. 
They found that the distances to targets appeared closer when their virtual arm was long, 
compared to when their virtual arm was short, but this is was true only after participants 
performed  a reaching action with the virtual arm. In contrast, in our study participants did not 
perform any movements. Anyway, it’s possible to assume that during the reaching distance 
task, participants imagined or programmed a reaching action, keeping into account the new 
body representation. Indeed, in other studies, the modulation in PPS was found also when the 
action is just imagined or intended even if it is not actually executed (Witt et al., 2008; 
Constantini et al., 2011; Davoli et al., 2011; Baccarini et al., 2014). Theories of motor control 
suggest that the brain uses internal models of the body to perform accurate movements. When 
a motor command is issued, a “forward model” of the body estimates the sensory consequences 
of the action (Blakemore et al., 2000; Wolpert & Flanangan, 2001). Thus, PPS space extension 
may reflect an updating of the sensorimotor representation of the body used by the foward 
model to predict the sensory consequences of the action (at this regard see the next chapter) .  
The Experiment 2, contrary to our expectation,  failed to find a significant modulation in PPS. 
However, we retain that the absence of effects on PPS in the short mannequin experiment, is 
quite interesting. Previous studies showed that, although body schema extension is recurrently 
reported, evidence of contraction is very rare (Podoll & Robinson, 200; Bassolino et al.,2012 ; 
Pavani et al., 2007). In healthy individuals, vibratory or visuotactile sensory illusions lead to a 
perception of body parts as bigger, rather than smaller than their actual dimensions, 
suggesting an asymmetric tendency to recognize enlarged but not reduced body parts (De 
Vignemon et al., 2005).  An asymmetric plasticity of body representation may also reflect daily 
life activities where we frequently manipulate objects or tools that elongate our body parts, 
while the reverse effect is uncommon. Thus it is possible that, although the ownership felt for 
the short body was effective in producing the interpersonal consequences consistent with a 
short body, it was ineffective in updating the sensorimotor representation of the arm, 
generating consistent sesorimotor expectations during the reaching distance task.     
To sum up, a change in body height modulated both the perceived interpersonal domince 
during the dyadic interaction and, at least in the tall condition, the perceived potentiality to act 
in space. This double effect on both social cognition and sensorimotor programming, allowed 
us to reveal a dissociation in space perception, depending on whether the space assumes a 
social or a sensorimotor valence.  To this regard, it’s worth to notice that before visuo-tactile 
stimulation reachable and comfort space estimates did not differ, supporting the idea that PPS 
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and IPS share  common functional mechanism and in some circumstances, they refer to the 
same sector of space.  However, despite the fact that the reaching and comfort pre-body swap 
amplitudes were comparable, the illusory ownership for the mannequin’s body revealed a 
difference in the plastic properties of PPS and IPS and even an opposite pattern in the tall 
condition. This suggests that both PPS and IPS may fed by the same sensory inputs , however, 
in some circumstance, they can diverge. Different prior, different weights ascribed to sensory 
inputs and different decision criteria may explained the divergence between them.  In our case, 
body size is an important variable involved not only in programming goal directed actions  but 
also in regulating social interactions. Given this double valence of the body size, a change in 
body height was effective to reveal a dissociation in the representation of the  space around the 
body, depending on whether this sector of space is used for programming actions or for 
regulating social dyadic interaction.        
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Chapter 5 
The sense of agency shapes body schema and 
peripersonal space 
 
 
In the previous chapter we did not succeed in finding a contraction of PPS after 
participants sensed ownership for the short body. We discussed this result in light of an 
asymmetric tendency in updating one’s own sensorimotor representation of the arm 
morphology. Indeed, body schema extension is recurrently reported but evidence of 
contraction is very rare. Moreover, in ecological situations  we frequently manipulate objects or 
tools that elongate our body parts, while the reverse effect is uncommon. We never see in 
everyday life the effects of our action closer to the body than the action itself. Thus it’s possible 
that the mere sense ownership for the short body was not enough to update the sensorimotor 
representation of the arm length and to generate consistent sensorimotor predctions.  
In the next chapter we  will focus more in depth on the notion of body schema and we will try 
to figure out the exact mechanism underling its plasticity. In particular, we hypothesized that 
changes in body schema and peripersonal space  depend on the experience of controlling the 
course of events in space trough one’s own actions, i.e., the sense of agency. Specifically, here 
we tested the hypothesis that body schema and peripersonal space representations are the 
consequence of the simple associations between one’s own intentional actions and their 
outcomes occurring in space. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The term body schema refers to a sensorimotor representation of the body morphology 
used for planning and executing body movements. This sensorimotor body representation 
entails tracking and updating the position and configuration of the body parts in space at the 
service of action (Frederique de Vignemont, 2010; Longo & Haggard, 2010; Longo et al., 
2010). A main characteristic of the body schema is that it is highly plastic. For example, there 
is abundant evidence that the active use of a tool, to interact with objects placed beyond one’s 
reaching space, changes the body schema, increasing length of the sensorimotor 
representation of the arm (Cardinali et al., 2009; Canzoneri et al., 2013; Sposito et al., 2012). 
Body schema has been found to be sensitive also to other manipulations. For instance, after 
right arm immobilization, participants overused the remaining free arm, modulating its 
representation. As a consequence, participants perceived their overused limb as longer after, 
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than before, immobilization (Bassolino et al., 2014). In another study, Tajadura-Jiménez et 
al.(2012) found that body schema is affected by the sound of one’s action. Body schema 
extended after participants tapped on a surface and listened to a tapping sound originating at a 
double the distance at which they actually tapped. This evidence emphasizes the strictly 
connection between body schema, space representation and the motor system. 
To this regard, body schema is closely interwoven with a functional representation of the 
action space immediately surrounding the body, the so-called peripersonal space (di Pellegrino 
& Làdavas, 2015).  As mentioned in Chapter 1, peripersonal space representation depends on 
the activity of multisensory neurons in fronto-parietal network, including the premotor cortex 
(PMc) and the posterior parietal cortex (PPc). These neurons respond both to tactile stimuli on 
body parts and to visual and/or auditory stimuli presented near the same body part. 
Peripersonal space has not only a sensory function, but also motor function. Indeed, in 
monkeys fronto-parietal multisensory neurons control movements of the head, arm and hand 
towards or away from nearby objects (Cooke et al., 2003; Graziano et al.,2002). In humans, 
auditory or visual stimuli presented in the peripersonal space modulate the excitability of the 
hand representation in the motor cortex (Serino et al., 2009; Avenanti et al., 2012). Indeed, 
when we perform an action, the motor system needs to compute target positions relative to 
head or hand. Thus, peripersonal space is a multisensory-motor interface that may serve to 
encode the position of sensory stimuli to generate goal directed action toward objects within 
the reaching distance (di Pellegrino & Ladavas, 2015; de Vignemont & Ianetti, 2015). As body 
schema, also peripersonal space is highly modulated by several action-dependent 
manipulations. Far space becomes included into the peripersonal space after tool-use 
manipulation (Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Farnè & Ladavas, 2000). Moreover, near space 
representation is contracted when participants perform action while wearing weights applied 
to their wrist (Lourenco & Longo, 2009). Thus, the possibility to act in space is critical for the 
construction of both body and space representations. 
Setting out from these premises, in the present study, we hypothesized that body schema and 
peripersonal space extent depend on the experience of controlling the course of events in space 
trough one’s own actions.  
In cognitive neuroscience, the sense of controlling one’s own motor acts and, through them, 
the events in the external environment, has been termed sense of agency (Haggard, 2017; 
Haggard & Chambon, 2012). By definition, the sense of agency depends on the mental 
association between an intentional action and its sensory outcome. Thus, while sense of agency 
begins with the sensorimotor experience of controlling one’s own body, humans can learn new 
contingent associations between movements and outcome, transferring a sense of agency from 
one’s own limb to objects or events, external to the body. Several studies have shown that it is 
possible to retain a sense of agency over an external object without necessarily perceive it as 
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belonging to our body (i.e. the body ownership)(Caspar et al., 2015; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 
2014; Moore et al., 2011). However, although the relationship between body ownership and the 
sense of agency has been extensively addressed, there are relative few studies that investigate 
whether and how body schema and peripersonal space may change when we actively control 
external events through one’s own action. Specifically, here we tested the hypothesis that body 
schema and peripersonal space representations are the consequence of the simple associations 
between one’s own intentional actions and their outcomes occurring in space (i.e., the sense of 
agency). 
Body schema was assessed through the Forearm bisection task. In this task, 
participants are asked to point at their forearm midpoint, a paradigm widely used to assess 
changes in body metric representation (Sposito et al., 2010; Bolognini et al., 2012; Bartolo et 
al., 2014). For instance, it has been recently shown that the perceived arm midpoint shifted 
distally after the active use of the tool, consistent with an increase of the perceived length of 
the arm representation (Sposito et al., 2006).  In the current work, the Forearm bisection task 
was performed before and after the participant’s sense of agency over a far virtual hand was 
manipulated. To this aim, an infrared motion captured device was used to track in real time 
the participant’s hand movements, and control a virtual hand presented on a PC screen placed 
beyond reachable space. If body schema is sensitive to the experience of controlling far space 
through one’s own actions, we should expect that participants pointed to their forearm 
midpoint more distally after sensing agency for the far virtual hand. Moreover, given the close 
functional relationship with body schema (Cardinali et al., 2009), we also tested how 
peripersonal space changes as a function of agency manipulation. To do so, we measured 
peripersonal space through a Reaching distance estimation task (Bourgeois et al., 2014; 
Patané et al., 2017; Witt et al., 2005), in which participants were asked to stop a ball, either 
approaching or withdrawing from them, at a distance at which they thought they could reach it 
by extending the arm. Since body schema and peripersonal space are functionally linked, we 
expected that peripersonal space, too, extended following agency manipulation.  
5.2 Experiment 1 
5.2.1 Methods 
 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (12 females), volunteered for the study (age range= 20-28; mean 
age= 23.86). 
Sample size was determinate a priori by conducting a power analysis using G*Power 3 (Faul et 
al., 2007) specifying a medium effect size (η2p = 0.25). Within our chosen sample size and 
effect size, the power (1-β) was approximately 0.80. Participants were naive to the 
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experimental hypothesis and had no self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric 
disease. All, but one, were right-handed, as assed by Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). They provided written informed consent to participate in the experiment. All 
methods, approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Bologna, were conducted in 
accordance with the 2008 Helsinki Declaration.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were comfortably seated during the experiment in front of a table. They 
performed a Forearm bisection task, in order to assess the sensorimotor representation of the 
arm length. Participants sat blindfolded with their left and right forearms (from the elbow to 
fingertips) on the table, positioned at about 30 cm from the midsagittal plane. On each trial (15 
in total), they were instructed to indicate, with the left index finger, the midpoint of their right 
forearm, considering the elbow and the tip of the middle finger as the two extremities. A 
transparent screen (10.5 cm in height) was placed over the right forearm to avoid tactile 
feedback. The subjective midpoint was measured with a digital laser meter (Agatec DM100, 
error ± 3mm) as the distance between the elbow, corresponding to the 0 mm, and the 
indicated point.  
In addition, peripersonal space was assessed by a Reaching distance estimation task. In this 
task, a small ball (40 mm in diameter), controlled by the experimenter through a linear 
actuator, moved at constant speed (26,93 mm/s) towards or away from the participants 
(approaching vs. withdrawing trials). The ball starting position was at 33 cm from the 
participants’ sternum in the withdrawing trials, and at 133 cm in the approaching trials. 
Participants kept the hands over the table, resting only the wrists over it. They were asked to 
estimate reaching distance (“stop the ball at the distance you think you can reach it by an 
extension of your arm”). Participants could fine-tune the ball distance by asking the 
experimenter to move the ball slightly further or forward. Finally, between trials, they were 
asked to close their eyes. The task was repeated for 15 trials, counterbalancing approaching 
and withdrawing trials. To control the ball movement, we used the aforementioned linear 
actuator (see Figure 5.1). The present linear actuator is operated by a ATmega328P 
microcontroller with a dedicated firmware; an LCD display was used to report the distance, in 
millimeters, from the zero-position of the carriage. The drive speed can be adjusted via a 
potentiometer from 0 to 27 mm/s approximately; two buttons provide forward and backwards 
motion and a calibration procedure (zeroing) for the machine is performed by a third button. 
The linear actuator was shielded from view with an opaque barrier to prevent participants 
from using it as a frame of reference.  
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Figure 5.1. The present linear actuator is based on a motorized spool that manoeuvres the carriage by means of a 
cable and by an elastic element opposite to the cable. When the motor rotates clockwise, the cable is pulled by the 
spool and this causes the carriage to move in the direction of the motor and the elastic cord is placed into tension. 
When the rotation of the motor is reversed, the cable is slowly released from the spool, and the tensioned elastic cord 
provides the force for the carriage to move away from the motor. This type of linear actuator was used mainly for 
safety reasons: it is a passively safe device, since the only force produced directly towards the participant is given by 
the elastic cord, and not by the motor itself.  
In a) a side view of the apparatus is shown; in b) a reduced length version is shown for clarity; in c) the same short 
version is shown, this time without the rails, in order to show the complete carriage and part of the cable and elastic 
cord which drive it; in d) the same version is shown from under the top plane: a cross-section (shown in green) was 
executed in the illustration  to show the passive pulley and the complete path of the cable and elastic cord 
 
 
The order of two tasks was counterbalanced across participants, who performed them twice, 
before and after a 15 minutes training aimed at experiencing a sense of agency for a 3D virtual 
hand. An infrared motion capture device, i.e. leap motion controller, which tracked in real time 
the participant’s hand movement, was used to control the 3D virtual hand presented on a PC 
screen placed at approximately 140 cm from the participants’ sternum. Leap motion controller 
(Weichert et al., 2013)  is an infrared motion capture device designed for hand tracking in 
virtual reality, consisting of two cameras and three infrared LEDs. Thanks to its wide-angle 
lenses (the field of view is 150° wide and 120° deep), the device has a large interaction 3D 
space of eight cubic feet. Both the leap motion controller and the screen were connected to a 
PC, such that when participants moved their right hand, a virtual hand, projected on the 
screen, moved synchronously with the participant’s real right hand (See Figure 5.2 A). At the 
beginning of the leap motion training, participants were asked to watch the screen and to raise 
their right arm in order to perform a game. Participants were instructed to virtually grasp 
objects and make precision grip by controlling the virtual hand (See Figure 5.2B). We 
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positioned a barrier on the table, along the participant’s right shoulder, to hide both the 
participant’s real hand and the leap motion controller.   
                                             
 
Figure 5.2. (A) Leap motion training: we placed a leap motion controller near the palm of the 
right hand and a screen at approximately 140 cm from the participants’ sternum. Both the leap 
motion controller and screen were connected to a PC, so that leap motion controller was used to 
track in real time the participant’s hand movements in order to control a 3D virtual hand projected 
on the screen. (B) Screenshots of two tasks performed by participants during leap motion training 
(V2 Playground app). 
 
 
The training consisted of two timing conditions: synchronous and asynchronous visual 
feedback. In the synchronous condition, participants were shown virtual hand movements 
responding in real time to their own right hand movements. In the asynchronous condition, 3-
second delay was interposed between the participant’s real hand and the virtual hand 
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movements. The order of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions was counterbalanced 
across participants, who performed both in two different days.  
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to complete a 12-statements 
questionnaire to assess the ownership and agency sensed over the 3D virtual hand, using a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). Three statements 
referred to the feeling of ownership, and three statements described sensations related to 
agency. The remaining six statements served as control for suggestibility, task compliance and 
expectancy effect, and were adapted from previous studies (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; 
2014)Three statements served as control for ownership and three for agency (See Table 5.1).  
 
Category 
Ownership 
I felt as if I was looking at my own hand 
I felt as if the virtual hand was part of my body  
I felt as if the virtual hand was my hand 
Ownership control 
It seems as if I had more than one right hand 
It felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as if my right hand had 
disappeared  
I felt as my real hand was turning virtually  
Agency 
I felt as if I could cause movements of the virtual hand 
I felt as if I could control movements of the virtual hand  
The virtual hand was obeying my will and I can make it move just 
like I want it  
Agency control 
I felt as if the virtual hand was controlling my will   
It seemed as if the virtual hand had a will of its own  
I felt as if the virtual hand was controlling me 
        Table 5.1 Statements used in the questionnaire  
 
5.2.2 Results 
 
For each task, a repeated measure ANOVA was performed on the mean distances, with 
Timing (Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions) and Session (Pre and Post leap motion 
training) as within-subject factors. Significant interactions were analysed by Newman-Keuls 
post-hoc test.  
In the Forearm bisection task, the ANOVA showed a main effect of Session (F1,23 = 12.38; p < 
.005; η2p = .34) and, crucially, a significant  interaction between Timing and Session (F1,23 = 
10.72; p < .005; η2p = .31). Post hoc tests indicated that the interaction was driven by the fact  
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that, following leap motion synchronous training, participants indicated the subjective forearm 
midpoint more distally as compared to the pre-training (214 vs. 233 mm; p < .001). 
 
          
 
                    
 
Figure 5.3. Effects of leap motion training with the virtual hand presented farther forward 
than actual hand location (A) Effects of leap motion training on forearm bisections. The graph shows the 
statistical comparison of mean distances from the elbow to the indicated forearm midpoint (in mm) as a 
function of Timing condition (Synchronous and Asynchronous leap motion training) and Session (Pre and 
Post leap motion training). Asterisk indicates a significant difference in forearm bisections between pre and 
post leap motion synchronous training. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. (B) Effects of leap 
motion training on the Reaching distance estimation task. The graph shows the average reaching distance (in 
mm) as a function of the Timing condition (Synchronous and Asynchronous leap motion training) and 
Session (Pre and Post leap motion training). Asterisk indicates a significant difference in the reaching 
judgments between pre and post synchronous leap motion training. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
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In contrast, there was no significant difference in the subjective midpoint estimates between 
pre and post leap motion asynchronous training (212 vs. 217 mm; p = .23; See Figure 5.3A). 
In the Reaching distance estimation task, the ANOVA revealed an interaction between Timing 
and Session (F1,23 = 9.07; p < .05; η2p = .28). Post hoc test showed that the reaching distance 
was significantly extended after, as compared to before, the leap motion synchronous training 
(266 vs. 279 mm; p < .01). In contrast, the mean reaching distance was not significantly 
different between pre and post leap motion asynchronous training (265 vs. 259 mm; p = .23; 
See Figure 5.3B). 
Since peripersonal space and body schema are not completely interdependent 
constructs, as they can dissociate in some circumstances (Bassolino et al., 2014), we tested 
whether the observed effect in one task predicted the observed effect in the other task. Thus, 
we conducted an ANCOVA on the forearm midpoint estimates prior and following 
synchronous training, with Session (Pre and Post) as a within factor. To control for the 
influence of peripersonal space, we entered the difference between post and pre reaching 
distance in the synchronous condition as a covariate in the analysis. Crucially, the difference in 
forearm midpoint estimates between pre and post synchronous training remained significant, 
even when controlling for the effect on peripersonal space (F1,22 = 22,92 ; p <.00005 ; η2p=.51), 
thereby suggesting some degree of functional separation between body schema and 
peripersonal space representation. 
In order to assess the sense of agency and ownership for the virtual hand, we computed a mean 
score from each of the three ownership statements, and a mean score from the three agency 
statements. Similarly, we computed average scores of the corresponding control statements. In 
this way, four single scores were computed: “Ownership”;  “Agency”; “Ownership control” and 
“Agency control”.  We interpreted a category as rated positively, or affirmed, when the average 
score was equal or higher than +1, indicating that at group level, the participants affirmed the 
experience of ownership or agency (this criterion has been used before  (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012;2014; Ehrsson et al., 2004). Because Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the questionnaire 
data were not normally distributed (p > .05), we used the non-parametric Wilcoxon test for 
pairwise comparisons.  
The average score was higher than +1 only for “Agency” in the synchronous condition 
(Average: 2.4). The “Agency” category in the synchronous condition was significantly different 
from its control category (“Agency control”, Z = -4.345; p < .0001), and from “Agency” in the 
asynchronous condition (Z= -3.526; p < .001), suggesting that participants experienced agency 
only during the training in which their own hand’s and virtual hand’s movements were 
synchronized (See Figure 5.4). Moreover, in the synchronous condition, there was also a 
significant difference between agency and ownership ratings (Z= -3.86; p < .001), indicating 
that participants affirmed more strongly agency statements than ownership statements. 
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Although “Ownership” category was not positively affirmed (Average: 0.71) in the synchronous 
condition, it was significantly different  both from its control category (Z = -3.21 ; p < .005 ) 
and from “Ownership” in the asynchronous condition (Z = -3.77; p<.005).  
 
Figure  5.4. Subjective ratings of agency and ownership of the virtual far hand. The 
graph shows the average ownership, ownership control, agency, agency control ratings on a 7-point 
Likert scale as a function of the Timing condition (Synchronous and Asynchronous). Sense of 
agency was present in the Synchronous condition (>1). In contrast, sense of ownership was not 
positively affirmed. Asterisk indicates that agency category score (the mean of the three statements 
related to agency) was significantly greater than its respective control category in the synchronous 
condition, and greater in the synchronous than asynchronous condition. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Finally, we examined the influence of agency and ownership ratings on the effects found on 
body schema and peripersonal space after synchronous training. Thus, two ANCOVAs for each 
task were performed with Session (pre and post) as within-subjects factor. To control for the 
influence of the agency and ownership sensed for the virtual hand, we entered first “Agency” 
and then “Ownership” category scores as covariates in the analyses. In the Forearm bisection 
task and Reaching distance task, the difference between pre and post synchronous training in 
the forearm midpoint (F1,22= 1,63 ; p = .21; η2p = .070), and reaching distance estimates (F1,22 = 
6.04 ; p <.05 ;  η2p=.21), respectively, were no longer significant after controlling for the 
“Agency” ratings. By contrast, the difference between pre and post forearm midpoint estimates  
(F1,22 = 10.86 p<.005; η2p = .331), and between pre and post reaching distances (F1,22 = 0.51 ; p 
= .48 ;  η2p = .23), remained significant even after controlling for the influence of the 
“Ownership” scores, thereby suggesting that sense of agency, rather than ownership, plays a 
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critical role in mediating the effect of synchronous training on body schema and peripersonal 
space representations.  
In sum, the main purpose of the Experiment 1 was to investigate whether the sensorimotor 
representation of the body can be modulated by manipulating agency sensed over an external 
object. The results showed that participants experienced agency, explicitly assessed through a 
questionnaire, over a virtual hand that moved synchronously with their own hand movements. 
Crucially, experiencing agency for the virtual hand, projected in far space, significantly 
extended the representation of the arm. On the contrary, when virtual hand and participants’ 
hand movements were asynchronous, and participants did not report any sense of agency at 
the questionnaire, no significant modulation of the body schema was found. Moreover, as 
hypothesized, peripersonal space followed the same trend of results. Participants showed a 
significant enlargement of peripersonal space, as assed by the reaching distance estimation 
task, only in the synchronous condition, when they reported agency over the virtual hand. In 
contrast, after asynchronous condition, participants did not affirm agency for the virtual hand 
and any significant modulation of peripersonal space was found. Rather, our results suggest 
that body schema and peripersonal space are sensitive to the experience of controlling the 
course of events in space thought one’s own action. When participants controlled the virtual 
hand by moving their own hand, limb movements and their outcomes occurred synchronously 
but in different spatial positions. We speculate that the spatial mismatch between intentional 
movements and outcomes leads to the updating of the dimension of both body schema and 
peripersonal space. To further test this hypothesis we conducted Experiment 2 aimed to reveal 
the opposite modulation of Experiment 1, presenting the virtual hand behind the participant’s 
real hand, and closer to the subjects’ body than the real hand. Accordingly, when outcomes of 
the action are closer to the body than the action itself, we should find a contraction of both 
body schema and peripersonal space. 
 
5.3 Experiment 2  
 
5.3.1 Methods 
 
Participants 
A new sample of twenty-four participants (12 females), volunteered for the study (age 
range = 20-28; mean age = 22.37). Participants were naive to the experimental hypothesis and 
had no self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric disease. All but two were right-
handed, as assed by Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. They provided written informed 
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consent to participate in the experiment. All methods, approved by the Ethical Committee of 
the University of Bologna, were conducted in accordance with the 2008 Helsinki Declaration.  
Procedure 
In Experiment 2, participants performed the Forearm bisection task, to assess body 
schema modulation, and the Reaching distance estimation task, to assess peripersonal space, 
before and after 15 minutes of synchronous and asynchronous leap motion training to 
modulate sense of agency for the 3D virtual hand. 
The experimental procedure was identical of Experiment 1, with the exception of the distance 
at which the virtual hand was presented during the training. The PC screen, in which the 
virtual hand was projected, was placed at approximately 14 cm from the participant’s sternum. 
Also in Experiment 2, participants performed both synchronous and asynchronous training. 
The order of two timing conditions was counterbalanced across participants, who performed 
both in two different days. At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to 
complete a 12-statements questionnaire to assess the ownership and agency experienced in 
relation to the 3D virtual hand. 
5.3.2 Results  
 
In the Forearm bisection task, an ANOVA with Timing (Synchronous and 
Asynchronous conditions) and Session (Pre and Post leap motion training) as within-subjects 
factors, showed a main effect of Session (F1,23 = 11.45; p < .003; η2p = .33) and, crucially, a 
significant interaction between Timing and Session (F1,23 = 18.65; p < .0003; η2p = .44). Post 
hoc tests indicated that the interaction was driven by the fact that, following leap motion 
synchronous training, participants indicated the subjective forearm midpoint more proximally 
as compared to the pre-training (220 vs. 198 mm; p < .0003). In contrast, there was no 
significant difference in the subjective midpoint estimates between pre and post leap motion 
asynchronous training (216 vs. 219 mm; p = .44; See Figure 5.5A). 
In the Reaching distance estimation task, the ANOVA revealed an interaction between Timing 
and Session (F1,23= 23.30; p < .0001; η2p = .50). Post hoc test showed that the reaching distance 
was significantly reduced after as compared to before leap motion synchronous training (226 
vs. 250 mm; p < .0001). In contrast, the mean reaching distance was not significantly different 
between post and pre leap motion asynchronous training (245 vs. 245 mm; p = .95; See Figure 
5.5B).  
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Figure. 5.5. Effects of leap motion training with the virtual hand presented closer to 
the participants than actual hand location (A) Effects of leap motion training on Forearm 
bisections. The graph shows the statistical comparison of mean distances from the elbow to the 
indicated forearm midpoint (in mm) as a function of the Timing condition (Synchronous and 
Asynchronous leap motion training) and Session (Pre and Post Leap motion training). Asterisk 
indicates a significant difference in forearm bisections between pre and post leap motion 
synchronous training. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
(B) Effects of leap motion training on the Reaching distance estimation task. The graph shows the 
average reaching distance (in mm) as a function of the of the Timing condition (Synchronous and 
Asynchronous leap motion training) and Session (Pre and Post Leap motion training). Asterisk 
indicates a significant difference in the reaching judgments between pre and post synchronous leap 
motion training. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
Also for the Experiment 2, we tested whether the observed effect on reaching space predicted 
the observed effect on the body schema. We performed an ANCOVA on the forearm midpoint 
with Session (Pre vs. Post) as within-subjects factor and the difference between post and pre 
reaching distance in the synchronous condition, as a covariate. Crucially, also in Experiment 2, 
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there was still a significant difference in the subjective midpoint estimates between pre and 
post synchronous training (F1,23 = .310 ; p <.05 ; η2p=.310), even after taking into account the 
effect on the reaching space as a covariate 
Questionnaire data, analysed as in Experiment 1, showed that the average score was higher 
than +1 only for “Agency” in the synchronous condition (Average: 2.09). The “Agency” 
category in the synchronous condition was significantly different from its control category 
(“Agency control”, Z = - 4.20; p < .00001) and from “asynchronous Agency” (Z = -4.11; p < 
.00001), suggesting that participants experienced agency only during the training in which 
their own hand’s and virtual hand’s movements were synchronous (See Figure 5.6). Moreover, 
in the synchronous condition, there was also a significant difference between “Agency” and 
“Ownership” ratings (Z = -4.28; p < .0001), indicating that participants affirmed more strongly 
agency statements than ownership statements.   
 
  
 
Figure 5.6. Subjective ratings of agency and ownership of the virtual near hand. The 
graph shows the average ownership, ownership control, agency, agency control ratings on a 7-point 
Likert scale as a function of the Timing condition (Synchronous and Asynchronous). Sense of 
agency was present in the Synchronous condition (>1). In contrast, sense of ownership was not 
positively affirmed. Asterisk indicates that agency category score (the mean of the three statements 
related to agency) was significantly greater than its respective control category in the synchronous 
condition and grater in the synchronous than asynchronous condition. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
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Also this time, “Ownership” category was not positively affirmed (Average: - 0.02) in the 
synchronous condition, but it was significantly different both from its control category (Z = -
2.02 ; p =0.04 ) and from “Ownership” in the asynchronous condition (Z = -3.28; p<.05).  
Thus, also in the Experiment 2, we examined the influence of “Agency” and “Ownership” 
ratings on body schema and peripersonal space changes after synchronous training with a 
virtual hand. Thus, we performed two ANCOVAs for each task, with Session (pre and post) as 
within-subjects factor. We entered first “Agency” and then “Ownership” category scores as 
covariates in the analysis. 
As in Experiment 1, in the Forearm bisection task and Reaching distance estimation task, the 
difference between pre and post synchronous training in the forearm midpoint (F1,22= 0.529 ; p 
= .47; η2p = .023), and in the reaching distances (F1,22 = 2.84 ; p = .10 ;  η2p = .11), respectively, 
failed to reach significance after controlling for the “Agency” scores. By contrast, the difference 
between pre and post forearm midpoint estimates  (F1,22 = 17.52 p<.0005; η2p = .44), and 
between pre and post reaching distances (F1,22 = 24,95 ; p < .005 ;  η2p = .51), remained 
significant even after controlling for the influence of the “Ownership” scores. 
Experiment 2 shows that it is possible to induce a contraction of both body schema and 
peripersonal space, presenting the virtual hand, over which participants experienced agency, 
behind their real hand. After experiencing agency for the virtual hand, participants indicated 
their forearm midpoint more proximally, as if their arm was shorter. In the same way, 
participants showed a significant reduction of peripersonal space, as assed by the Reaching 
distance estimation task, only in the synchronous condition, when they reported agency over 
the virtual hand. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
In the present study, we induced changes in the extent of body schema and peripersonal 
space by manipulating the sense of agency over an external object. As recently suggested, to 
retain a vivid sense of agency, three conditions need to occur: first an internal volition that 
provides an experience of intentional action, second the occurrence of a body movement and 
third the external outcome of the action (Khalighinejad & Haggard, 2016). Humans, and other 
primates, can learn and exploit new intention-movements-outcome associations, transferring a 
sense of agency from one’s own limb to objects or events, external to the body (Kalckert 
&Ehrsson, 2012;2014; Caspar et al.,2015; Moore et al.,2011; Iriki et al.,2001; Heyes, 2012). 
Experiment 1 showed that the sense of agency for a virtual hand projected in the far space 
extends both the body schema and peripersonal space, reproducing plastic modulations 
similar to those classically found after tool use. These results suggest that body schema and 
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peripersonal space are concurrently modulated when agents establish new intention-
movements-outcome associations to control events in the external environment through one’s 
own actions. Experiment 2 further supported this hypothesis by revealing, a concurrent 
contraction of both body schema and peripersonal space in healthy participants, when the 
virtual hand was presented closer to the body than their real hand. Moreover, participants, at 
the group level, did not rate positively ownership statements for the virtual hand. On the 
contrary, agency statements were strongly affirmed. This is in line with previous work 
(Kalckert &Ehrsson, 2012;2014; Caspar et al., 2016) showing that sense of agency is partially 
dissociable from body ownership, and it is possible to retain a sense of agency over an external 
object without necessarily perceive it as belonging to our body. In Kalckert and Ehrsson 
(2012;2014), for instance, the dissociation between body ownership and agency was 
investigated by using a modified version of the rubber hand illusion. In the classical rubber 
hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), touching a fake hand in synchrony with participant’s 
hand induces participants to perceive the rubber hand as part of their body. In Kalckert and 
Ehrsson version (2012,2014), the participant’s index finger was connected to the rubber hand’s 
finger by a wooden stick. Thus, when participant moved his or her index finger, the rubber 
hand’s finger moved synchronously with respect to the participant’s movement. Crucially, 
when the rubber hand was placed in far location, or in an anatomical incongruent position 
with respect to the participant’s real hand, participants still reported a clear feeling of agency 
for the fake hand, even if they did not have anymore the illusion that the fake hand belonged to 
their body, as in the classical rubber hand illusion. Indeed, different studies with the rubber 
hand illusion have showed that the strength of the ownership illusion is constrained by the 
anatomical characteristic and spatial reference frames of the limb (Lloyd, 2007; Makin et al., 
2008; Preston, 2013). Note, however, that since in the current study we do not have implicit 
physiological measure of body ownership, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that 
participants did not experience ownership for the virtual hand. In fact, a significant difference 
in ownership ratings was found between synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
Nevertheless, our findings show that, when agency ratings were added as covariates, pre and 
post synchronous training differences in forearm midpoint and reaching distance estimates 
were no longer apparent, providing support in favour of our hypothesis that the sense of 
agency, rather than the sense of ownership, plays a major role in the construction of body 
schema and peripersonal space representations. 
This conclusion is in line with a relatively recent study demonstrating that the (illusory) 
ownership of a long or short arm per se is not enough to rescale distances in space 
(Linkenauger et al., 2015). Linkenauger et al. (2015), by using virtual reality technology, 
induced in participants the illusion of having a long or short virtual arm. They found that the 
distances to targets appeared closer when their virtual arm was long, compared to when their 
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virtual arm was short, but only following a reaching experience. Crucially, modulations in 
space perception only occurred after participants actively performed reaching movements, 
thereby receiving sensory feedback from those movements.  
This finding nicely fits with the results of present study. In both experiments, indeed, body 
schema and peripersonal space were updated when the consequences of the action occurred 
synchronously with participant’s movements, but in a different spatial position than expected, 
based on the actual hand position. This spatial mismatch caused a modulation in body schema 
and peripersonal space, suggesting that these representations emerge from the precise and 
dynamic mapping between intentional body movements and their outcomes in space.  It is 
therefore plausible to hypothesize that modulations of body schema and peripersonal space 
similar to those observed here could be found when agents control a virtual or physical object 
that is not hand-shaped, or not related to the body at all. This is an interesting experimental 
question that future studies could address.    
Body schema provides proprioceptive and somatosensory information about the body 
morphology during action planning and execution. Theories of motor control and agency 
suggest that the brain uses internal models and representations to ensure accurate control of 
movement (Wolpert et al., 2001). According to these views, when a motor command is issued, 
a “forward model” (or “internal predictive model”) of the moving body estimates the sensory 
consequence of the action (Blakemore et al., 2000). Sensory information about the body and 
the environment is then compared with the actual sensory feedback of the action. The result of 
this comparison is known as prediction error. It is possible to assume that when intentional 
body movements and their consequences occur synchronously but in different spatial 
positions, a prediction error is generated. Body schema updating, therefore, reflects the need 
to achieve control over the body (i.e. an effector) and the environment, minimizing prediction 
error (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2013).  
It has been theorized and empirically demonstrated, indeed, that forward models predict 
similar sensory consequences for actions involving a tool, and natural hand movements. In a 
recent study, it has been found that the predictive attenuation of touch, observed when people 
touch their hand with the other, is also observed for touches applied with a hand-held tool 
(Kilteni & Ehrsson, 2017). Thus, it is possible to assume that the forward model takes into 
account in its predictions not the location of a body part per se but rather the location of the 
current effector, i.e. the tip of the tool during tool use in the aforementioned study or, in our 
case, a virtual object controlled at distance.   
Likewise, peripersonal space is fundamentally a working space used to compute arm and 
nearby objects positions in order to plan and execute actions. This sector of space is coded by 
multisensory neurons in the fronto-parietal areas with a tactile receptive field centred on 
different body parts and a visual and\or an auditory receptive field (di Pellegrino & Ladavas, 
104 
 
2015), partially overlapping with the tactile one. Stimuli from different sensory modalities 
occurring on or close to the body, are integrated to provide a working space to act on nearby 
objects (i.e., peripersonal space). In the present study, like body schema, peripersonal space 
size was updated when hand movements and visual stimuli occurred synchronously but in 
different spatial positions.  
Incidentally, although we highlighted that body schema and peripersonal space show similar 
plastic effects, we do not claim that they are completely overlapping functional constructs. 
Indeed, after controlling for the influence of training on peripersonal space, modulations of 
body schema were still evident. Together with previous evidence (Bassolino et al., 2015), this 
suggests that plastic changes of body schema and peripersonal space rely, at least in part, on 
separate mechanisms.  
The current findings on peripersonal space are in agreement with previous evidence showing 
an extension of peripersonal space by using synchronous audio tactile stimuli. Specifically,  
Serino et al. (2015) found that peripersonal space was enlarged after synchronous audio-tactile 
training, in which hand-tactile stimuli and auditory-far stimuli were simultaneously presented. 
According to Serino et al.(2015) multisensory areas, capturing the synchronicity between the 
tactile stimulus at the hand and an auditory (or visual) stimulus in the far space, associated the 
two stimuli, as if they occurred from a functionally equivalent sector of space. However, in 
Serino et al.(2015), participants passively received tactile stimuli on their hand, whereas in the 
present study participants actively moved their hand, receiving proprioceptive information, 
and simultaneously perceived a visual stimulus that synchronously responded to their 
movements in a different position. The current study, therefore, highlights the importance of 
intentional action to actively create associations between different stimuli occurring in space. 
The mere occurrence of proprioceptive and visual stimuli per se, indeed, is not sufficient to 
induce changes in body schema and peripersonal space, as demonstrated by the absence of 
effects in the asynchronous condition. Rather, these changes occur only when the visual 
stimulus movements followed closely hand movements, i.e., in a strict temporal contiguity 
(synchronous condition), causing the emergence of a sense of agency over the external event.  
It is well known, indeed, that sense of agency depends on processes of temporal associations 
between an action and its effect. It is possible that in Serino et al.(2015) participants developed 
an implicit sense of agency for the far auditory outcomes, following the audio-tactile training. 
However, this possibility was not explored in their study.  
To sum up, collectively Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggest that the experience of 
controlling external events through one’s own actions is crucial for determining both body 
schema and peripersonal space extent.  This finding opens a new venue into the interpretation 
of the relationship between body schema, peripersonal space and action. However, future 
research is needed to understand what are the precise neurocognitive computations involved 
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in controlling an external object, and dynamically updating space and body representations. 
These findings could have several implications in the field of brain-machine interfaces 
(Marchesotti et al., 2017; Lebedev & Nicolelis, 2017) that enable, trough real time decoding of 
neural signals, the control of external devices, from robotic arms to virtual avatars. 
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Outlooks 
 
 “Into our mental lives there entered a dramatic quality of open-endedness, an essentially 
unlimited extensibility, as compared with a very palpable limitedness in other species. 
Concepts in the brains of humans acquired the property that they could get rolled together 
with other concepts into larger packets, and any such larger packet could then become a new 
concept in its own right. In other words, concepts could nest inside each other hierarchically, 
and such nesting could go on to arbitrary degrees. This reminds me — and I do not think it is 
a pure coincidence — of the huge difference, in video feedback, between an infinite corridor 
and a truncated one.” 
Douglas Hofstadter (2007)  
 
In the incipit of the thesis, I said that the self is a hierarchical construct containing both 
low level sensorimotor representations and social and interpersonal representations. The 
studies in this thesis showed a dynamic interaction between bodily self representation and 
sociocognitive processes. The first study, in Chapter II, showed that the illusion of having an 
invisible body reduces the social interpersonal space without affecting the reaching space. In a 
control experiment, the active use of a tool extended the perceived reaching space without 
affecting social interpersonal space. We discussed that the experience of invisibility may 
induce participants to feel themselves more protected and shielded during the confederate’s 
approach,  leading to a contraction of the space in which participants felt most comfortable 
with the other proximity. Thus, knowing whether one is the recipient of a gaze can be decisive 
in a social interaction and experiencing one’s own body as invisible may affect the social 
consequences of being looked at. In particular, the experience of invisibility may affect the 
manner in which the brain processes the attention of others toward the self (Guterstam et al., 
2015). The study in Chapter III, demonstrated that this could happen because the experience 
of invisibility directly affect the perception of gaze, reducing the range of gaze directions over 
which participants perceived to be looked at. Thus, the perceived body appearance seems to 
play a key role in the  interpersonal attitudes and beliefs.  The dynamic interaction between 
bodily self and interpersonal attitude is further supported by the study in Chapter IV in which 
a manipulation in body height revealed a dissociation in social interpersonal and action 
peripersonal space.  Indeed, body size has an impact both in the social domain and in the 
action programming. In the social domain, body size and height  have been  associated with 
social status and dominance in both animals and humans. Also, a change in body height affect  
the sensorimotor representation of participant’s arm length, the so called body schema. The 
term body schema refers to a sensorimotor representation of the body morphology used for 
planning and executing body movements. Thus an illusory change in body height updated the 
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representation of  participants’ arm length, generating new sensorimotor predictions 
consistent with the new arm representation. This led to an extension of peripersonal space 
when participants experienced an illusory ownership for a tall body. At the same time, the 
change in body height may lead participants to feel themselves as more dominant (tall body) or 
less dominant (short body) in the dyadic interaction with the confederate, leading to an 
enlargement or contraction of interpersonal space. Collectively these data suggest that while 
the perceived body appearance plays a key role in emotional and social processing, the body 
schema is an implicit body representation mainly involved in estimating the sensory 
consequence of the action (Chapter V). The study presented in Chapter V, indeed, showed that 
the body schema, concurrently to the peripersonal space, is modulated when agents establish 
new intention-movements outcome associations to control events in the external environment 
through one’s own action. 
Overall these data point toward the idea that the self consists of a layer structure. In this  
hierarchical layered structure, each layer is highly dynamic and extremely plastic. Moreover, 
there may be also cross-layer dynamics that operate along different categories of the self. These 
cross-layer dynamics may be, in part, responsible for both the integrity of the categories and 
the ambiguity across different categories of self. Future researches are needed to explain the 
neural and computational principles underlying the dynamic interactions between low level 
body representation and high level socio cognitive representation of the self.  
A proposal could be that a unique characteristic or computational architecture is  
common to the dynamical processes of each layer. Recently, predictive coding model and free 
energy principle have emerged as a prominent underlying theories of cortical function to 
explain brain processes underlying perception and action. The starting premise of the free 
energy principle is that  self-organizing organisms have to resist a natural tendency towards 
disorder in a constantly changing environment. To do so, the brain avoids surprise associated 
with  sensory states (Friston, 2010), which in turn will result in a desired state where the world 
is highly predictable. Thus, the brain works as an inference machine that is trying to optimize 
its own model of the world, by actively predicting the causes of its sensory input  (Friston, 
2005). In other words, the brain interprets sensory information maintaining probabilistic 
hypothesis (“generative model”) of the hidden causes of sensory input. In this model any 
mismatch between predicted and actual sensory inputs generates a prediction error. However, 
cause organisms must maintain themselves in a narrow range of desirable state, prediction 
errors must be minimized (Brown & Brüne, 2012). In order to “explain away” the prediction 
error, the brain constantly update its predictions by means of sensory input. At  the biological 
level the free energy framework is biologically constrained by the so-called ‘predictive coding’ 
models (Clark, 2013). According to the predictive coding model, there is constant filtering of 
sensations by top-down (backward or descending) predictions and a parallel updating of the 
108 
 
latter based on prediction error that referred to the level above by bottom-up (forward or 
ascending) connections. Thus, the result is that minimisation of prediction errors is ensured  
by recurrent message passing among hierarchical level of cortical systems, so that various 
neural subsystems at different hierarchical levels minimize uncertainty about incoming 
information by generating a prediction and responding to errors (Hohwy, 2012).  
Recently this framework was extended to the self awareness to explain the malleability 
of the bodily self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013, 2015). Indeed, as 
biological organisms are embodied in the environment, the “world- model” of a self-organizing 
system also has to include the sensory apparatus (the body) of the organism, whereby the self 
is perceived as a result of dynamic self modelling mechanisms (Limanowski & Blankenburg, 
2013). Thus, also one’s own body is processed as most likely to be “me”. The likelihood that 
one’s own body is “me” is created by the combination of bottom up prediction error generated 
in unimodal sensory area that are explained away at higher levels of hierarchy (i.e. 
multisensory area) by top down “predictions” about the body (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014).  In the 
case of bodily illusion, for instance the rubber hand, the somatosensory experience of touch on 
one’s own hand that is temporally congruent with the vision  of touch on the fake hand 
generates a prediction error from unimodal sensory system. This prediction error will be 
explained away by top down effects from multisensory areas. In turn, perceptual learning 
process will update representations of one’s appearance, such that the probabilistic 
representation of one’s own body is different after synchronous multisensory stimulation.  
Future studies could investigate whether the predictive coding model can be adapted 
also to others categories of self, from the very basic sensorimotor representation of the body 
(i.e. body schema) to  the interpersonal or social self, explaining not only their internal 
plasticity but also their mutual dynamics. For instance, the study in  Chapter V found that body 
schema and peripersonal space were updated when the consequences of the action occurred 
synchronously with participant’s movements, but in a different spatial position than expected, 
based on the actual hand position. This spatial mismatch caused a modulation in body schema 
and peripersonal space, suggesting that these derive from the precise and dynamic mapping 
between intentional body movements and their outcomes in space. Now, I speculated that 
these  data are compatible with the predictive coding model. Indeed, when participants moved 
their arm and watched the virtual hand responding synchronously but in different spatial 
positions, they generated a prediction error about the position of their hand and the extension 
of reachable space. To minimize the prediction error, the brain updates its initial model about 
the position of the limb in space, modulating both the sensorimotor representation of the arm 
length and the extent of peripersonal space.  
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The existence of predictions and prediction errors also during an individual’s social 
interaction, may be empirically and intuitively plausible. An implicit expectation about the 
range of possible responses usually arises in situations in which one individual greets another.    
At the same time, given the focus of predictive coding on complementary hierarchical top-
down and bottom up processes, it’s possible that different layers or levels of self representation 
continuously interact and when a prediction error is left unexplained at one level, it needs to be 
processed and eliminated at a higher level of the hierarchy, by updating the priors (attitudes 
and beliefs)  held about the self.  Thus, the prediction error generated in one layer may result 
in an updating of that layer but also in adjacent layers.   
As previously recalled, several studies showed that people have a prior expectation that other 
person gaze or attention is directed toward them (Mareschal et al., 2013) [an expectation that 
could be particularly enhanced in some pathological conditions, such as schizophrenia or 
social phobia (Jun et al.,2013)].  In studies presented in Chapters II and III, we induced in 
participants a change in low level perceptual representation of one’s own body, that is the 
illusion of having an invisible body or face.  Once that the body appearance is updated, this can 
create other errors further up in the processing hierarchy. Indeed, the information that one’s 
own body is invisible, may conflict with more higher order representations of oneself and the 
other. In our case, the experience of invisibility may conflict with  the prior expectation that 
other attention or gaze is directed toward one’s own body. Thus, participants updated their 
prior expectation, reducing the cone of gaze or feeling less discomfort to the other approach.      
Moreover, futures researches could investigate the neural basis and the cortical areas 
involved in these cross layer dynamics. As discussed in Chapter I, the bodily self is supported 
by a fronto-parietal system, involving mainly the premotor cortex and the posterior parietal 
cortex. At the same time, the cortical midline structure seems to support social and 
psychological aspects of the mental self. It’s possible that several cortical areas may play a 
unique role in the coordination of functioning across multiple layers. For instance, it has been 
shown the existence of direct connections between the precuneus (major node of the cortical 
midline structure) and the inferior parietal lobe (the posterior componenent of the fronto 
parietal system), suggesting that this is one pathway by which such interactions might occur 
(Uddin et al., 2007). On the other hand, it has been proposed that the right lateral prefrontal 
cortex may have a role in resolving conflicts at different layers.  This region, for instance, is 
activated in detecting sensory-feedback errors during  an action (Fink et al., 1999) or when 
agency-attribution judgment (i.e., self or other) is required. Moreover, this region responds to 
behavior that violates social norms (i.e., error in the interpersonal layer) (Wakusawa et al., 
2009) or when there are discrepancies between a subject’s self-evaluation and the evaluation 
by others. Despite the general appeal that predictive coding models have for researches in the 
field of body and self awareness, more direct empirical support has to be generated. The results 
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of this thesis can only be taken as a first preliminary evidence to better understand the 
hierarchical and dynamical structure of the self.  Such challenge should and will be addressed 
in the near future.  
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